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ABSTRACT
This article aims at a careful reconstruction of what has been called
America’s first great constitutional controversy—the 1791 debate over Al-
exander Hamilton’s Bank of the United States. This article reviews this de-
bate both at the congressional level and within the executive branch. The
debate over the bank led to the articulation of theories of constitutional
interpretation that are with us still. On the one hand, we find theories of
interpretation that stress implied constitutional powers and an expansive
role for the federal government. On the other hand, we encounter theories of
interpretation that emphasize limited federal authority and a preeminent role
for the states. These debates included not only well known figures such as
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, but other
leading figures of the time less well known today, such as Fisher Ames,
Theodore Sedgwick, and Elbridge Gerry.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article has a single major focus. It aims at a careful reconstruc-
tion of what has been called America’s “first great constitutional contro-
versy”1—the 1791 debate over Alexander Hamilton’s Bank of the United
States. The controversy unfolded over three stages. It commenced when
Alexander Hamilton, who was George Washington’s Secretary of the Trea-
sury, proposed that Congress create the Bank as one part of his larger pro-
gram for national economic integration and renewal.
1. Stephen G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Arguments for Overruling
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 334
(2005); Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sover-
eignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1739 (2007).
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In his proposal to Congress, Hamilton did not reference the Constitu-
tion at all. He made the case for the Bank entirely on the grounds of public
policy. It would benefit America’s commercial classes and thereby benefit
the economy as a whole if the United States had a Bank of the sort that
could be found in some European capitals. His sources for this claim in-
cluded the latest developments in banking theory and European experience.
One can infer from his silence on the matter that Hamilton must have
viewed the constitutional question as unproblematic.
Hamilton’s proposal, however, was immediately met with objections
over its constitutionality. These objections led to the commencement of
stage two of the controversy. A vigorous debate ensued in the House of
Representatives between James Madison and a small group of mostly
Southern House members, on one side, and, on the other side, a larger num-
ber of mostly Northern and Eastern Representatives, many of them allies of
Hamilton. The debate caused both sides to advance novel but important
theories concerning the application and interpretation of the Constitution.
The House and Senate both eventually enacted the Bill, but the contro-
versy was not yet concluded. It entered its third and final stage when Presi-
dent George Washington requested that three members of his cabinet brief
him on the Bank’s constitutionality. Washington plainly took his role as
constitutional interpreter seriously and thus he sought opinions on the
Bank’s constitutionality from Edmund Randolph, his Attorney General, his
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and from Alexander Hamilton. Having
satisfied his own scruples, Washington finally signed the legislation into
law.
A careful examination of the three stages of this controversy provides
an important window into how the Constitution was understood in its earli-
est years. Madison and his allies argued that the Constitution must be seen
primarily as a restraining document. It was meant to limit the federal gov-
ernment. Consisting as it did of carefully enumerated powers, Madison
maintained that Congress could not transgress these carefully-crafted
boundaries.
Hamilton and his allies, on the other hand, viewed the Constitution
principally as an empowering document. The Constitution was created and
ratified so as to preserve the Union from the chaos and disarray of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. Consistent with this history and purpose, the federal
government, they maintained, possessed broad and extensive powers to
build a powerful and unified nation.
In back of these theories was yet another layer of more fundamental
ideas about nationhood and sectionalism. Hamilton and his supporters
stressed national unity as the Constitution’s overarching goal, while
Madison, and at a later stage Jefferson, contended for the primacy of the
states. After careful deliberation, George Washington, himself a native Vir-
ginian, aligned with the Hamiltonian side of this debate.
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Throughout, this Article will be sensitive to historical context. And
that means chiefly that attention must be paid to the ways in which mem-
bers of Congress and the executive branch viewed themselves as constitu-
tional interpreters. It must be borne in mind that the debate over the Bank of
the United States occurred twelve years before the United States Supreme
Court handed down Marbury v. Madison.2 If we view the debate as the
participants would have seen it, we must acknowledge that they could not
have known whether a subsequent Supreme Court would claim for itself the
implied power of judicial review. In that context, Congress was defining for
itself what it meant to behave constitutionally, and the debate over the Bank
was very much a part of that self-definition.
Indeed, we must also note that the Congress that took up the question
of the Bank was the First Congress of the United States. Its work is now
revered and has been given near normative significance in some branches of
the law,3 but the question in the back of everyone’s mind at the time it met
and deliberated was nothing less than whether this experiment in unified
government would succeed.4 Thus it has been observed, concerning this
Congress, that “[h]ad it failed in its work, the United States as we know it
would not exist.”5 Still, the First Congress did not speak with one mind or
one voice. Even at this early date in American history, there were tensions
and fault lines already apparent,6 and the debate over the Bank helped to
reveal where some of those fault lines lay.
This Article is divided into four Parts and the conclusion. Part One will
examine the economic crisis of the 1780s, which provided impetus for the
formation of a tighter Union; Part Two will consider Hamilton’s “Report on
the Bank,” submitted to Congress in December 1790; Part Three will look
at the congressional debate on the subject of the Bank; while Part Four
reviews the debate George Washington provoked among his cabinet. Part
One is meant to provide needed background while Parts Two through Four
address each of the stages of the controversy over the Bank. The conclusion
will provide a synthetic review of the main themes of this Article in order to
come to a clearer understanding of the significance of this debate to consti-
tutional history and early conceptions of American nationhood.
Scholars have long recognized the importance of these events to our
understanding of the Constitution. Thus Robert Kaczorowski looked to the
debates over the First Bank of the United States to conclude that the Foun-
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See Michael Bhargava, The First Congress and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2006).
4. See CHRISTOPHER HOBSON, THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY: REVOLUTION, WAR AND TRANS-
FORMATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE 1776, at 58–73 (2015).
5. FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE WASH-
INGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 1 (2016).
6. JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 4–5 (1999).
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ders’ vision of federal powers and state/federal relations were more fluid
and flexible than is often asserted.7 Saikrishna Prakash finds in George
Washington’s instruction to Alexander Hamilton to respond to constitu-
tional objections to the Bank bill a precedent for claiming that the President
is affirmatively obliged to veto legislation he or she believes to be unconsti-
tutional.8 William Eskridge and John Frerejohn see the bill authorizing the
Bank of the United States as an early example of what they call a “super-
statute,” legislation so basic that it “become[s] axiomatic to a state’s funda-
mental law.”9
In an examination of the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve sys-
tem, Michael Wade Strong finds in the design and creation of the Bank of
the United States evidence for the important role centralized banking played
in the early American Republic.10 Taking as normative Thomas Jefferson’s
criticisms of the Bank, Congressman Ron Paul used the debate as a means
of criticizing what he understood to be federal overreach in monetary pol-
icy.11 Bruce F. Davie, considering the Bank from the perspective of Ameri-
can economic history, concluded that it helped “[lay] the foundation for a
highly successful economic policy.”12
In an important biographical study of Alexander Hamilton, James Wil-
lard Hurst found in his drafting and defense of the Bank bill evidence of his
“creativity” and his “alert[ness] to ground action in principles of choice that
reached beyond the occasion to determine the long run distribution of politi-
cal and economic power.”13 Judge Richard Arnold, writing about another
major actor in this debate, praised James Madison for his opposition to the
Bank and asserted that Madison’s objections to an expanded interpretation
of the necessary and proper clause have largely been vindicated.14
7. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sover-
eignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1017
(1997); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History and To It: An Impossible
Dream, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1663, 1667 (1997) (defending a dynamic interpretation of constitu-
tional history and seeing in congressional creation of the First Bank of the United States “the
political and constitutional decisions of all three branches of government”).
8. See Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 84 (2007).
9. William N. Eskridge & John Frerejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218 (2001);
see also id. at 1223–1224 (examining the constitutional and executive-branch debate on the
Bank).
10. Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan for a
More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. REV. 371, 372–375 (2001).
11. See Ron Paul, The Banks vs. the Constitution, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 467
(2010).
12. Bruce F. Davie, Monetizing the Post-Revolutionary American Economy: A Bicentennial
View of Hamilton’s Reports to the First Congress, 84 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N HELD UNDER
AUSPICES NAT’L TAX ASS’N 155, 155 (1991).
13. James Willard Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 486
(1978).
14. Richard S. Arnold, How James Madison Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 274 (1997).
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There are three important in-depth studies of the constitutional debate
over the Bank. Michael Coblenz revisited the debate over the Bank in the
context of contemporary constitutional controversies concerning the Af-
fordable Care Act.15 Coblenz in particular disagreed with the dissenting
opinions in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which
take as normative James Madison’s restrictive view of the powers of the
federal government.16 Coblenz conducted an exhaustive review of the con-
gressional debate over the Bank to demonstrate that members of the First
Congress, which included a number of participants at the Constitutional
Convention, did not treat Madison’s interpretation of federal powers as
binding on them.17 More generally, Coblenz concluded that congressional
creation of a Bank that became “the largest commercial enterprise in the
[United States] . . . [was] hardly an endorsement of limited government.”18
Less polemically, Benjamin Klubes conducted a careful study of the
Bank legislation’s progress through Congress.19 His article contains some
important insights. He notes, for instance, that even though eighteen mem-
bers of the Constitutional Convention participated in congressional deliber-
ations on the Bank bill, only two members of Congress—Elbridge Gerry
and James Madison—raised the issue of original intent, thus demonstrating
the unimportance of this concept to the founding generation.20 His article is
especially important for its careful reconstruction of Senate deliberations. In
the absence of official records of the Senate debate, Klubes combed the
correspondence of the senatorial participants for evidence of what was
said.21 He notes that support or opposition to the Bank broke strongly along
sectional lines—the South opposing the Bank, the North favoring it.22 A
large portion of Klubes’ article is devoted to understanding James
Madison’s constitutional thought, relating his performance at the Constitu-
tional Convention to his opposition to the Bank to conclude that he was a
nationalist who simultaneously believed in a federal government of strictly
limited and enumerated powers.23
Finally, David Currie, in a law review article and later in his magiste-
rial multi-volume study of the Constitution in the pre-Civil War Congress,
provided succinct but important reviews of the debate over the Bank. In his
article-length examination of the Constitution in the First Congress, he
15. Michael Coblenz, The Fight Goes On Forever: “Limited Government” and the First
Bank of the United States, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 391 (2015).
16. See id. at 391–392 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)).
17. Id. at 438–439.
18. Id. at 439.
19. Benjamin B. Klubes, The First Federal Congress and the First National Bank: A Case
Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 J. EARLY AM. REPUBLIC 19 (1990).
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 23–25.
22. Id. at 23, 28.
23. Id. at 31–35.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST104.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-APR-18 14:36
2018] AMERICA’S FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 111
presented the debate as one that featured two protagonists: Fisher Ames of
Massachusetts, who favored creation of the Bank, and James Madison, who
opposed it.24 Currie’s book largely reiterated the points he previously made
in his article.25
This Article builds on these previous studies but also differs from them
and expands upon them in significant ways. First, this Article pays particu-
lar attention to Alexander Hamilton’s justifications for the Bank of the
United States. As Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton was not a direct par-
ticipant in the congressional debate, and so his views have largely been
omitted from these earlier studies. Still, they are central to an understanding
of the controversy, since it was his proposal that initiated the congressional
discussions.
Second, this Article pays greater attention to context than previous
studies. In particular, the debate over the Bank was a proxy for a different
struggle—namely, the type of nation the participants wished to craft and
whether the Constitution might be interpreted so as to accommodate it. This
concern became especially prominent when the debate over the Bank
shifted from Congress to George Washington’s cabinet. Was the United
States to become Hamilton’s tightly-united commercial nation? Or was it to
be a loose federation of sovereign states, living out Thomas Jefferson’s
agrarian ideal?
Third, this Article recognizes and develops a tension that seems hard-
wired into the American constitutional tradition. Should the Constitution be
seen primarily as a restraining document—a text that limits and confines
the exercise of federal power to expressly enumerated goals and means? Or
should it be seen as an empowering document—a text that enables and en-
trusts the federal government with a broad range of powers to achieve so-
cially beneficial objectives?
Finally, this Article acknowledges as a major premise, the realization
that every constitutional controversy occurs within a particular moment in
time. To be sure, constitutional debates involve abstract arguments over
governmental design and purpose which take on lives of their own, espe-
cially in a system such as ours, which makes so much of precedent. Still,
these arguments are not deployed in a vacuum, but in order to win an argu-
ment. The context is always adversarial, the stakes are high, and the particu-
lar contingencies that come into play are historically non-repeatable. Hence,
careful attention to detail is required to understand the stakes of this debate.
But such attention shall be rewarded since the debate over the Bank was
among the very first arguments over the nature and purpose of the United
States and the Constitution that made it a nation.
24. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Con-
gress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 808–812 (1994).
25. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789–1801, at 78–80 (1997).
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I. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE 1780S
An “acute economic slump” is the way one recent writer on constitu-
tional history described the conditions prevailing in the 1780s.26 In truth,
the political circumstances of the era were chaotic and the fragmented polit-
ical environment of immediate post-Revolutionary America contributed
greatly to the “economic malaise.”27 It would be out of this malaise and
disintegration that calls for constitutional reform emerged in the latter
1780s.28
Politically, the new American nation, if one could call it that, remained
a radically decentralized project, with innumerable local parties and person-
ages each seeking to advance their own agendas;29 it was also nearly bank-
rupt, lacking even the means to satisfy its creditors.30 The Revolutionary
War currency known as the “Continental” had become worthless,31 the ef-
fort to create a central bank known as the “Bank of North America” faltered
because of political opposition,32 and state and regional interests engaged in
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies and practices harmful to other states and re-
gions.33 The intense economic parochialism of the age is evident in the fact
that “seven state governments revived their currency systems in the
1780s.”34 “Peace,” it has been said, “brought an end to war, but marked
only the beginning of America’s economic difficulties.”35
26. DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 20 (2012).
27. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND DE-
MOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 31 (2013); Linzy A. Brekke, The “Scourge of
Fashion”: Political Economy and the Politics of Consumption in the Early Republic, 3 EARLY
AM. STUD. 111, 123–132 (2005).
28. Marc C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional Frame-
work, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 950 (2006); Cristine de Clercy, Uncertainty and the General
Interest in the American Constitution: Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitu-
tional Choice, in BEHIND A VEIL OF IGNORANCE?: POWER AND UNCERTAINTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 85, 89 (Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob eds., 2015).
29. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1783–1789, at 5–6 (2015).
30. AARON N. COLEMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, 1765–1800, at 70 (2016).
31. THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER, A VIGOROUS SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE: MERCHANTS AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY PHILADELPHIA 240 (1986).
32. See CHARLES RAPPLEYE, ROBERT MORRIS: FINANCIER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
393–411 (2010); HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY 8 (2003).
33. Cathy Matson, The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, in 1 THE CAM-
BRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA 378–381 (Stanley L.
Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996); Mary M. Schweitzer, The Economic and Demo-
graphic Consequences of the American Revolution, in A COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 571 (Jack P. Greene & J. R. Pole eds., 2000).
34. Edwin J. Perkins, Conflicting Views on Fiat Currency: Britain and its North American
Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, in BANKS AND MONEY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
FINANCE IN HISTORY 8, 26 (Geoffrey Jones ed., 1991).
35. Brooke Hunter, The Prospect of Independent Americans: The Grain Trade and Economic
Development During the 1780s, 5 EXPLORATIONS EARLY AM. CULTURE 260, 260 (2001).
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Contributing to the centrifugal forces of the 1780s, was the reality that
economic activity differed quite substantially from one region to the next.
New England agriculture had gone through a crisis. “On the eve of the
Revolution, New England had the lowest per capita wealth and ‘the most
dismal outlook’ of any colonial region.”36 Matters grew even more difficult
after the Revolution.37 Farming had always been small-scale, and where
farming failed to provide an adequate living, one saw the rise of “diver-
sifi[cation] as farmers attempted to timber, fish, and cobble their way to
solvency.”38
The tenuousness of New England agricultural life led to vigorous,
class-based political conflict.39 Unrest had been percolating just beneath the
surface from the moment independence from Britain had been won,40
prompted by widespread insolvency and debt.41 It is little wonder then that
it was in western Massachusetts that Daniel Shays led his short-lived rebel-
lion in 1786 and 1787 against the creditor class.42
The mid-Atlantic states also struggled agriculturally. In these states,
production of wheat was diminished thanks to blight caused by the so-
called “Hessian fly.”43 One further finds in the literature statements such as
“the 1780s were a difficult decade in Delaware history [and] were charac-
terized by disturbed economic conditions.”44 Maryland, too, experienced
both sluggish economic development and weak population growth.45 Simi-
36. Winifred B. Rothenberg, The Emergence of a Capital Market in Rural Massachusetts,
1730–1838, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 781, 781 (1985) (quoting ALICE HANSON JONES, WEALTH OF A
NATION TO BE: THE AMERICAN COLONIES ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 141 (1980)).
37. Gregory Nobles, The Rise of Merchants In Rural Market Towns: A Case Study of Eight-
eenth-Century Northampton, Massachusetts, 24 J. SOC. HIST. 5, 12–13 (1990).
38. PETER DOBKIN HALL, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1700–1900: PRIVATE
INSTITUTIONS, ELITES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY 16 (1984).
39. VAN BECK HALL, POLITICS WITHOUT PARTIES: MASSACHUSETTS, 1780–1791, at 60–62
(1972).
40. See John L. Brooke, To the Quiet of the People: Revolutionary Settlements and Civil
Unrest in Western Massachusetts, 1774–1789, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 425, 443–462 (1989).
41. DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION
19–36 (1980).
42. A major study of the causes of Shays’s Rebellion answered the question: “What then
triggered Shays’s Rebellion? . . . The answer is twofold: the new state government—and its at-
tempt to enrich the few at the expense of the many.” LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION:
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 63 (2002); see also MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI, CUL-
TURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 165–177 (2011) (discussing the
class-based concept of liberty used by Shays and his supporters).
43. Brooke Hunter, Creative Destruction: The Forgotten Legacy of the Hessian Fly, in THE
ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 236, 252–253
(Cathy Matson ed., 2006).
44. Harold B. Hancock, Introduction to PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF THE
DELAWARE STATE, 1781–1792, at 13 (Claudia L. Bushman et al. eds., 1988).
45. Donald R. Adams, Jr., Prices and Wages in Maryland, 1750–1850, 46 J. ECON. HIST.
625, 636–637 (1986).
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larly, New Jersey underwent an “economic depression” in the mid-1780s
that had a “profound effect” on economic relations in that state.46
As in New England, the mid-Atlantic states also experienced political
unrest. One historian has recently described the “agrarian insurgency” in
mid-1780s Pennsylvania as “Wild Yankee resistance.”47 The region would
experience real economic development in the 1790s, but such growth was
as yet distant and uncertain.48
The Southern states, on the other hand, were already growing depen-
dent on a slave-based plantation system. This was a system, furthermore,
which enriched and empowered at least the upper strata of white society.
Virginia tobacco was a popular commodity not only among the other for-
mer colonies, but throughout much of Europe.49 Indeed, “tobacco exports
rose steadily during the 1780s.”50 Cotton was also establishing itself as a
leading commodity. Thus “[i]n the 1780s, South Carolina and Georgia grew
[two] million pounds of [long-staple cotton].”51 The invention of the cotton
gin in 1793 would greatly increase production, including the more profita-
ble short-staple varieties of cotton.52
Still, the South also experienced its share of poverty and unrest. South
Carolina went through a period of impoverishment caused by the British
decision to block access to its Caribbean ports and aggravated by a series of
crop failures.53 Matters were even worse in frontier regions. Kentucky, at
this time, has been described as appearing “less like an agrarian paradise
and more like a preindustrial purgatory.”54 Like New England, the Appa-
lachian South was also characterized by political fragmentation and seces-
sion movements, as witnessed, for instance, in the rise and sudden fall of
the short-lived State of Franklin that was carved out of parts of modern-day
North Carolina and Tennessee.55
46. Mary R. Murrin, New Jersey and the Two Constitutions, in A NEW JERSEY ANTHOLOGY
121, 129 (Maxine N. Lurie ed., 1994).
47. Paul B. Moyer, “A Dangerous Combination of Villains”: Pennsylvania’s Wild Yankees
and the Social Context of Agrarian Resistance in Early America, 73 PA. HIST. 37, 61 (2006).
48. See MAX L. GRIVNO, GLEANINGS OF FREEDOM: FREE AND SLAVE LABOR ALONG THE
MASON-DIXON LINE, 1790–1860, at 23–26 (James R. Barrett et al. eds., 2011).
49. BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, A PLANTER’S REPUBLIC: THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC INDEPEN-
DENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 252–253 (1996).
50. RACHEL N. KLEIN, UNIFICATION OF A SLAVE STATE: THE RISE OF THE PLANTER CLASS IN
THE SOUTH CAROLINA BACKCOUNTRY, 1760–1808, at 248 (1990).
51. ANNE SINKLER WHALEY LECLERCQ, AN ANTEBELLUM PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: INCLUD-
ING THE SOUTH CAROLINA LOW COUNTRY RECEIPTS AND REMEDIES OF EMILY WHARTON SINKLER
5 n.13 (2006).
52. David J. Libby, Short Staple Cotton, in 1 SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 448, 448 (Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2007).
53. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE SOUTH’S ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 101
(Robert J Haws ed., 1991).
54. HONOR SACHS, HOME RULE: HOUSEHOLDS, MANHOOD, AND NATIONAL EXPANSION ON
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY KENTUCKY FRONTIER 73 (2015).
55. KEVIN T. BARKSDALE, THE LOST STATE OF FRANKLIN: AMERICA’S FIRST SECESSION
36–52 (2009).
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When one shifts the focus to commerce and manufacture, a picture
emerges of activity that both differed significantly from region to region but
had yet to generate real wealth. Thus, while New York State displayed
enormous economic promise, it was not yet the behemoth it would become.
In 1790, its population was only sixth greatest “[a]mong the initial thirteen
states.”56 The Port of New York took second place either to Boston or to
Philadelphia throughout this period,57 while large parts of upstate New
York remained uncultivated.58
New England, for its part, experienced serious disruptions to its busi-
ness and trade during the Revolutionary War and recovery was slow.59
Shipbuilding and fishing, two of its major commercial activities, remained
mired in economic stagnation through the 1780s.60 Still, even in this time of
disruption, Boston merchantmen began to explore international commercial
opportunities—even in distant locations like China.61
In the mid-Atlantic states, thanks to some important innovations in
milling,62 commerce centered around foodstuffs, particularly grain.63 Still,
conditions were difficult. Even though the Port of Philadelphia remained a
major hub of commerce, it was not immune to the economic difficulties of
the 1780s.64
One does not have to espouse Charles Beard’s economic interpretation
of constitutional origins65 to conclude that the Founding period was one of
56. ALAN TAYLOR, WRITING EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 204 (2005).
57. DIANA DIZEREGA WALL, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GENDER: SEPARATING THE SPHERES IN
URBAN AMERICA 2 (1994).
58. RYAN K. SMITH, ROBERT MORRIS’S FOLLY: THE ARCHITECTURAL AND FINANCIAL FAIL-
URES OF AN AMERICAN FOUNDER 53 (2014).
59. Robert A. McGuire, The Founding Era, 1774–1791, in PRICE V. FISHBACK ET AL., GOV-
ERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A NEW HISTORY 56, 64 (2007); FRANCIS J. LEAZES JR.
& MARK T. MOTTE, PROVIDENCE: THE RENAISSANCE CITY 29 (2004).
60. JACQUELINE BARBARA CARR, AFTER THE SIEGE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BOSTON,
1775–1800, at 161 (2005) (discussing economic depression in the shipbuilding industry); REGI-
NALD HORSMAN, THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789–1815, at 90 (reprt.
ed. 2013) (discussing disruptions in the fishing industry).
61. CARR, supra note 60, at 161–62.
62. CARROLL W. PURSELL, THE MACHINE IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
27–29 (2d ed. 2007).
63. Hunter, supra note 35, at 274–286; Elizabeth A. Ramey, Grains, in THE OXFORD ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, LABOR, AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 307, 307 (Melvyn Dubofsky
ed., 2013).
64. See DOERFLINGER, supra note 31, at 212.
65. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913). The Beard thesis remains the subject of lively debate. See, for instance, James H.
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: Scholarship at a Standstill, 12 REV. AM. HIST. 463,
467–469 (1984) (situating Beard’s work in emerging progressive historiography); Robert A. Mc-
Guire & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A Quantitative
Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 509 (1984) (reasserting the importance of
understanding the economic interests at work in the Founding); Jac C. Heckelman & Keith L.
Dougherty, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited, 67 J.
ECON. HIST. 829 (2007) (a qualified reaffirmation of the Beard thesis); John Patrick Diggins,
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economic dislocation, and that a desire for economic stability—if not the
achievement of real growth—was an animating concern at the Constitu-
tional Convention.
II. ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
A. Alexander Hamilton: Background
Alexander Hamilton stood out to his contemporaries for his in-
candescent intelligence.66 One biographer has described him as an “exuber-
ant genius.”67 John Marshall once wrote that “‘Hamilton’s reach of thought
was so far beyond’ his that, compared to Hamilton’s, it was like a candle
‘before the sun at noonday.’”68
In truth, Hamilton had no choice but to be the brightest and most ambi-
tious of his contemporaries, for he had none of the advantages of birth that
others enjoyed.69 Born out of wedlock on the Island of Nevis,70 he came to
New York around the age of nineteen to attend the future Columbia Univer-
sity.71 With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Hamilton enlisted in the
new Continental Army and quickly became a captain of artillery.72
He developed a close relationship with George Washington, serving as
his aide-de-camp,73 in which capacity he became perhaps Washington’s
most important ghost writer.74 He had a brief falling out with the older man
in 1781, but eventually repaired the relationship.75 In the interim, however,
Class, Classical, and Consensus Views of the Constitution, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 555–566
(1988) (situating Beard’s work in larger currents of twentieth-century constitutional
historiography).
66. James Kirby Martin, Beyond the Good Guys-Bad Guys Syndrome: Will the Real Alexan-
der Hamilton Please Stand Up?, 11 REV. AM. HIST. 51, 52 (1983).
67. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 5 (2004).
68. Peter R. Henriques, The Great Collaboration: The Increasingly Close Relationship Be-
tween George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, in SONS OF THE FATHER: GEORGE WASHING-
TON AND HIS PROT ´EG ´ES 189, 191 (Robert M.S. McDonald ed., 2013).
69. Douglas Ambrose, Introduction: The Life and Many Faces of Alexander Hamilton, in
THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST ELU-
SIVE FOUNDING FATHER 1, 2–3 (Douglas Ambrose & Robert W.T. Martin eds., 2006).
70. Harold Larson, Alexander Hamilton: The Fact and Fiction of His Early Years, 9 WM. &
MARY Q. 139, 139–151 (1952) (reviewing the facts and circumstances of Hamilton’s birth and
early childhood).
71. ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY, STAND COLUMBIA: A HISTORY OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 1754–2004, at 56 (2003).
72. See MICHAEL E. NEWTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 134–152
(2015).
73. Walter Russell Mead, First Principles, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 133–134.
74. Hamilton continued to serve as Washington’s principal ghost writer during his presi-
dency. JAY M. SHAFRITZ & CHRISTOPHER P. BORICK, CASES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT 205 (reprt. ed. 2016); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD
OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 142 (1998).
75. Broadus Mitchell, Hamilton’s Quarrel with Washington, 1781, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 199,
199–216 (1955).
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beginning in 1783, Hamilton practiced law76 and helped found and manage
one of America’s most important early banks, the Bank of New York.77
In the latter 1780s, Hamilton entered public life as he campaigned for a
constitutional convention that might frame a better governing arrangement
for the newly-independent states than the clearly inadequate Articles of
Confederation.78 He was a participant in the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.79 He offered a proposal for a powerful
central government that was soundly defeated.80 He indicated a preference
for the total subordination of the states to the federal government, but real-
ized that this goal could not be achieved.81 He advocated also for a power-
ful chief executive serving an unlimited term who could appoint and
remove the governors of the individual states.82 Hamilton was on the losing
side of all of these propositions but still reconciled himself to the Constitu-
tion’s final version.
Indeed, not only did Hamilton make peace with the new Constitution,
he became one of its principal champions.83 He played an indispensable
role in securing its ratification.84 His essays on behalf of ratification, which
form an integral part of The Federalist Papers, proved to be highly persua-
sive.85 With the Constitution ratified, George Washington invited Hamilton
to join his Cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury.86
76. Paul Finkelman, Alexander Hamilton, Esq.: Founding Father as Lawyer, 9 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 229, 229 (1984) (book review).
77. BRIAN PHILLIPS MURPHY, BUILDING THE EMPIRE STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 36–55 (2015).
78. In a series of newspaper essays, Hamilton made the case to replace the Articles of Con-
federation beginning in the early 1780s. SHELDON D. POLLACK, WAR, REVENUE, AND STATE
BUILDING: FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN STATE 165–167 (2009); Thomas K.
McCraw, The Strategic Vision of Alexander Hamilton, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 31, 43–44 (1994).
79. JOHN CHESTER MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE GROWTH OF A NEW NATION
151–170 (Transaction Publishers 2004) (1959).
80. Id. at 159–161.
81. Alexander Hamilton, Constitutional Convention. Remarks on the Abolition of the States
(June 19, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 211, 211–212 (Harold C. Syrett. ed.,
1962).
82. Alexander Hamilton, Constitutional Convention. Plan of Government (June 18, 1787), in
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 81, at 207, 207–211.
83. John Dunn, Unmanifest Destiny, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 483, 485–486 (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009).
84. See Dan T. Coenen, A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument of The Federalist and Its
Impact on Constitutional Interpretation, 56 DUKE L.J. 469, 477–481 (2006).
85. Brannon P. Denning, Publius for All of Us, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 93 (2009) (book
review).
86. Michael W. McConnell, What Would Hamilton Do?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 259,
265 (2012); Naomi Caiden, To Build a Nation, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 291, 291 (2006) (book
review).
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B. Hamilton’s Proposal for the Bank of the United States
As Secretary of the Treasury, President Washington entrusted Hamil-
ton with the task of putting the new nation’s economic house in order.87 But
Hamilton saw his role as something even larger; he wished to create an
engine of economic growth for the United States.88 His proposal for the
creation of the Bank of the United States was one aspect of this larger
ambition.89
1. The Sources of Hamilton’s Banking Theory
European models were available for Hamilton to consult. The Bank of
England was clearly Hamilton’s most immediate model.90 Founded in 1694
as a means of making more efficient the process of tax collection,91 the
Bank of England was a joint-stock company whose shares were privately
owned but subject to substantial parliamentary oversight.92
By the late eighteenth century, the Bank had assumed numerous func-
tions, both public and private.93 It collected taxes and disbursed govern-
mental remittances, thus smoothing and making regular the system of
governmental finance.94 It helped to finance the British war machine, both
by its assumption of government debt and by its ability to facilitate pay-
ments “to overseas spheres of military operations.”95 Through its extension
of credit and its sophisticated use of bank notes and bills of exchange—
87. To that end, he submitted to Congress his First Report on the Public Credit, January 9,
1790, in which he drew from the British experience with its national debt to issue government
bonds. On December 5, 1791, he submitted to Congress his Report on Manufactures, which pro-
posed a system of tariffs and subsidies as means of protecting and building domestic industry. See
generally Claire Priest, Law and Commerce, 1580–1815, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW
IN AMERICA 400, 438 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (discussing the First
Report on Credit); Daniel J. Gifford, Trade and Tensions, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 297, 299 (2006)
(discussing the nineteenth-century success of Hamilton’s program of tariffs and subsidies).
88. ROBERT E. WRIGHT & RICHARD SYLLA, GENEALOGY OF AMERICAN FINANCE 1 (2015).
89. Alexander Hamilton also submitted to Congress a Report on Manufactures, which advo-
cated for the adoption of tariffs and other protectionist policies and which has been called “one of
the most impressive pieces of writing in political economy (i.e., economics applied to statecraft) in
our literature.” ANDREA MANESCHI, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 76 (1998) (quoting Louis M. Hacker, The Report on Manufacturers, 19
HISTORIAN 144, 164–165 (1957) (alteration in original)).
90. RICHARD S. GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE IN-
DUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800, at 223–224 (2010).
91. GLYN DAVIES, HISTORY OF MONEY 259 (3d. ed. 2002).
92. See J. SAMUEL BARKIN, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND THE LOGIC OF MONEY: FINANCIAL
PREDOMINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP 74 (2003).
93. W.T.C. King, The Bank of England, 15 ECON. HIST. REV. 67, 68–69 (1945); J. H.
Clapham, The Private Business of the Bank of England, 1744–1800, 11 ECON. HIST. REV. 77
(1941) (detailing the private role played by the Bank in English financial life).
94. H.V. Bowen, The Bank of England During the Long Eighteenth Century, in THE BANK
OF ENGLAND: MONEY, POWER, AND INFLUENCE 1694–1994, at 1, 10–11 (Richard Roberts & David
Kynaston eds., 1995).
95. Id. at 10; HILTON L. ROOT, THE FOUNTAIN OF PRIVILEGE: POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
MARKETS IN OLD REGIME FRANCE AND ENGLAND 188–189 (1994); William Roberds & Franc¸ois
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which circulated as currency—it greatly increased the money supply.96 And
it was even hoped that the Bank might provide a source of stability in the
event of financial panic.97
If Hamilton looked to the United Kingdom for examples of successful
banks, he also turned to Britain for supportive economic theory, which he
found in the work of Adam Smith.98 In his writing on banking and credit,
Smith was concerned in the first instance with explaining how gold and
silver related to the larger economic order he envisioned. Smith took a
fairly skeptical view of these precious metals’ ability to lubricate the en-
gines of economic growth.99 He knew that they were generally accepted as
expressions of value and he did not mean to challenge their primacy, but
Smith still chose to emphasize their weaknesses. He argued that gold and
silver were inert, dead stock, incapable of growth.100 They were things, ob-
jects, nothing more, and were too inherently expensive, difficult, and cum-
bersome to use or to circulate as currency in a sophisticated economy.101
What Smith sought was a mechanism that might stimulate growth and
he found that in the borrowing and lending practices of banks. “A particular
banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes,” Smith
wrote.102 These notes might be redeemable for gold or silver, though Smith
believed that redemption would only rarely happen.103 Rather, he intended
that the largest portion of bank notes circulate as money, and by circulating,
they would expand the value of the gold and silver that secure them.104 The
whole system, Smith asserted, depended on trust, but where bankers se-
cured the trust of their users, they might safely lend more than their reserves
R. Velde, Early Public Banks II: Banks of Issue, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION:
MIDDLE AGES TO BRETTON WOODS 465, 471 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016).
96. CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM
361 (2014); 1 JOHN CLAPHAM, THE BANK OF ENGLAND: A HISTORY 1694–1797, at 221–223
(1945); see generally ULRICH BINDSEIL, MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THEORY, PAST,
PRESENT 109 (2004).
97. By the latter eighteenth century, the system of public finance had become sufficiently
stable that the solvency of the government was no longer doubted. Julian Hoppit, Financial Crises
in Eighteenth-Century England, 39 ECON. HIST. REV. 39, 50 (1986). Still, panics in the private
sector occurred. Id. at 54–56.
98. M.L. BURSTEIN, STUDIES IN BANKING THEORY, FINANCIAL HISTORY, AND VERTICAL
CONTROL 122 (1988); CHERNOW, supra note 67, at 347.
99. Carl C. Winnerlind, The Humean Paternity to Adam Smith’s Theory of Money, 8 HIST.
ECON. IDEAS 77, 90–91 (2000).
100. VINCENT BLADEN, FROM ADAM SMITH TO MAYNARD KEYNES: THE HERITAGE OF POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY 59 (1974).
101. WILLIAM FARINA, THE AFTERLIFE OF ADAM SMITH: THE INFLUENCE, INTERPRETATION,
AND MISINTERPRETATION OF HIS ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY, 1760S–2010S, at 105 (2015).
102. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
277 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).
103. Maria Pia Paganelli, Adam Smith and the History of Economic Thought: The Case of
Banking, in ADAM SMITH: HIS LIFE, THOUGHT, AND LEGACY 247, 249–252 (Ryan Patrick Hanley
ed., 2016).
104. Id.; ARIE ARNON, MONETARY THEORY AND POLICY FROM HUME AND SMITH TO WICK-
SELL: MONEY, CREDIT, AND THE ECONOMY 38–39 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST104.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-APR-18 14:36
120 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
in gold and silver.105 Thus Smith summarized the process by which frac-
tional reserve banking operated.106 These ideas, some derived from a read-
ing of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, some independently arrived at, were
current in the America of the 1780s.107
Hamilton found yet other sources of insight on the European continent.
There was Holland, whose banking system for much of the eighteenth cen-
tury enjoyed the “position [of] the world’s trading and financial centre.”108
The Bank of Amsterdam played a crucial role in public finance109 and was
an inspiration even to Adam Smith.110 This Bank was nearly a century older
than the Bank of England and engaged in many of the same practices,111
although in 1790 and 1791—the years Hamilton made the case for his
Bank—Amsterdam had fallen into a short-lived crisis.112 Hamilton had
even read widely in the works of Jacques Necker, the reform-minded
French minister of finance.113
2. Hamilton’s Report on a National Bank
Hamilton paid due acknowledgment to these sources in his “Report on
a National Bank.”114 “Holland, England, and France” all provided examples
of successful banks of the sort that Hamilton now proposed.115 He opened
his justification for the Bank by leaning heavily on Adam Smith. “Gold and
silver, when they are employed merely as instruments of exchange and
105. MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 110 (2013); Michael
Mussa, Adam Smith and the Political Economy of a Modern Financial Crisis, 44 BUS. ECON. 3,
4–5 (2009).
106. JERRY EVENSKY, ADAM SMITH’S WEALTH OF NATIONS: A READER’S GUIDE 69 (2015);
Hugh Rockoff, Adam Smith on Money, Banking, and the Price Level, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF ADAM SMITH 307, 308–310 (2013).
107. JOSE R. TORRE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SENTIMENTS: PAPER CREDIT AND THE SCOT-
TISH ENLIGHTENMENT IN EARLY REPUBLIC BOSTON 40–49 (reprt. ed. 2016).
108. YOUSSEF CASSIS & PHILIP L. COTTRELL, PRIVATE BANKING IN EUROPE: RISE, RETREAT,
AND RESURGENCE 64 (2015).
109. Wantje Fritschy & Rene´ van der Voort, From Fragmentation to Unification: Public Fi-
nance, 1700–1914, in A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS 64, 70–75 (Marjolein ‘T Hart
et al. eds., 1997).
110. Charles P. Kindleberger, Was Adam Smith a Monetarist or a Keynsian?, 19 BUS. ECON.
5, 6 (1984).
111. Ned W. Downing, Transatlantic Paper and the Emergence of the American Capital Mar-
ket, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL
MARKETS 271, 283 (2005).
112. JAN DE VRIES & AD VAN DER WOUDE, THE FIRST MODERN ECONOMY: SUCCESS, FAIL-
URE, AND PERSEVERANCE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY, 1500–1815, at 129–133 (1997).
113. Donald F. Swanson & Andrew P. Trout, Alexander Hamilton, “the Celebrated Mr.
Neckar,” and Public Credit, 47 WM. & MARY Q. 422, 424–425 (1990). Necker had attempted a
thorough-going modernization of French public finance in the years before the Revolution but was
attacked for his unconstitutional overreach. P.M. JONES, REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE:
THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION, 1774–1791, at 111–115 (1995).
114. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2082–2112 (1790).
115. Id. at 2083.
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alienation, have been not improperly denominated dead stock . . . .”116 But
if precious metals were deposited in a bank, “to become the basis of a paper
circulation . . . they then acquire life, or, in other words, an active and
productive quality.”117
Hamilton drove the point home with a hypothetical question. Suppose
a merchant accumulated gold but kept that gold locked away for safe-keep-
ing “in his chest.”118 It sits lifeless in the dark. But deposit it in a bank and
it will generate a profit.119
Why? In answering this question, Hamilton got to the heart of banking
practice. He again echoed the language of Adam Smith’s endorsement of
fractional reserve banking.120 A bank issued notes on the basis of the gold
and silver deposits it held in reserve.121 And because of the trust that the
holders of these notes had in the solvency of the bank, the general public
felt free to exchange these notes as currency.122
Certainly, the holders of bank notes could and sometimes did seek to
redeem their notes and claim an equivalent in gold or silver.123 In practice,
however, Hamilton recognized that such redemptions rarely occurred;124
more routinely, holders “pass [notes] . . . to some other hand as an
equivalent [for gold].”125 This, Hamilton explained, was the heart of good
banking practice.126 Banks might thus lend larger sums of money than the
reserves they had accumulated. The money supply would thereby be ex-
panded and commercial activity stimulated. And so Hamilton might realize
his larger ambition, which was to “create legal and economic institutions
congenial to taking [deposits] and investing them in manufacturing and
trade.”127 Hamilton dreamt that the United States might one day become a
powerful commercial republic that could compete with the European pow-
ers,128 and the Bank of the United States was central to that larger vision.
116. Id. at 2083.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2083–2084.
120. G. Thomas Woodward, Money and the Federal Reserve System: Myth and Reality, in
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: BACKGROUND, ANALYSES, BIBLIOGRAPHY 73, 78 (George B. Grey
ed., 2002) (explaining the modern practice of fractional reserve banking).
121. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2084 (1790).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (“Though liable to be redrawn at any moment, experience proves, that the money so
much oftener changes proprietors than place, and that what is drawn out is generally so speedily
replaced as to authorize the counting upon the sums deposited as an effective fund.”).
125. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2084 (1790) (“And in this manner[,]” Hamilton continued, “the
credit keeps circulating, performing in every stage the office of money.”).
126. Id.
127. David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist, and
the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 759 (2001).
128. JOHN KANE, BETWEEN VIRTUE AND POWER: THE PERSISTENT MORAL DILEMMA OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 37–39 (2008).
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Still, Hamilton anticipated an objection. Might not a panic wipe out the
Bank? Hamilton’s response was to insist that he had put in place the prereq-
uisites to earn and maintain “confidence.”129 He assured Congress that the
Bank would not act precipitously. Its lending would be “gradual.”130 Its
management would be prudent and guided by “all the maxims of a reasona-
ble circumspection.”131 And finally, Hamilton promised, there would be
available to the Bank “auxiliary capital” in the event of crisis.132
Having described the basic principles of banking and offered the
mandatory assurances, Hamilton shifted focus by attempting to demonstrate
the benefits a major national bank would confer on the new United
States.133 Money will not lie idle.134 There will never be “intermission of
demand.”135 Merchants will borrow and invest the funds wisely. Banks will
realize a profit through interest and distribute that profit to depositors. “And
thus, by contributing to enlarge the mass of industrious and commercial
enterprise, banks become nurseries of national wealth—a consequence as
satisfactorily verified by experience as it is clearly deducible in theory.”136
One modern economic commentator has observed, regarding Hamil-
ton’s agenda, that “credit [was] a tool for enabling investment for
growth.”137 He “wanted to industrialize the country, and he was prepared to
borrow money to invest in infrastructure.”138 Nowhere were these proposi-
tions better borne out than in Hamilton’s economic justifications for the
Bank of the United States.
Commercial advantage—an eighteenth-century writer might have used
language like this to describe Hamilton’s proposal. Hamilton wished to
have Congress establish a bank to provide advantages to promote a particu-
lar way of life and form of wealth.139 And such an observer might then ask
the next question, where and how in the Constitution could such a use of
government power find justification?
And Hamilton would have deflected the question, pointing to yet other
compelling reasons that a national bank might serve the public good. Con-
gress should approve the Bank, he argued, because it might prove useful






135. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2085 (1790).
136. Id.
137. ROBERT U. AYRES, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: IS SUSTAINABLE GROWTH POSSIBLE? 78
(2014).
138. Id.
139. JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1774–1970, at 88 (Beard Books 2001) (1973); Andrew Shankman, “A New Thing on Earth”:
Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, and the Democratization of the American
Political Economy, 23 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 323, 331–334 (2003).
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during fiscal crises. Such a Bank, he contended, might provide “[g]reater
facility to the Government in obtaining pecuniary aids, especially in sudden
emergencies.”140 There were two reasons Hamilton believed a national
bank helpful in such circumstances: first, it would be large, well-capital-
ized, and trusted.141 It would therefore enjoy a greater level of confidence
than other financial institutions.142 Secondly, it would enjoy an “intimate
connexion of interest [with] the Government,” and so would be well-posi-
tioned to act as an instrument of policy where the “public safety and wel-
fare” might otherwise be at risk.143
Only after justifying the establishment of a national bank by reference
to its importance to commercial expansion and financial stability, did Ham-
ilton come to the question of the services such a bank might provide to the
government. A bank with freely circulating bank notes would become an
important tool for the payment of taxes from distant locations. “[T]he trans-
portation and re-transportation of the metals [i.e., gold and silver] are obvi-
ated, and a more convenient and more expeditious medium of payment is
substituted.”144
This final justification made sense in light of prevailing taxation prac-
tices of 1791. Custom and excise taxes assessed against trade and commer-
cial activities constituted the largest share of the tax burden in 1791,145
although Congress reserved to itself the right, through constitutional provi-
sion, to impose “direct taxation by apportionment” on the States.146
In advancing this tax-based argument for the Bank, Hamilton might
have invoked the Constitution or the government’s power to tax, but he
chose not to. He rather focused, once again, principally on the question of
utility: what was the best, most convenient way by which taxes might be
paid?
Hamilton then closed his case with a series of additional utilitarian
justifications for the Bank, which filled the remainder of his Report. Banks
ensured punctuality and predictability in repayment of credit, which re-
dounded to the benefit of merchants.147 Yes, he conceded, a bank “serves to
counteract that rigorous necessity for the metals as a medium of circula-
tion,”148 but he reiterated that this was a beneficial aspect to banking and
not a weakness.149 And Hamilton repeated and elaborated on his point that
140. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2085 (1790).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2085–2086.
144. Id. at 2086.
145. FREDERIC CLEMSON HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SYSTEM, 1791–1895, at 12 (1896).
146. Id. at 11.
147. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2087–2088 (1790).
148. Id. at 2092.
149. Id.
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“[t]he support of industry” was of benefit to the whole of society.150 Again,
there was not even a nod in the direction of any express constitutional
provisions.
Hamilton prepared a draft of legislation that he planned to submit with
the Report.151 As he intended it, the Bank would be initially capitalized at
ten million dollars, eight million dollars provided by private investors, and
another two million from the federal government.152 Its board of directors
would consist of twenty-five “private individuals, not public appointees.”153
A legislative drafting committee, however, was appointed to prepare a final
version of the bill that was submitted to Congress for approval. By the
terms of the legislation in its final form, the Bank was to take the form of a
corporation whose shareholders might be “any person, co-partnership, or
body politic.”154 Only stockholders who were also citizens of the United
States were eligible to serve on the board of the directors.155 The legisla-
tion, however, faced an uncertain fate in Congress.
C. Hamilton: Commerce, Nationhood, and the Constitution
In light of the constitutional challenge that Hamilton encountered in
Congress, one is entitled to ask why he failed to offer a constitutional de-
fense of his proposal. Did he regard the constitutionality of the Bank as an
easy case? Or did he not wish to tip his hand on what he knew would be a
bruising battle? Surely, though, as one of the leading lawyers of his day,
Hamilton must have known that others would have viewed his proposal as
constitutionally problematic.
A clue to how Hamilton must have understood the Bank within the
American constitutional framework comes from his activities in the time
immediately before and after the Constitutional Convention. A strong, cen-
tralized American nation tightly integrated through expanding the possibili-
ties for commerce—these were two of Alexander Hamilton’s principal
political goals in the middle 1780s, even before the drafting or the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution.156 And Hamilton was eager to promote these twin
150. Id. at 2092–2093.
151. Alexander Hamilton, Draft of an Act to Incorporate the Bank of the United States, in 7
The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, supra note 81, at 399, 399–406.
152. THOMAS K MCCRAW, THE FOUNDERS AND FINANCE: HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND
OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW ECONOMY 112–113 (2012).
153. Id. at 113.
154. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2375 (1790) (“An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of
the United States.”).
155. Id. This provision simultaneously aimed at the prevention of two foreseeable problems:
foreign domination of the Bank, and the domination of the Banks by either private partnerships or
governmental shareholders.
156. Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863–864 (2002); Christine
Margerum Harlen, A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism,
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objectives even in the early planning stages for the Constitutional
Convention.
One might thus consider Hamilton’s activities at the Annapolis Con-
vention of 1786 as an expression of these ambitions.157 This Convention
proved to be an important precursor to the Constitutional Convention, de-
spite its modest attendance.158 Indeed, had its proceedings not eventuated
into something far grander, critics would have dismissed it as one more
obscure, failed attempt at national unity.
The Convention consisted of twelve representatives from five states,
called together to remedy defects under the Articles of Confederation,159
especially as they pertained to the “Trade and Commerce of the United
States” and the creation of “an uniform System in their Commercial Interest
. . . and permanent Harmony.”160
In preparing the Convention’s report and recommendations, Hamilton
was particularly insistent on several crucial aspects of their assigned du-
ties—including especially the promotion of unity and harmony among the
states and the cultivation of commerce and trade.161 He also took the oppor-
tunity of the Convention to urge the delegates to call on their states to con-
voke a second convention the following year—an assembly that would
transform itself into the meeting we know as the Constitutional
Convention.162
Hamilton did not abandon his concerns for unity and commerce at the
Constitutional Convention or afterwards. Indeed, they count among the cen-
tral organizing principles of Hamilton’s contributions to The Federalist Pa-
pers. And since these themes played an important role in his subsequent
efforts to justify the Bank, it is worth considering them here.
One might begin with Hamilton’s conception of national union. While
it might seem far-fetched today, Hamilton worried that if the Constitution
were not ratified, war would soon follow among the states.163 “[I]f these
states should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confedera-
43 INT’L STUD. Q. 733, 738–742 (1999); see also Robert J. Delahunty, From Ancient Liberty to
the Welfare State, 1994 PUB INT. L. REV. 181, 181 n.2 (1994) (book review).
157. Harry P. Lawther, The Making of the Federal Constitution, 11 TEX. L. REV. 67, 69
(1932).
158. JOHN R. VILE, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE ALTERNATE ARTICLE V MECHANISM FOR
PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION 10 (2016).
159. Robert A. Feer, Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEW
ENG. Q. 388, 391–392 (1969).
160. Alexander Hamilton, Appointment as Commissioner to the Annapolis Convention, in 3
The PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 81, at 666.
161. Louis Ottenberg, A Fortunate Fiasco: The Annapolis Convention of 1786, 45 A.B.A. J.
834, 878–879 (1959).
162. KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
142 (2001); VILE, supra note 158, at 10.
163. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 6, 7, 18 (Alexander Hamilton).
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cies,” Hamilton wrote, “the subdivisions into which they might be thrown
would have frequent and violent contests with each other.”164
Hamilton looked to historical sources to justify this proposition.165
Drawing deeply from classical antecedents, Hamilton observed that even
“commercial republics”—he gave the examples of Athens and Carthage—
fought wars with their neighbors.166 He feared, he confessed, “an infinity of
little jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries
of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or con-
tempt.”167 Without a strong union committing them to larger objectives, the
leaders of the various states and regions were at risk of descending into just
such a cacophony of mayhem and strife.168
Only a little less compelling than his fear of internal conflict, was his
dread of insurrection. Shays’ Rebellion was never far from his mind.169 “An
insurrection,” Hamilton wrote, “whatever be its immediate cause, eventu-
ally endangers all government.”170 States, with their limited powers, would
find it difficult to contend with rebellion: “A turbulent faction in a State,”
Hamilton opined, could easily catch fire and threaten the established gov-
ernment, even posing a fair risk of overturning it.171 If left unchecked, the
spirit of rebellion might thus contaminate “the people” and even “taint[ ]”
the minds and “spirit” of their duly constituted “representat[ives].”172
War between the states and consuming class-based insurrection—
these, plainly, were Hamilton’s two greatest fears, and he argued that a
centralized, integrated Union was the answer to these concerns. Thus, in the
opening paragraph of Federalist No. 1, Hamilton declared that the Constitu-
tion was intended to support and sustain “the existence of the UNION, the
safety and welfare and parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire
in many respects the most interesting in the world.”173 In Federalist No. 9,
Hamilton added: “A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the
peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
165. “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected
sovereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of
human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 6
(Alexander Hamilton).
166. Id. The Amphictyonic League, which was a semi-mythical league of pre-classical Greek
city-states whose members waged continuous war against one another, was a constant referent
point for Hamilton. CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND
THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 105 (1994).
167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
168. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 673–674
(2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
169. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 6, 21, 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
170. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
171. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton).
172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
173. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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insurrection.”174 “Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the com-
mon safety?”175 Hamilton asked rhetorically. He knew the answer: A strong
Union and only a strong Union, Hamilton was confident, would ensure “po-
litical safety and happiness.”176
But Hamilton believed that more was needed to ensure the Union’s
success than political integration. The new Union must also enjoy commer-
cial vitality.177 Hamilton listed protection, preservation, and expansion of
both domestic and international commerce among the purposes the Consti-
tution served.178 He pointed to prevailing economic conditions to illustrate
his point. The United States, governed as it was under the Articles of Con-
federation, had proven incapable of attracting international trading part-
ners.179 Indeed, “[n]o nation acquainted with the nature of our political
association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the
United States, by which they conceded privileges of any impor-
tance . . . .”180 At the same time, Hamilton observed, there were foreign
powers who appreciated the United States’ economic potential and sought
to exploit the present vacuum to their own advantage:181 “Spain,” “France,”
and “Britain” all had designs on America’s national wealth.182
Approval of the Constitution, therefore, and the formation of a tighter
Union, were the appropriate responses to these threats. A single American
nation would be empowered to deal as an equal with “Great Britain,” the
“Dutch,” and the rest of Europe.183 Furthermore, Hamilton was convinced
that in the world of international economic competition, the United States,
under the new Constitution, would emerge triumphant: “[T]he natural
strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would
baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.”184
And not only would the Constitution drive success in the international mar-
ketplace, it would ensure economic vitality at home: “The prosperity of
commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened states-
men, to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national
174. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
175. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
177. Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57
ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1239 (1994); Richard Alexander Izquierdo, The Architecture of Constitutional
Time, 23 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 1089, 1124 (2015).
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The principal purposes to be answered
by Union are these . . . the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the
superintendance of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”).
179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
180. Id.
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wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political
cares.”185
Hamilton conceded that his theory of the Constitution was expansive,
but he believed that the “necessary and proper” clause conferred on the
federal government the authority to enact the program he outlined.186 He
acknowledged that this was a “sweeping clause,”187 but it was not without
its limits. Laws enacted under the necessary and proper clause still had to
be judged by reference to the underlying substantive “powers upon which it
is founded.”188 And where the legislature was deemed to have overstepped
its bounds, it belonged to the people to “take such measures to redress the
injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence
justify.”189
In his Report to Congress, Hamilton made no attempt to justify the
Bank of the United States under the necessary and proper clause. Undoubt-
edly, he did not feel the need to do so. As he elucidated the Constitution, it
stood for national unity and the promotion of commerce. Congress, by
Hamilton’s reasoning, had the inherent power to facilitate these ends.190
And since the Bank served these purposes, for Hamilton in December 1790,
this surely must have seemed constitutionally sufficient.
III. CONGRESS DEBATES HAMILTON’S BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
A. The Opposition to the Bank
1. The Personalities
The House of Representatives, unlike the Senate,191 debated the pro-
posed Bank vigorously, and a record of that debate has been preserved. The
opposition to the Bank bill was led by Hamilton’s one-time collaborator on
The Federalist Papers, James Madison, who stood at the head of a group of
Southern representatives united in their views that the Constitution did not
permit the federal government to charter a national bank.
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
186. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
187. Id. The expression “sweeping clause” originated with anti-Federalist opponents of the
Constitution as criticism of the seeming breadth of the necessary and proper clause. Gary Lawson
& Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of
the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270–271 (1993).
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
190. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047–1048
(2014).
191. On the Senate debate, see Klubes, supra note 19, at 23–25.
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The personal contrasts between Madison and Hamilton were great.
Madison had been born into the Virginia planter aristocracy.192 Both his
mother and his father had substantial holdings of real estate and slaves;193
by the time Madison reached his maturity, his family had become the larg-
est landowner in Orange County, Virginia.194
Madison was also a major slave-owner in his own right. “Between
about 1783 and 1801, Madison owned a total of about 150 slaves, and in the
early 1780s he was the largest single slave owner in [Orange] county.”195
While he opposed the African slave trade early in his political career,196 he
did little as President or afterwards to threaten the rights and privileges of
the slave-holding class.197
The political system that Madison would have known, and within
which he thrived, consisted of a dense honeycomb of county-wide aristocra-
cies198 that was governed at its apex by an oligarchy of large plantation
owners.199 Madison blended effortlessly into this hierarchy of caste and
privilege even as he advocated for the vitality of republican forms of gov-
ernment.200 He was further benefitted in career advancement by his large
and well-connected extended family, of which Madison made full use to
advance his own ambitions.201
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison was quick to pro-
mote Virginia’s interests. This was especially apparent in Madison’s advo-
192. SCOTT J. KESTER, THE HAUNTED PHILOSOPHE: JAMES MADISON, REPUBLICANISM, AND
SLAVERY 15 (2008).
193. “By 1757 [when the future president was six], the Madison plantation had grown to over
4,000 acres, and James Sr. [Madison’s father] was among the most prominent planters in Orange
County. By 1782, the family owned at least 118 slaves.” JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THE GREAT VIRGINIA
TRIUMVIRATE: GEORGE WASHINGTON, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND JAMES MADISON 153 (2010).
194. JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 345
(2010).
195. DOUGLAS B. CHAMBERS, MURDER AT MONTPELIER: IGBO AFRICANS IN VIRGINIA 98
(2005).
196. JOHN P. KAMINSKI, JAMES MADISON: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 37–38 (2006).
197. JEFF BROADWATER, JAMES MADISON: A SON OF VIRGINIA AND A FOUNDER OF THE NA-
TION 198–201 (2012); Jeff Broadwater, James Madison and the Dilemma of American Slavery, in
A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE 306 (Stuart Leibiger ed., 2013). Al-
though, to be sure, Madison revealed himself to be tortured by the threats slavery posed to the
integrity of the Union. Thus, his response to the Missouri Compromise was to write an elegant
allegory about a white husband and wife. The wife’s left arm had become permanently dyed
black, and the pair struggled to find ways to remain joined despite their differences. Robert J.
Allison, “From the Covenant of Peace, a Simile of Sorrow”: James Madison’s American Alle-
gory, 99 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 327, 330–333 (1991).
198. RICHARD R. BEEMAN, THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION: 1788–1801, at 28–55
(1972).
199. John M. Murrin, In the Land of the Free and the Home of the Slave, Maybe There was
Room Even for Deference, 85 J. AM. HIST. 86, 90–91 (1998).
200. Robert A. Dahl, James Madison: Republican or Democrat?, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 439,
440–441 (2005).
201. RALPH LOUIS KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 6 (Univ. Press of Va. 1990)
(1971).
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cacy of what was known as the “Virginia Plan”—an outline for a new
constitution to take the place of the Articles of Confederation.202 Drafted by
Madison and presented to the Convention by his Virginia associate Edmund
Randolph,203 this plan contained many of the elements that would come to
make up the final text of the Constitution—coordinate branches of govern-
ment, a strong executive, and a bicameral legislature.204 But its use of pro-
portional representation conferred on Virginia outsized political power, and
this much at least of the Virginia Plan could not survive scrutiny.205
Madison was also, at least initially, not a friend of a strong doctrine of
state autonomy. Another feature of the Virginia Plan—which similarly went
down to defeat—was a proposal to confer on Congress the power “to nega-
tive all laws passed by the States, contravening in the opinion of the Na-
tional Legislature the articles of Union.”206 Had it been adopted, this
proposal essentially would have given Congress the power to annul state
legislation for its failure to conform to the Constitution.207
Still, Madison was sufficiently adroit to assume an important role in
shepherding the final version of the Constitution through the Convention,208
and he subsequently played an indispensable part in the drafting and ap-
proval of the Bill of Rights.209 When Madison spoke about the Constitution,
his voice carried authority even if, as shall be seen, others were not pre-
pared to defer to his views.
Madison had several important collaborators in his fight against the
Bank, all of them hailing from south of the Mason-Dixon Line and all of
them members of the slave-owning, planter class. James Jackson
(1757–1806) was something of a child prodigy. He arrived in Georgia at the
age of fifteen in 1772 and by 1777 he was a member of “the state’s first
constitutional convention, an amazing accomplishment for someone only
202. RICHARD J. ELLIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 215 (Routledge
2015) (2012).
203. KEVIN R.C. GUTZMAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 70–80 (2012).
204. Originally four coordinate branches of government were contemplated, but a proposed
council of revision was quickly defeated. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE
FOUNDING PERIOD 17 (1997).
205. LANCE BANNING, FOUNDING VISIONS: THE IDEAS, INDIVIDUALS, AND INTERSECTIONS
THAT CREATED AMERICA 111–125 (Todd Estes ed., 2014).
206. Gordon Lloyd & Christopher Burkett, James Madison and the Grand Convention: “The
Great Difficulty of Representation,” in A COMPANION TO JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE,
supra note 197, at 5, 17.
207. Of course, the Congress retains the power under the Supremacy Clause, which repre-
sented a dilution of the Madison position, to supersede state law, though not review it for constitu-
tionality. See David A. Herrmann, Comment, To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That is the
Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies Federalism
Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157, 1161–1163 (1997).
208. For a balanced, somewhat critical assessment, see Harold S. Schultz, James Madison:
Father of the Constitution?, 37 Q. J. LIBR. CONG. 215, 222 (1980).
209. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP.
CT. REV. 301, 303–304 (1990).
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twenty years old.”210 He enjoyed a distinguished combat record during the
American Revolutionary War211 and afterwards grew rich purchasing land
confiscated from loyalists.212 He also practiced law and entered politics.213
Jackson spent only a single term in the House of Representatives, but
during those two years he established himself as an uncompromising advo-
cate for states’ rights. He opposed the creation of inferior federal tribunals,
arguing that a judicial system composed of the US Supreme Court working
with state judiciaries would be adequate to the nation’s needs.214 He op-
posed the Bill of Rights215 and proposed a constitutional amendment limit-
ing the taxing power of the federal government.216
In his personal life, Jackson was a combative figure. He fought duels
with other leading members of the Georgia bar,217 and while governor, shot
and killed his lieutenant governor.218 Late in life, he confessed that he was
prone to “violent passions,” but still declared that he was “patriotic and
zealous for the preservation of those liberties America had so perseveringly
obtained.”219
There was also Michael Jenifer Stone (1747–1812) of Maryland. He
was born on a plantation known as “Equality,” on the southern Eastern
Shore of Maryland, where his family had cultivated tobacco since the year
1648.220 In the seventeenth century, planters in the area made use of a
mixed labor force of indentured whites and enslaved African-Americans,
but by the time Stone was born the tobacco workforce consisted entirely of
slaves.221
Stone was a lawyer as well as a planter. He won a seat in Congress in
an election in which he made it clear he would represent rural, plantation
210. Marie Sauer Lambremont, Representative James Jackson of Georgia and the Establish-
ment of the Southern States Rights Tradition in Congress, in INVENTING CONGRESS: ORIGINS AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 191, 191 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R.
Kennon eds., 1999).
211. WILLIAM OMER FOSTER, SR., JAMES JACKSON: DUELIST AND MILITANT STATESMAN,
1757–1806, at 1–24 (1960).
212. Id. at 31–32.
213. George R. Lamplugh, “Oh the Colossus! The Colossus!”: James Jackson and the Jeffer-
sonian Republican Party in Georgia, 1796–1806, 9 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 315, 316–317 (1989).
214. Lambremont, supra note 210, at 194; Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 39, 72 n.76 (1995).
215. Lambremont, supra note 210, at 195–196.
216. Id. at 196.
217. Alfred Holbrook, James Jackson and Thomas Gibbons: Two Lawyer Statesmen of Geor-
gia, 15 GA. B.J. 309, 310 (1953).
218. JACK K. WILLIAMS, DUELING IN THE OLD SOUTH: VIGNETTES OF SOCIAL HISTORY 17
(1980).
219. Lilla M. Hawes, Miscellaneous Papers of James Jackson, 1781–1798, Part II, 37 GA.
HIST. Q. 147, 160 (1953).
220. See generally JOHN G. HOLLANDSWORTH, JR., PORTRAIT OF A SCIENTIFIC RACIST: ALFRED
HOLT STONE OF MISSISSIPPI 26–27 (2008).
221. See generally GLORIA L. MAIN, TOBACCO COLONY: LIFE IN EARLY MARYLAND,
1650–1720, at 105–106 (1982).
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interests as against the urban center of Baltimore.222 Once installed in the
House, he proved to be a loyal servant of reactionary interests. Although the
Constitution had made provision for the eventual cessation of the importa-
tion of slaves, Stone opposed legislative efforts to implement that clause.223
Like Jackson, he opposed the creation of inferior federal courts, believing
that a functioning federal judiciary threatened the independence of state-
court judges224 and was unnecessary to the functioning of the federal gov-
ernment.225 He had come into Congress as a federalist but left Congress at
the end of his single term deeply suspicious of anything that seemed like
federal overreaching.226 He later served as a judge in Charles County, Ma-
ryland.227 He died in 1812, and was interred on the family tobacco
plantation.228
Finally, there was William Branch Giles (1762–1830). Giles enjoyed
an eminent career in Virginia politics. He was a member of the House of
Representatives for much of the 1790s;229 represented Virginia in the
United States Senate from 1804 to 1815;230 and served as governor from
1827 until shortly before his death in 1830.231
Like Madison, Giles was born into Virginia’s aristocracy.232 His fa-
ther’s family traced its lineage back to the earliest days of Virginia’s settle-
ment in the 1620s.233 Giles enjoyed a successful law practice,234 but like his
222. 2 JOHN THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF MARYLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
PRESENT DAY 572–573 (Tradition Press 1967) (1879).
223. Howard A. Ohline, Slavery, Economics, and Congressional Politics, 1790, 46 J. S. HIST.
335, 342 (1980).
224. JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 33 (2012); MAEVA MARCUS, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS
ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 18 (1992).
225. Louis J. Sirico, Original Intent in the First Congress, 71 MO. L. REV. 687, 712–713
(2006).
226. DAVID J. SIEMERS, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: MEN OF GREAT FAITH AND FORBEARANCE
240–243 (2003).
227. JOSHUA DORSEY WARFIELD, THE FOUNDERS OF ANNE ARUNDEL AND HOWARD COUNTIES,
MARYLAND: A GENEALOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 246 (1905).
228. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–2005, at 1986 (2005) [hereinafter BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
CONGRESS].
229. See DICE ROBINS ANDERSON, WILLIAM BRANCH GILES: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF
VIRGINIA AND THE NATION FROM 1790 TO 1830, at 11, 71 (1914).
230. Id. at 93, 205–206.
231. D.R. Anderson, A Jeffersonian Leader: William Branch Giles, 21 SEWANEE REV. 65,
77–78 (1913).
232. Mark F. Leep, Giles, William Branch, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WAR OF 1812, at
300–301 (Spencer Tucker et al. eds., 2012).
233. 1 VIRGIL A. LEWIS, VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIANS 153 (1888).
234. Mary A. Giunta, In Opposition: The Congressional Career of William Branch Giles,
1790–1798, in NEITHER SEPARATE NOR EQUAL: CONGRESS IN THE 1790S, at 130 (Kenneth R.
Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2000).
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collaborators Jackson and Stone, he did not thereby cease being a represen-
tative of southern agrarian interests.235
Giles proved himself in the First Congress to be a zealous defender of
the prerogatives of the states. Thus, in December 1790, he objected to a bill
requiring state governments to equip their “militia[s] with weapons and re-
lated supplies” as a federally-imposed mandate lacking constitutional
justification.236
Giles quickly became an ardent foe of Alexander Hamilton. He op-
posed an excise tax proposed by the Secretary arguing that it had a dispro-
portionate impact on Southern states.237 More significantly, he continuously
demanded complete accountings of Hamilton’s financial activities at the
Treasury, seeking proof that Hamilton did not abuse his office or misuse
funds.238 It has been credibly speculated that Giles was emboldened in these
attacks on Hamilton by Madison’s subtle, off-stage support.239
2. The Opposition Case
Madison, Jackson, and Stone took the lead in presenting the constitu-
tional case against the Bank. Giles’ intervention, on the other hand, would
occur late in the deliberations, as he offered a refutation of the main argu-
ments of the Bank’s supporters. Accordingly, only the Madison, Jackson,
and Stone arguments will be presented in this section of the Article; Giles’
contentions will be considered in Section III.C, dealing with the rebuttal.
a. James Madison
James Madison launched a two-pronged assault on Hamilton’s Bank
bill, wishing to demonstrate that it was both bad public policy and a viola-
tion of the constitutional order. Where policy was concerned, Madison had
four main objections. First, he contended that the Bank might have the ef-
fect of diluting the value of gold without offering a commensurate return of
value.240 Second, he feared the economic interests and forces the Bank rep-
resented and served: the Bank, he said, was a symbol of monarchy in the
way it “favored the concentration of wealth and influence at the metropo-
lis.”241 Third, he argued that this convergence of wealth at the center mag-
nified the damaging effects of any future bank panics, since it thereby also
235. ROBERT E. WRIGHT & DAVID J. COWEN, FINANCIAL FOUNDING FATHERS: THE MEN WHO
MADE AMERICA RICH 35 (2006).
236. Giunta, supra note 234, at 133.
237. Id. at 134.
238. Id. at 136–137; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress,
1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 649–651 (1996); ANDREW BURSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG,
MADISON AND JEFFERSON 267 (2010).
239. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 119 (Univ. of Mis-
souri Press 1997) (1987).
240. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944 (1791).
241. Id. at 1945.
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centralized and concentrated risk.242 Much better, Madison thought, to have
a number of smaller, regional banks “properly distributed.”243 This led to
Madison’s final objection: if the Bank was truly meant to aid commerce,
then widespread access to its facilities had to be assured. And such access
was only possible for most Americans, if there were “several banks” placed
in a variety of locations.244
Madison, however, was merely warming up. The heart of his case was
constitutional. The Bank bill, he claimed, violated the nation’s founding
charter and so he “den[ied] the authority of Congress to pass it.”245
Madison was meticulous in attempting to prove this absence of author-
ity. He commenced his analysis by laying down three interpretive principles
to guide his analysis. First, he contended that “[a]n interpretation that de-
stroys the very characteristic of the Government cannot be just.”246
Secondly, Madison continued, “[i]n controverted cases, the meaning of
the parties to the instrument, if . . . collected by reasonable evidence, is a
proper guide.”247 He then added a third principle: “Contemporary and con-
current expositions are a reasonable evidence of the parties.”248 Did he
mean by these interpretive recommendations some concept of original in-
tent? It seems probable that he did.249
And since the deliberations of the parties mattered when interpreting
the Constitution, Madison introduced his remembrances of the Constitu-
tional Convention as evidence that Congress lacked the power to create the
Bank. Hamilton’s Bank bill, if enacted, conferred on Congress the power to
charter a corporation. And, Madison insisted, “he well recollected that a
power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in the General
Convention and rejected.”250
Still, Madison did not overly dwell on what the Constitutional Conven-
tion did or did not say regarding the power to charter a corporation.251 In-
deed, neither here nor elsewhere did the doings and sayings of the
242. Id. (And, Madison warned, “a run on the bank” might be triggered by many causes, such





246. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Donald Burke, James Madison’s Dystopian Vision: The Failure of Equilibrium, 43 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 254, 268 (1999).
250. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1945 (1791).
251. Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1022 (1991).
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Constitutional Convention play a major part in Madison’s interpretation of
the Constitution.252
Rather, Madison would attempt to show through an analysis of the
language and structure of the Constitution that Congress lacked the power
to charter the Bank. He began this part of his analysis by distinguishing
between “express authority” and “constructive authority,” the former refer-
ring to the expressly enumerated powers conferred on the government by
the Constitution and the latter category consisting of powers implied or de-
rived from those express provisions.253 Where Congress was considering
the exercise of a constructive authority, Madison went on, it must weigh
“not only the degree of its incidentality to an express authority . . . but the
degree of its importance also.”254
Put another way, before conceding to Congress the power to act,
Madison wished to see both a close connection between an implied power
and the text of the Constitution and to know how essential such a power
was to the operation of good government.255 On the whole, Madison was
suspicious of implied powers: “The doctrine of implication is always a
tender one. The danger of it has been felt in other Governments.”256
Congress, Madison was convinced, lacked the express power to charter
corporations. Still, this did not automatically bring the analysis to a close;
he next asked whether a constructive power to do so existed and if it did,
from which clause of the Constitution might it fairly be derived.257 He iden-
tified three candidates: “The power to lay and collect taxes;”258 “[T]he
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States;”259 and “[t]he
power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution those
powers.”260
Madison turned first to the power to tax. The Bank bill “laid no tax
whatever. It was altogether foreign to the subject.”261 Still, Madison be-
lieved that more must be said. The relevant constitutional provision in its
252. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 435, 455–456 (1996); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Fram-
ers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 353 (1989); Fidelity Through
History: Colloquy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1697 (1997).
253. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 189 (2003); John O. McGinnis &
Michael Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 777–778 (2009).
254. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791).
255. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738,
1751–1752; Anna Gotfryd, The Safeguards of the Constitution: Fundamental Rights, Not Dispos-
able Gifts, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 627, 661 (2016).
256. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1948 (1791).
257. Id. at 1945.
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entirety authorized Congress to impose taxes and duties “and provide for
the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”262 Did this
additional language, joined as it was by the conjunction “and”, confer on
Congress any additional power?
Madison thought not, for two reasons. First, if one separated the lan-
guage about the common defense and general welfare from the congres-
sional power to tax, the result would be to “give to Congress an unlimited
power [and] render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers.”263 The
reference to congressional responsibility for the “general welfare” was
broad language, Madison acknowledged, but it was “limited and explained
by the particular enumeration subjoined.”264
There was yet another reason, Madison asserted, a broad interpretation
of defense and general welfare provisions failed, and that was the structure
of the Constitution itself. The Constitution created a federal government of
limited and enumerated powers precisely so as to preserve the powers of the
States. And it was the right and responsibility of the States to create and
regulate banks. A federal bank “would directly interfere with the rights of
the States to prohibit as well as establish Banks and the circulation of bank
notes.”265 Thus, the contention that Congress could charter the Bank,
Madison concluded, could not be justified by reference to Congress’s power
to tax.266
What then of the power to borrow money? Might the Bank bill pass
constitutional muster under Article I, Section Eight, Clause Two?267
Madison asked the simple rhetorical question: “Is this a bill to borrow
money?”268 “It does not borrow a shilling,” Madison swiftly answered his
own rhetorical question.269
Madison, however, was not yet finished. Was there “any fair construc-
tion” by which the Bank bill might be justified under Congress’s power to
borrow money?270 In other words, might the power to borrow be construed
so as to embrace the power to charter a bank? Madison thought it impossi-
ble. The meaning of the word “borrow” was clear. It is the extension of a
loan from one willing to make it to one who agrees to pay it back.271 The
Bank bill did not do this. It merely facilitated the “power” or “ability” to
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
263. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (1791).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 1946–1947; see also Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123
YALE L.J. 2044, 2083 (2014); Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1295, 1314 (1997).
267. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (“[Congress shall have power] . . . To borrow Money on the
credit of the United States.”).
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lend and to borrow, and this was to extend the analysis beyond the text’s
meaning.272 Large British trading firms like the East India Company were
creditors to the English crown, Madison observed.273 Adopt an expansive
construction of the power to borrow clause and soon, Madison predicted,
the United States Congress would be incorporating immense manufacturing
and trading enterprises on the pretext of the power of lending and
borrowing.274
What, then, of the necessary and proper clause? By its terms, this
clause empowered Congress “To make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”275
Madison insisted upon a narrow interpretation of this clause.276 Too
many had fallen into error when attempting to give this constitutional provi-
sion a broad meaning. It did not confer on Congress “a power necessary and
proper for the Government or Union.”277 Rather, its scope was limited to
effectuating only “the enumerated powers.”278 For Madison, this was the
essence of the Constitution: “no power . . . not enumerated could be in-
ferred from the general nature of Government.”279
Madison was willing to pursue the logic of this insight to extreme
lengths. He pointed out first the care with which particular powers had been
crafted. Congress was given not only the authority “to regulate the value of
money,” but the power to ensure “that counterfeiters may be punished.”280
Not only, furthermore, was Congress empowered to declare war, but given
the express authority “to raise and support armies” and to “make rules and
regulations for the government of armies.”281 Had the treaty power not been
conferred by express constitutional provision, Madison was sure, its ab-
sence “could only have been lamented or supplied by an amendment of the
Constitution.”282 Madison conceded that the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers was not perfect. Perfection “is not the character of any human
work.”283 Nevertheless, Madison stood his ground, “the exercise of any
272. Id.; H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651,
659 (1995).
273. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1948 (1791).
274. Id.
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.




280. Id. at 1949.
281. Id.
282. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791); see also Randy Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44
UCLA L. REV. 745, 753 (1997); Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Powers Doctrine,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 58–59 (2005).
283. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791).
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power, particularly a great and important power which is not evidently and
necessarily involved in an express power” must be condemned.284 And
even if the power could be found, Madison added, “the proposed Bank
could not even be called necessary to the Government; at most it could be
but convenient.”285
Madison reinforced this position with an appeal to the nature and pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights, particularly the Ninth Amendment.286 The Bill of
Rights, he asserted, aimed to strip Congress of certain powers: “the power
of Congress to abridge freedom of the press, or the rights of conscience,
[et]c”287 were among the powers taken from Congress. “All of these renun-
ciations of power,” Madison, ever the artful craftsman, explained, “pro-
ceeded on a rule of construction” that demanded a narrow interpretation of
Congress’s enumerated powers.288
This was because the Ninth Amendment provided the interpretive key
through which the Bill of Rights and the authority of Congress should be
seen.289 All power not specifically conferred on Congress was retained by
the States. “[L]atitude of interpretation” must accordingly be avoided so as
to preserve this delicate and finely-wrought constitutional order.290
And so for Madison the conclusion was inescapable: “It appeared on
the whole . . . that the power exercised by the bill was condemned by the
silence of the Constitution; was condemned by the rule of interpretation
arising out of the Constitution; was condemned by its tendency to destroy
the main characteristic of the Constitution.”291
There was a logic and coherence to Madison’s argument. The Bank
bill was a comprehensively unconstitutional piece of legislation on his rea-
soning. The creation of the Bank could not be justified under any express
power; nor could the Constitution be construed to permit its founding on a
theory of implied or constructive powers. The structure of the Constitution
stood against the Bank, as did Madison’s rules of interpretation, which he
claimed were not mere private insights but derived from the logic of the
284. Id.; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71
N.C. L. REV. 949, 955–956 (1993).
285. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791).
286. Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV.
801, 844–848 (2008); Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60
STAN. L. REV. 895, 917 (2008); see also Eugene M. Van Loan, III, Natural Rights and the Ninth
Amendment, 48 BOS. U. L. REV. 1, 12–15 (1968) (further elucidating Madison’s conception of the
Ninth Amendment as reserving to the States all powers not expressly enumerated in the
Constitution).
287. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (1791).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.; see also Kurt T. Lash, Originalism as Jujitsu, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 521, 530 (2009)
(“James Madison saw the Ninth as an enforceable rule of construction which actively constrained
the interpretation of Congress’ enumerated powers.”) (book review).
291. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1951 (1791).
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Constitution and the Bill of Rights, especially the Ninth Amendment.
Madison’s logic was powerful, but was it unassailable?
b. James Jackson
James Jackson of Georgia raised two major objections to the Bank bill.
First, he argued that the Bank did not serve the common interests of the
nation. It aimed rather “to benefit a small part of the United States, the
mercantile interest only.”292 Farmers will not benefit from the Bank,
whether they reside in Georgia or New Hampshire.293 Nor would those citi-
zens who live some distance from the nation’s great commercial centers.
“[T]he bank bills will not circulate to the extremities of the Union.”294
While he did not cite a particular provision, Jackson believed that this fa-
voritism contributed to its “unconstitutionality.”295
Also contributing to its constitutional invalidity, in Jackson’s estima-
tion, was the monopoly the Bank bill seemed to create.296 The word “mo-
nopoly,” in late eighteenth-century political and legal thought, was
freighted with significance.297 It signified oppression and the unjust ac-
cumulation of wealth.298 Monopoly was associated with the British Crown
and its economic exploitation of its American colonies.299 Indeed, English
trade with its colonies, in America and India, depended upon the generous
granting of monopolies and privileges to favored trading firms, such as the
much-despised East India Company.300 Thus, the Boston Tea Party targeted
East India cargoes.301 The Constitutional Convention debated whether to
insert an antimonopoly clause into the text of the Constitution,302 while
several states either adopted antimonopoly clauses or urged Congress to
include such a clause among the Bill of Rights.303





297. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History
of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1009 (2013).
298. JAMES R. FICHTER, SO GREAT A PROFIT: HOW THE EAST INDIES TRADE TRANSFORMED
ANGLO-AMERICAN CAPITALISM 17 (2010).
299. See Robert E. Wright, Rise of the Corporation Nation, in FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S, at 217, 228 (Douglas A. Irwin & Richard Sylla eds., 2011).
300. HERBERT APTHEKER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763–1783: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 42 (1960); JONATHAN EACOTT, SELLING EMPIRE: INDIA IN THE MAKING OF
BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1600–1836, at 170, 170 n.2 (2016).
301. ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION, 1763–1776, at 281–290 (1939); see also Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Uprising Against
the East India Company, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 60, 73 (1917) (“[T]he fear of monopoly was the main-
spring of American opposition . . . .”).
302. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 297, at 1009–1016.
303. Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 799–801 (1982); STEPHEN M. KRASON,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 187 (2012).
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To denounce the Bank as establishing a monopoly was, thus, to invoke
strong feelings about the reasons for the American Revolution. Although
Jackson did not—and could not—point to a particular clause, he clearly
understood the “spirit of the Constitution” to be repugnant to
monopolies.304
In other respects, Jackson’s criticism of the Bank tracked Madison’s
closely. He did not believe it could be justified under the necessary and
proper clause,305 and he viewed it as a threat to the right of the States to
charter and regulate banks.306 The national economy, he observed finally,
was recovering nicely and, thus, a Bank was not necessary even if it was
constitutionally permissible.307
c. Michael Jenifer Stone
Stone saw the debate as posing a momentous choice for the partici-
pants: did the Constitution confer upon Congress all of the powers of a
“General Government” enjoying the rights of unlimited legislative author-
ity?308 Or did it create a federal government of merely limited powers, vest-
ing instead most governing authority in the States?309
Stone’s speech was given to hyperbole. Was the choice really as stark
as Stone suggested? Did the Bank bill really force Congress to select be-
tween the total abandonment of all constitutional restraint, on the one hand,
versus fidelity to a conception of limited government? Stone, for one,
thought so. He bolstered this claim with three main arguments.
First, Stone was willing to go even farther than Madison did in criticiz-
ing the exercise of implied or constructive or incidental powers. Once the
door is opened to this sort of reasoning, all constitutional restraint vanishes:
“If gentlemen are allowed to range in their sober discretion for the means, it
is plain they have no limits. By the cabalistic word incident, your Constitu-
tion is turned upside down, and instead of being a grant of particular pow-
ers, . . . it is made to imply all powers.”310
Stone sought to prove the inappropriateness of implied powers by two
quite different supporting contentions. First, he contended that the structure
of the Constitution precluded implied powers. He sought to establish this
point with some logical propositions. It is impossible, he stated, for a con-
stitution to forbid the exercise of particular powers since the imagination
can always maneuver its way around a list of prohibitions.311 Thus, the only
304. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1791).
305. See id. at 1987.
306. Id. at 1981, 1987.
307. Id. at 1987.
308. Id. at 1983.
309. See id.
310. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983–1984 (1791) (emphasis added).
311. Id. at 1983.
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effective means of forbidding the exercise of general powers was to propose
a list of narrowly-defined express powers, “implying a negative to all
others.”312 In this way, Congress is restricted in what it may and may not
do. The “discretion of the Legislature,” Stone claimed, far from reigning
supreme in Congress, “was the very thing intended to be curbed and re-
strained by our Constitution.”313
The logic of this reasoning was compelling once the premise was ac-
cepted: if the Constitution established a government of limited means; if
those means are expressly enumerated in the constitutional text; if all pow-
ers not expressly enumerated in the text cannot as a matter of definition be
exercised by the federal government; then it follows that it is impermissible
to resort to implied powers.
Stone believed that resort to implied powers was improper for a second
reason also, in that it opposed the popular will.314 Public opinion was united
on this point: “Never did any country more completely unite in any senti-
ment than America in this, ‘that Congress ought not to exercise, by implica-
tion, powers not granted by the Constitution.’”315 Stone cited no evidence
for this sweeping conclusion. It stands today less as evidence of the mood
of the public than the willingness of a leading member of Congress to cite
public opinion as a valid source of constitutional interpretation.
Stone’s second main argument against the Bank bill was the impact it
had on the States. As he understood it, the Bank bill aimed both to disfavor
state banking and monetary regimes and to elevate the Bank of the United
States as supreme.316
Stone reminded his listeners that many states had issued notes which
remained important for local business.317 Not only that, but there were a
number of states that had chartered or were preparing to charter local
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1982.
315. Id.
316. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1982 (1791).
317. See id. at 1981 (“[Stone] took notice of the distinction made by the plan of the bill,
between Continental and State paper. The State paper, on account of partial payments of interest
still remained in the respective states.”). Stone’s point is that the Bank of the United States chal-
lenged the operation of this system. In fact, state-issued currency, although disallowed by the new
Constitution, “continued to circulate and dominate market transactions into the early 1790s.” Far-
ley Grubb, Creating the U.S. Dollar Currency Union, 1748–1811: A Quest for Monetary Stability
or a Usurpation of State Sovereignty for Personal Gain?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1778, 1783 (2003).
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banks.318 Stone defended the rights of these states,319 asserting these efforts
could be damaged or destroyed by the Bank of the United States.320
Finally, Stone contended that the Bank bill violated a principle of non-
discrimination among the States which he believed had been enshrined in
the Constitution. “In the fair administration of our Government,” Stone un-
derstood the Constitution to declare, “no partial advantages may be
given.”321
Hamilton’s financial program, in Stone’s opinion, had already begun
to corrode national unity. The system of tariffs and duties that Hamilton had
already seen through Congress322 shifted the burden of taxation to “the con-
sumers of manufactures.”323 The East in particular benefitted from this ar-
rangement, while the Southern states were disadvantaged.324 The Bank bill
would only enhance these sectional divisions.325
3. Observations
Each of these three opponents of the Bank bill brought distinctive in-
sights to bear in their reasoning. In each case, furthermore, the analysis
went beyond the mere details of the Bank bill to offer more general points
about the Constitution.
For Madison, it was the rigor of his thinking. He articulated an entire
theory of the Constitution and used it to frame his opposition to the Bill.
The Constitution was one of limited and enumerated powers. This insight
might be a truism, but Madison used it not only to explain particular consti-
tutional provisions such as the necessary and proper clause, but as a princi-
ple of interpretation (“latitude of interpretation” must be avoided). Indeed,
even the Bill of Rights was made to fit this larger vision, with the Ninth
Amendment furnishing the main interpretive key.
Jackson, for his part, introduced what amounted to a paradoxical the-
ory of national unity. The position and status of the States within the consti-
tutional order must be shown particular deference since any effort to govern
from a national perspective would result in the advantaging of one region or
way of life at the expense of another. Not only that, but Jackson’s condem-
318. See generally Benjamin J. Klebaner, State-Chartered American Commercial Banks,
1781–1801, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 529, 530–535 (1979); J. Van Fenstermaker & John E. Filer,
Impact of the First and Second Banks of the United States and the Suffolk System on New England
Bank Money, 1791–1837, 18 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 28, 29–30 (1986).
319. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1987 (1791) (“The States will institute banks which will answer
every purpose.”).
320. See id. at 1981.
321. Id. at 1987.
322. JOHN M. DOBSON, BULLS, BEARS, BOOM, AND BUST: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCEPTS 107 (2007) (“On July 4, 1789, the First Session of the First Con-
gress passed the first tariff legislation for the United States.”).
323. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1981 (1791).
324. Id.
325. Id.
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nation of monopolies suggested an economic understanding of the Constitu-
tion that was simultaneously egalitarian and libertarian. Everyone should
have the right to make his or her own way in the world, and no one should
be the beneficiary of government preference at the expense of someone
else.
Stone, finally, showed himself the constitutional radical. While he
made common cause with Madison, he did not share Madison’s willing-
ness—at least on occasion—to permit the introduction of implied or con-
structive powers. For Stone, the logic of the Constitution pointed to the
exclusion of all implied powers. Like Jackson, Stone wished for a modest
federal government exercising limited powers as essential to good constitu-
tional order.
Both Jackson and Stone saw the Bank bill, and Hamilton’s other eco-
nomic reforms, as favoring one form of economic organization—manufac-
turing and commerce—over another. For Jackson and Stone in particular,
the Constitution should not discriminate between modes of making a living.
Jackson and Stone would have described themselves as farmers, and their
way of life as agrarian. But more honestly they made their living from plan-
tation-based slavery and it is not difficult to see their interest in the preser-
vation of this way of life as the main motive for the positions they took.
B. The Supporters of the Bank
1. The Personalities
James Madison’s counterpart among the proponents of the Bank bill
was Fisher Ames (1758–1808) of Massachusetts. Since Hamilton was not a
member of the House, he had to turn to House members for support, where
Ames established himself as “a leading spokesman for Hamilton.”326
Ames’ background was fundamentally dissimilar to Madison’s. His fa-
ther was Nathaniel Ames, a lawyer, physician, and writer.327 Nathaniel died
when Fisher was six, causing the family to struggle financially.328 Ames
himself trained as a teacher and a lawyer, and had established himself in
practice by the end of the Revolutionary War.329 Quickly bored with legal
practice, Ames sought an outlet in state politics.330
326. JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1789–1803, at 51 (1986).
327. Nathaniel Ames wrote and published the Ames Almanack, which was focused on science,
skeptical of superstition, and was perhaps even more popular than Benjamin Franklin’s Poor
Richard’s Almanac, “selling upwards of 50,000 copies annually at the height of his popularity.”
See Peter Eisenstadt, Almanacs and the Disenchantment of Early America, 65 PA. HIST. 143, 158
(1998); see also Marion Barbara Stowell, The Influence of Nathaniel Ames on the Literary Taste
of His Time, 18 EARLY AM. LITERATURE 127, 143 (assessing Ames’s impact on colonial American
literature).
328. Ames’s mother became a Massachusetts inn-keeper. Elisha P. Douglas, Fisher Ames,
Spokesman for New England Federalism, 103 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 693, 696 (1959).
329. See id. at 697.
330. Id.
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His unyielding response to Shays’ Rebellion brought him prominence.
He wrote to denounce “[t]he crime of levying war against the state” and the
“high treason” of Daniel Shays.331 The rebellion should rouse the American
people to action. It was time, he warned his audience, for the American
nation such as it was to form tighter bonds of union: “While the bands of
union are so loose, we are no more entitled to the character of a nation than
the hordes of vagabond traitors.”332 These and other similar strident com-
ments led Ames to join the company of some of the most powerful and
conservative figures in New England politics.333
Ames quickly developed a “reputation for oratory”334 and was elected
as a Massachusetts representative to the First Congress,335 where he distin-
guished himself early by proposing language that eventually became the
First Amendment.336 But if Ames worked well with Madison on the Bill of
Rights, on the Bank bill they were opponents.
Ames was joined in opposition by another Massachusetts representa-
tive, Theodore Sedgwick (1746–1813). Like Ames, Sedgwick was a law-
yer,337 and had served in the Revolutionary War, seeing action in
Canada.338 Following the War, Sedgwick practiced law in Massachusetts
and gained some fame for successfully litigating the freedom of an African-
American woman on the principle that all persons are created equal and
therefore none should be enslaved.339 He was active in state government in
the 1780s and was elected to the First Congress.340 Sedgwick went on to a
331. FISHER AMES, Lucius Junius Brutus, in WORKS OF FISHER AMES 1, 2 (Boston, T.B. Wait
1809).
332. FISHER AMES, Camillus No. III, in WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra note 331, at 16, 18.
333. See David H. Fischer, The Myth of the Essex Junto, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 191, 194–195
(1964); see generally John W. Malsberger, The Political Thought of Fisher Ames, 2 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 1, 1–20 (discussing Ames’s Calvinism, his conservatism, and his commitment to a
strong national government).
334. JOHN ZVESPER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS 169 (1977).
335. Samuel Eliot Morison, Squire Ames and Doctor Ames, 1 NEW ENG. Q. 5, 13 (1928).
336. David Reiss, Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion
Clause Jurisprudence, 61 MD. L. REV. 94, 141 (2002); DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE,
AND ORIGINAL INTENT 235 (2010).
337. Sedgwick was expelled from theology studies at Yale College and subsequently appren-
ticed himself to a prominent Massachusetts lawyer. TIMOTHY KINSLEA, THE SEDGWICKS IN LOVE:
COURTSHIP, ENGAGEMENT, AND MARRIAGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 4–5 (2006).
338. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY CONGRESS, supra note 228, at 1885.
339. GARY B. NASH, THE UNKNOWN AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE UNRULY BIRTH OF DEMOC-
RACY AND THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE AMERICA 408 (2005); EMILY BLANCK, TYRANNICIDE: FORG-
ING AN AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY IN REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH CAROLINA AND MASSACHUSETTS
120–121 (2014); Arthur Zilversmit, Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of Slavery in Mas-
sachusetts, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 614, 619–620 (1968).
340. Jack N. Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
261, 281 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
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distinguished career, serving as Speaker of the House from 1799 to 1801341
and as a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1802 to
his death in 1813.342
Unlike Ames and Sedgwick, Elias Boudinot (1740–1821) was already
an established political figure at the time of his election to the First Con-
gress. He was a lawyer who was named to the College of New Jersey’s (the
future Princeton University) board of trustees in 1772, a position he re-
tained for life.343 He was a member of the Continental Congress and had
served a term as its president,344 in 1782 and 1783, during which time he
received the British surrender at Yorktown.345 In his capacity as President,
he signed the Treaty of Paris, which acknowledged American independence
from Great Britain.346
Following the War, Boudinot practiced law prior to his election to the
House, a seat he retained until 1795.347 He would eventually help to organ-
ize the American Bible Society and served as its first president until his
death.348 Among the founders, Boudinot was perhaps the most deeply relig-
ious, revealing a “warm evangelicalism” during his long tenure in public
life.349
Finally, there was Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814). Like Ames and
Sedgwick, he hailed from Massachusetts and was the son of a merchant.350
He was active in resistance to Great Britain by 1774351 and was one of the
341. See generally Patrick J. Furlong, John Rutledge, Jr., and the Election of a Speaker of the
House in 1799, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 432, 432–436 (1967) (discussing the circumstances of
Sedgwick’s election as Speaker).
342. See generally William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
325, 339 (2004).
343. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–1989, at
34 (Robert Sobel ed., 1990).
344. Rick K. Wilson & Calvin Jillson, Leadership Patterns in the Continental Congress:
1774–1789, 14 LEGIS. AFF. Q. 5, 14, 18–19 (1989).
345. JOHN D. GRAINGER, THE BATTLE OF YORKTOWN, 1781: A REASSESSMENT 160 (2005).
346. JEAN-RAE TURNER & RICHARD T. KOLES, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 33 (2001); see also
JEAN-RAE TURNER & RICHARD T. KOLES, ELIZABETH: FIRST CAPITAL OF NEW JERSEY 52 (2003)
(“Boudinot is considered by some historians to have been the first president of the United States
since he was president of the Continental Congress when the Treaty of Paris was signed . . . .”).
347. 1 NEW JERSEY BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 59–60 (Caryn Hannan et al. eds., 2008–2009
ed. 2008).
348. Jonathan J. Den Hartog, Elias Boudinot, Presbyterians, and the Quest for a “Righteous
Republic”, in FAITH AND THE FOUNDERS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 253, 258 (Daniel L. Dreis-
bach & Mark David Hall eds., 2014).
349. JONATHAN J. DEN HARTOG, PATRIOTISM AND PIETY: FEDERALIST POLITICS AND RELIG-
IOUS STRUGGLE IN THE NEW AMERICAN NATION 96 (2015).
350. 2 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1761 (Michael Nelson ed.,
5th ed. 2013).
351. See Christopher P. Magra, “Soldiers . . . Bred to the Sea”: Maritime Marblehead, Massa-
chusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution, 77 NEW ENG. Q. 531, 547
(2004).
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signers of the Declaration of Independence in 1776.352 He participated in
the Constitutional Convention, but argued against ratification, objecting that
the judiciary it created was too powerful,353 that the Senate’s role in treaty-
making was too great,354 and that there was no bill of rights that might
protect individuals from summary government power.355
Once elected to Congress, he remained an independent spirit and was
criticized even by political allies for his seeming inconsistencies.356 He
sometimes tangled with Hamilton,357 but nevertheless allied with him on
the Bank bill.358 He became scandalously involved in the XYZ affair, a
botched negotiation with the French Revolutionary government, which led
to some naval skirmishing between the two countries.359 Still, he recovered
from this embarrassment to be elected Governor of Massachusetts in
1810.360 He died in office while serving as James Madison’s Vice President
in 1814.361
These four figures presented a significant contrast with Madison and
his collaborators. While their names may not be well remembered today,
they were substantial figures, including in their number a Revolutionary
War statesman, a future Speaker of the House, and a future Vice President.
But they inhabited a different region of the country from their Southern
opponents, and not only that, they seemed to inhabit a different universe of
experience. They were lawyers and merchants who did not own large
landed estates and who did not draw a profit from the bondage of others.
They were certainly not poor, but they were also not born to great privilege
or position. A clash over something as fundamental as the First Bank of the
United States, which entailed not only the exercise of federal power but a
preferential option for commercial life, seemed almost predestined.
352. Michael J. Kasper, The Almost Rise and Not Quite Fall of the Political Gerrymander, 27
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 409, 411 (2007).
353. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 54–55 (1923).
354. John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1235–1236 (2009).
355. A. E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta’s American Adventure, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1413, 1419
(2016); John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Grand Security: The Debate Over a Federal Bill of
Rights, 1787–1792, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 887, 890 (1993).
356. TERRI DIANE HALPERIN, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS OF 1798: TESTING THE CONSTI-
TUTION 42 (2016).
357. See generally Freeman W. Meyer, A Note on the Origins of the “Hamiltonian System”,
21 WM. & MARY Q. 579, 584 (1964).
358. S. E. Morison, Elbridge Gerry, Gentleman-Democrat, 2 NEW ENG. Q. 6, 21–22 (1929).
359. 1 GUIDE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 10 (Robert J. McMahon &
Thomas W. Zeiler eds., 2012); Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: The
Adams Network and the Quasi-War, 1797–1798, 31 J. EARLY AM. REPUBLIC 283, 292–294,
305–308 (2011).
360. GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE ELECTO-
RAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2002).
361. JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL DISA-
BILITY AND SUCCESSION 10 (2015).
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2. The Proponents’ Case
a. Fisher Ames
Fisher Ames commenced his argument by declaring that banks of the
sort contemplated by Hamilton have been almost universally recognized by
the nations of the world as not only “useful to trade” but “almost essential
to revenue” and “little short of indispensably necessary in times of public
emergency.”362 “In countries whose forms of Government left them free to
choose, this institution has been adopted of choice.”363 “The most orderly
governments in Europe have banks.”364 And banks have proven their value
“in times of national danger and calamity,” so much so, in fact, that they
have become “a necessary means of self-preservation.”365
Ames was engaging in rhetorical flourishes. Who, he seemed to ask,
might obstruct America from having a bank of its own? “The gentleman
from Virginia,” Ames acidly continued, has raised objections.366 This gen-
tleman—Ames was referring to Madison—participated in the Constitu-
tional Convention and now insisted “that the meaning of the Constitution is
to be interpreted by contemporaneous testimony”—in other words, by the
intent of those who drafted it.367 Ames admired the “felicity” of Madison’s
“situation”—a backhanded way of referring to his role in Philadelphia—but
he did not believe that this was the proper means of interpreting the
Constitution.368
Ames did not comment further on the question of what we would call
original intent, preferring instead to commence discussion of what he took
to be the two important questions the Bank Bill posed: “[M]ay Congress
exercise any powers which are not expressly given in the Constitution, but
may be deduced by a reasonable construction of that instrument? And, sec-
ondly, will such a construction warrant the establishment of the bank?”369
Answering the first of these questions, Ames further contended, re-
quired Congress to move beyond “the letter of the Constitution.”370 If
Madison wished to be a constitutional literalist—Ames implied but did not
directly state—he would demonstrate for Madison the absurdity of that po-
sition. Consider, Ames stated, the many acts of legislation the First Con-
gress has already passed into law. Under its authority to regulate trade,
362. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1953 (1791).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1956.
365. Id. at 1953.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1953–1954 (1791); see also GUY PADULA, MADISON V. MARSHALL:
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, NATURAL LAW, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 83 (2001) (fur-
ther examining Ames’s and Madison’s approaches to constitutional interpretation).
369. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791).
370. Id.
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Ames pointed out, Congress “taxed ships, erected light-houses, made laws
to govern seamen, [etc.], because we say that they are the incidents to that
power.”371 There are no express clauses in the Constitution authorizing any
of these undertakings, Ames noted, and so each of these pieces of legisla-
tion required Congress to construe the text and make use of its
“discretion.”372
Thus, for Ames, the Constitution was neither self-limiting or self-exe-
cuting. Rather, it was a document that called on the members of Congress to
exercise sound judgment as to policy choices. And these choices need not
be limited by a rigidly literal application of the constitutional text. Indeed,
he declared, an examination of the structure and language of the Constitu-
tion revealed it was written so as to maximize the possibility for choice.
“[T]he ingenuity of man was unequal to providing, especially beforehand,
for all the contingencies that would happen.”373 The drafters of the Consti-
tution, in other words, could not have foreseen or provided for every possi-
bility. Hence, the Constitution was drafted with an eye towards establishing
“the principles which are to govern in making laws.”374 And these were
principles that were flexible and forward-looking and aimed to make the
Constitution a document that could serve many and varied legislative
agendas.375
Thus, Ames demonstrated that although Madison viewed the Constitu-
tion as a strict restraint on legislative authority, it should rather be read as
an empowering document. It empowered law-makers to use their discretion,
acting within broadly-defined principles, to make judgment calls as to the
best course of action to take on pressing questions of policy. Law-makers
might make mistakes from time to time, Ames conceded, but they should
nevertheless always follow their “honest conviction[s]” as to the Constitu-
tion’s meaning and the soundness of the legislative acts they wished to
undertake.376
In truth, Ames argued, the Madisonian reading of the Constitution as a
series of limited and enumerated powers did not represent a superior form
of analysis. It was simply one choice among competing interpretations of a
text and not a very good one.377 What Madison and his allies did was
371. Id.
372. Id. Ames added that if Madison’s view were adopted: “A great part of our two years’
labor is lost, and worse than lost to the public, for we have scarcely made a law in which we have
not exercised our discretion with regard to the true intent of the Constitution.” Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1791) (“That construction may be maintained to be a safe one
which promotes the good of society, and the ends for which the Government was adopted.”).
376. Id. at 1954; see also GARY MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 264 (2010) (further developing the contrast between Ames’s
and Madison’s approaches to the Constitution).
377. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 32 (2007).
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merely to pit “one construction against another.”378 “The powers of Con-
gress are disputed,” Ames observed.379 And, Ames continued, this was in
keeping with the Constitution’s design and purpose. It was meant to pro-
mote dispute and disagreement. Such is the essential character of a docu-
ment consisting of broadly-phrased principles.
And if this was so, Ames argued, then restraint is not necessarily the
safer course. “The negative, if false, is less safe than the affirmative, if true.
Why, then, shall we be told that the negative is the safe side? Not exercising
the powers we have, may be as pernicious as usurping those we have not.”
To illustrate this point, Ames took one of Madison’s arguments and turned
it on its head. Suppose, he said, the Constitution failed expressly to confer
on Congress the power to raise an army. Such a power could still “be im-
plied from other parts of the Constitution.”380 Not to do so would be to
invite foreign invaders to lay waste to the country.381
How, then, shall the Constitution be interpreted? Ames submitted first
that it must be understood to create a government. Government was a spe-
cial word for Ames. Ames was a believer in good and just government that
proceeds according to “a fixed rule and standard of political happiness, and
that is the greatest permanent happiness of the greatest number of peo-
ple.”382 Furthermore, for Ames, government was not an arbitrary set of
rules or the supreme power in a community, but rather the “highest kind of
corporation” and as such “has tacitly annexed to its being various powers
. . . which are essential to its effecting the purposes for which it was
framed.”383
Happiness and a government empowered to effectuate it. In speaking
thus, Ames was dealing in abstractions that would have been instantly rec-
ognizable to an eighteenth-century mind. The word “happiness” as abstract
philosophical principle was undergoing transition as it came to signify in-
creasingly the ideas of freedom of action and self-empowerment.384 In-
creasingly, the promotion of happiness had come to be seen by at least
some writers as a concern of government.385 And “government,” broadly




382. AMES, Camillus, supra note 332, at 19.
383. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791).
384. JOHN PHILIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AU-
THORITY OF RIGHTS 79–80 (1986); Adam Potkay, Joy and Happiness, in A COMPANION TO THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH NOVEL AND CULTURE 327–334 (Paula R. Backscheider & Cathe-
rine Ingrassia eds., 2005).
385. James J. Jones, Prolegomena to a History of Happiness in the Eighteenth Century, 6
FRENCH-AM. REV. 283, 290 (1982).
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understood, had become the obsessive concern of political philosophy.386 It
was described in the sources as existing “for the common good”387 and as
seeking to serve the interests of the many and not the few.388 Government
was meant ideally both to restrain the passions389 but also to protect and
conserve well-ordered liberty.390
Constitutional interpreters, Ames proposed, must have recourse to this
larger body of ideas when construing the Constitution. And if they did, he
went on, they would know that the powers of government were real and
must be used to “promote the good of the society and the ends for which the
Government was adopted.”391
But, Ames assured his listeners, this did not mean that constitutional
limitations were to be disregarded in favor of a potentially limitless philo-
sophical quest for the proper blend of freedom and communal good. Read
broadly, the Constitution still imposed three types of restraint on Congress.
The legislature must not violate “the natural rights of man;” it must respect
the rights which have been “expressly reserved” to the people; and it must
preserve “the powers which are assigned to the States.”392 At the level of
general principle, one could find in Ames’ arguments echoes of Madison’s
constitutional claims. Still, unlike Madison, Ames did not understand the
Bank to infringe on any of the three categories of limitations he identified
largely, it seems, because of a half-articulated commitment to the idea of
government as protector of the common good.
Ames was now prepared to turn to the question of the Bank Bill, and in
doing so, he laid down a guiding principle: “As the bank is founded on the
free choice of those who make use of it, and is highly useful to the people
and to Government, a liberal construction is natural and safe. This circum-
stance creates a presumption in favor of its conformity to the
Constitution.”393
Ames must have sensed the weakness of the arguments he had thus far
advanced. After all, he did little more than elevate utilitarianism—a na-
386. Craig Smith, Forms of Government, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BRITISH PHILOSOPHY
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 530 (James A. Harris ed., 2013) (“One of the chief themes in
eighteenth-century British philosophy is the importance of the form of government.”).
387. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 7 (A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts).
388. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES ON GOVERNMENT 451 (1805).
389. RACHEL HAMMERSLEY, THE ENGLISH REPUBLICAN TRADITION AND EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY FRANCE: BETWEEN THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS 56–58 (2010).
390. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 35–44
(1997).
391. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1791); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADI-
TION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 95 (1993) (seeing
Ames as advancing a theory of government’s power “to act for the common good”).
392. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1791); see also Joseph M. Lynch, The Federalists and the
Federalist: A Forgotten History, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 18, 21 (2000) (further analyzing this
text).
393. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956 (1791).
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tional bank was useful to national interests—into an argument for its consti-
tutionality. He needed greater support, and so he next reviewed a series of
constitutional powers that might justify Congress’ decision to incorporate
the bank.
There was the interstate commerce clause—which Ames described as
“the power to regulate trade from State to State.”394 Trade and commerce
among the States “can never be on a good footing without a bank, whose
paper will circulate more extensively than that of any State bank.”395 There
was also the necessity of collecting and paying the interest on the national
debt. Payment transfers can be made much more efficiently through the
operation of the bank. Without the bank, Ames asked, “Is it possible to
transport the revenue from one end of the Continent to the other”?396 The
federal government cannot rely on state banks since not every state has a
bank, and there is no constitutional obligation that they should have one.397
Then there was national defense. Suppose the United States were in-
vaded while Congress was not in session. Who would finance an appropri-
ate military response until Congress could be convened?398 Only a bank
could be counted on in such circumstances.399
He scoured the Constitution for other possible sources of authority.
There was the clause—Article I, Section 8, Clause 17—which conferred on
Congress jurisdiction to govern the territory acquired for the new national
capital and property acquired for federal purposes, such as “Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals . . . and other needful Buildings.”400 If Congress en-
joyed the right of “exclusive legislation” for these territories, “it may estab-
lish a bank in those places with corporate powers.”401
And this brought Ames to the necessary and proper clause. He ac-
knowledged that the clause did not confer on Congress “any new pow-
ers.”402 Ames nevertheless insisted that the necessary and proper clause
should be read broadly, as “establish[ing] the doctrine of implied pow-
ers.”403 Still, he magnanimously conceded, even if one adopted Madison’s
narrow reading of the necessary and proper clause, banks remained indis-
pensable to the exercise of other constitutional powers and hence Congress





398. Id. at 1956–1957.
399. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1957 (1791).
400. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
401. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1959 (1791).
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMEND-
MENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 142 (2001).
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There is no question that Ames’s search for textual support was scat-
tershot. But did that search bespeak the strength of his claim of constitu-
tional authority or its weakness? Was the Constitution seemingly
honeycombed with sources of power for the establishment of a bank? Or
was Ames grabbing at a chimera? What Ames desperately required was a
unifying theory that could explain how these diverse powers fit together in
a single constitutional ensemble. His appeals to happiness and government
were insufficiently developed to provide the needed framework.
b. Theodore Sedgwick
Theodore Sedgwick’s analysis consisted of a carefully-wrought series
of syllogisms. First, he sought to identify the major purposes served by the
Constitution and of all Government. These included most especially “the
public good and general welfare”405 and “the general happiness of the peo-
ple.”406 If these were the purposes of constitutional government, then the
Constitution had to be interpreted as containing within itself “the means of
effecting the great purposes for which [it] was designed.”407
It is worthwhile to contrast this understanding of the Constitution with
the view espoused by Madison and his collaborators. They did not speak of
the Constitution in these terms. Indeed, the logic of their position would
have foreclosed such a vision. For them, the purpose of the Constitution
was to impose a minimum degree of consistency and coherence upon a
system in which most power and responsibility would be lodged in the
states. For Sedgwick, on the other hand, as it had been for Ames, the federal
government was charged with the responsibility of ensuring the general
welfare and the common good of the new nation and these were open-ended
responsibilities that Congress had to zealously fulfill.
Next, Sedgwick conceded that even though the Constitution aimed at
the achievement of these broad public purposes, it did not confer on Con-
gress general authority to achieve those lofty ends. Congressional action
still had to be justified by reference to particular constitutional
provisions.408
This recognition led Sedgwick to consider the nature of power as a
legal concept. There was a principle, he asserted, “universally acknowl-
edged,” that holds “that wherever a power is delegated for express pur-
poses, all the known and usual means for the attainment of the objects
expressed are conceded also.”409
405. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1962 (1791).
406. Id. at 1963.
407. Id. at 1961.
408. Id. (“[I]t would be necessary to reflect on the powers with which Congress are expressly
invested.”).
409. Id.; see also Robert G. Natelson, Tempering the Commerce Power, 68 MONT. L. REV. 95,
95, 111 n.83 (2007); Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
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To apply this principle, however, meant that Sedgwick had to identify
particular provisions of the Constitution under which the Bank might be
authorized. He had little problem doing so: “Congress was authorized to lay
and collect taxes, to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to
raise and support armies, provide and maintain navies, to regulate foreign
and domestic trade, and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry
these and other enumerated powers into effect.”410
The next step in Sedgwick’s reasoning was to connect these substan-
tive grants of power with the necessary and proper clause. On this, he di-
rectly challenged Madison. For Madison, the word “necessary” carried a
meaning akin to “indispensable.” Since he did not view the Bank as neces-
sary but merely as “convenient” to the good functioning of government,
Madison condemned it as unconstitutional.411
For Sedgwick, however, Madison’s equation of “necessary” as equal-
ing “indispensable” was not supported by the Constitution and had not been
the way Congress had thus far interpreted its legislative authority.412 To
make this point, Sedgwick held up for inspection many of the First Con-
gress’s legislative enactments: “Such a construction would be infinitely too
narrow and limited; and to apply the meaning strictly, it would prove per-
haps that all the laws which had been passed were unconstitutional; for few,
if any, of them could be proved indispensable to the existence of the
Government.”413
Still, Sedgwick was not prepared to endorse an unfettered power of
congressional action to pass laws that were merely “convenient” to the ac-
complishment of one or another of the Constitution’s enumerated powers.
He sought for a middle ground between Madison’s rigorism and a general
license to legislate. He located that middle ground in his understanding of
power: a grant of power carried “the known and usual means” for effectuat-
ing it. And reliance on a bank was undoubtedly a known and usual means
employed by many governments for raising taxes, financing armies, and
achieving all other constitutional powers.414
Where Ames’ defense of the Bank attained its objective through bril-
liant rhetorical embellishment, Sedgwick’s reached the same goal through
tightly reasoned syllogism. Both, however, arrived at the same destination.
in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 60–80 (Gary Lawson et al. eds.,
2010) (both articles tracing the source of this universal acknowledgment to the common law’s
treatment of incidental powers in such areas as agency and the administration of trusts).
410. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1961 (1791).
411. Id.
412. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1961–1962 (“It might be of use to determine with precision what
was the meaning of the words necessary and proper—they did not restrict the power of the Legis-
lature to enacting such laws only as are indispensable.”).
413. Id. at 1962.
414. Id.
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c. Elias Boudinot
For Boudinot, the primary question was the constitutionality of the
Bank Bill. The members of the House could judge for themselves whether a
bank was needed, but before reaching that question, the House had to deter-
mine whether it possessed power to act under the Constitution.415
Boudinot asserted that constitutional analysis had to proceed, in the
first instance, from the Preamble. The Preamble “declar[es] the general pur-
poses for which [the Constitution] was formed: ‘the insurance of domestic
tranquility, provision for the common defence, and promotion of the gen-
eral welfare.’”416 The whole of the Constitution must be seen through the
prism of the Preamble. Every grant of power, every authorization, must be
evaluated and understood as a means of furthering these great purposes.417
Constitutional historians today recognize the crucial role the Preamble
has played in the development of ideas about the nature and purpose of the
United States even if it has not figured prominently in case law.418 Scott
Douglas Gerber has argued that the Preamble possesses “substantive signif-
icance” in the way it summarizes the meaning of the American nation.419
Akhil Reed Amar declared that the Preamble contained within itself a “geo-
strategic vision of union.”420 Carol Berkin wrote that the Preamble was re-
sponsible for forging a distinctive American identity. Its careful choice of
words and elegant style caused its readers to think of themselves as citizens
first of the United States and only then of the separate states.421
A careful lawyer, Boudinot did not find it necessary to advance such
far-reaching claims in his invocation of the Preamble, but he almost surely
would have agreed with them. Rather, he looked to two phrases of the Pre-
amble in particular that required the financial security that the Bank en-
sured: “The public defence [and] general welfare” both demanded revenue
streams that were predictable and sufficient.422
Having identified these large general purposes, Boudinot next searched
for the particular enumerated powers that were meant to give them effect.
He condensed a number of specific clauses into a tightly phrased sentence
that emphasized Congress’s powers to ensure national security, to borrow
415. Id. at 1970.
416. Id. at 1972 (quoting Preamble of the Constitution).
417. Id.
418. Erhard Denninger, Constitutional Law Between Statutory Law and Higher Law, in LAW
IN THE MAKING: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 103, 113 (Alessandro Pizzarusso ed., 1988).
419. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 60 (1995).
420. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 106 (2005).
421. Carol Berkin, “We the People of the United States”: The Birth of an American Identity,
September 1787, 20 OAH MAG. HIST. 53, 53 (2006).
422. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1973 (1971).
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money, and “to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion the foregoing powers.”423
Boudinot warned Congress to take his concerns for national security
seriously. He subtly reminded the members of his service in the Continental
Congress and how the revolutionary cause nearly collapsed for want of ade-
quate funding.424 “That danger which was then so hardly avoided became a
solemn memento to this House to provide against a similar case of
necessity.”425
The word “necessity” was crucial to Boudinot’s analysis. Unlike
Sedgwick, Boudinot viewed the Bank as indispensable and so he proceeded
to demonstrate its necessity to the well-being of the nation. Again, Boudinot
adverted to the financial crises of the Revolutionary War to stress the indis-
pensability of a bank to any war effort: “To this necessary end it becomes
Congress to provide that the necessary means may be always at hand, by
being able to arm their citizens and provide their support while engaged in
the defense of their common country.”426
Still, Boudinot was not finished making the constitutional case for the
Bank. He was satisfied that a bank met the constitutional standard of neces-
sity he had set for it, but he still had to resolve the question whether Con-
gress had the authority to grant a corporate charter. Boudinot thought the
Bank opponents were unduly dismissive by maintaining Congress had no
constitutional power to grant corporate charters.427 In reply, Boudinot
sought to explain precisely what a grant of a corporate charter meant at law.
It was important for Boudinot to take this step since the common law
of corporations was then undergoing a major transition. Corporations were
a regular feature of medieval law, known to canon,428 Roman,429 and En-
glish common law.430 These corporations, however, were typically not busi-
ness firms but institutions of governance. A bishop and his chapter might
423. Id. at 1972.
424. Id. at 1975.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 1973.
427. Id. at 1971.
428. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 98–105 (Routledge 2013) (1995).
429. John F. Padgett, The Emergence of Corporate Merchant-Banks in Dugento Tuscany, in
THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS 121, 122 (John F. Padgett & Walter W.
Powel eds., 2012).
430. David J. Seipp, Formalism and Realism in Fifteenth-Century English Law: Bodies Cor-
porate and Bodies Natural, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND
CIVIL LAW: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 37, 40 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds.,
2012).
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comprise a corporation,431 as might a town and its governing authorities,432
or a guild and its members.433
Over the course of the seventeenth century, one witnessed the steady
emergence of corporations organized expressly for business purposes.434
Thus, in England, one saw the Crown granting a series of charters to what
were called joint-stock companies to raise capital so as to exploit the re-
sources of its ever-expanding colonial reach—such as the Levant Company
in 1581, Hudson’s Bay Company in 1670, the Royal African Company in
1672, and the South Sea Company in 1711.435 Companies such as these
(and one must include among them the Bank of England and the East India
Company) were the frequent recipients of trading privileges and monopo-
lies.436 Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century, a company such as the
East India Company could even exercise quasi-governmental authority in
parts of India.437
Corporations, by 1791, in other words, might assume diverse forms
and perform diverse functions. It is little wonder, therefore, that corporate
theory remained fluid if not fairly confusing. The seventeenth-century Case
of Sutton’s Hospital declared corporations to be “invisible, immortal, and
resting only in intendment and consideration of the law.”438 William Black-
stone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England repeated this conception
of a corporation describing it as “a person that never dies” and so capable of
retaining its “privileges and immunities . . . estates and possessions” in
perpetuity.439
431. Kenneth Pennington, Politics in Western Jurisprudence, in 7 A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY AND GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE THE JURISTS’ PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FROM ROME TO THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 181–186 (Fred D. Miller et al. eds., 2007).
432. GEORGE SHEERAN, MEDIEVAL YORKSHIRE TOWNS: PEOPLE, BUILDINGS, AND SPACE 4
(1998); ALBERTA SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, US FEDERALISM, AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 86–87 (1996).
433. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE 394 (2006); ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 6–7 (1979);
John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Globalisation of Corporate Regulation and Corporate Citizen-
ship, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW 6 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2003).
434. RICHARD GRASSBY, THE IDEA OF CAPITALISM BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
24–25 (1999); STEPHEN R. BROWN, MERCHANT KINGS: WHEN COMPANIES RULED THE WORLD,
1600–1900, at 1–56 (2009).
435. MORTIMER EPSTEIN, THE ENGLISH LEVANT COMPANY: ITS FOUNDATION AND ITS HISTORY
TO 1640, at 16 (1908); RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 49 (2000); GEOFFREY POITRAS, EQUITY CAPITAL: FROM
ANCIENT PARTNERSHIPS TO MODERN EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS 238 (2016).
436. RALPH DAVIES, THE RISE OF THE ATLANTIC ECONOMIES 242 (1973); MANUEL GOTTLIEB,
A THEORY OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 109 (1984).
437. TILMAN W. NECHTMAN, NABOBS: EMPIRE AND IDENTITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRIT-
AIN 16–18 (2010).
438. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm: From Nature to Function, 118
PA. ST. L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (2013) (citing Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 973 (1613)).
439. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 456 (1979); see
also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Dganit Sivan, A Historical Perspective on Corporate Form and
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Aside from its theoretical immortality, Blackstone offered a sweeping
analysis of corporations that brought under that rubric many different types
of social organizations. The king was a corporation, as were bishops.440
“[T]he mayor and commonality of a city, the head and fellows of a college,
the dean and chapter of a cathedral church” also counted as corporations.441
But private individuals might also form corporations for the advancement
of knowledge,442 or for the distribution of alms or other forms of charity,443
or for economic advantage.444 Of the last type of corporation, Blackstone
gave the examples of “the Bank of England and the society of the British
fishery.”445
Only the King, Blackstone emphasized, might create a corporation.446
Corporate powers, as Blackstone understood them, were broad and ill-de-
fined. Corporations were exempt from criminal prosecution for a wide vari-
ety of offenses;447 corporations might also buy and sell property,448 and
they enjoyed a variety of “incidents and powers.”449 Finally, they also had
the power to promulgate “by-laws for their own government, not contrary
to the law of the land.”450
A review of other sources, such as Sir John Comyns’ Digest of the
Laws of England, indicates just how broad was the power of corporate rule-
making. Corporations, Comyns’ text observed, possessed the inherent
power to legislate,451 and their legislative acts were valid so long as they
were “legi, fidei, rationi consona (consistent with law, religion, and rea-
son).”452 By-laws might, furthermore, regulate the fine details of business
and trade.453 Comyns gave examples: archers might be prohibited from
making bows; bricklayers might be prohibited from mixing plaster; bakers
Real Entity: Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE FIRM AS ENTITY: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 156–157 (Yuri Biondi et al. eds., 2007).
440. BLACKSTONE, supra note 439, at 457.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 459.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 461.
446. BLACKSTONE, supra note 439, at 460.
447. Id. at 464.
448. Id. at 463.
449. Id. at 465.
450. Id. at 464.
451. 2 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 148 (4th ed. 1800). Comyns
(1667–1740) wrote in Law French. His work was posthumously translated into English, edited,
and updated by other hands. H.A. Hollond, English Legal Authors Before 1700, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
292, 326–327 (1947).
452. COMYNS, supra note 451, at 150 (my translation).
453. Id. at 151. Comyns gave examples: archers might be prohibited from making bows;
bricklayers may not make plaster; bakers might be regulated on the type of bread they bake;
cobblers “may not make boots or shoes, which belong to shoe-makers.”
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might be regulated on the type of bread they bake; cobblers “may not make
boots or shoes, which belong to shoe-makers.”454
One can now appreciate why Madison objected that the Congress
lacked the constitutional power to grant corporate charters and why James
Jackson so deeply feared the creation of monopolies. Given the reach and
scope of corporation law, these were rational concerns. An entity that never
dies, enjoying a wide array of exemptions, rights, and privileges including
the power to make law to govern entire industries, operating with the full
backing of the federal government, must have seemed very threatening in-
deed.455 And so Boudinot assumed the responsibility of demystifying what
it meant for Congress to charter a corporation.
Boudinot commenced by examining the inherent, natural rights of in-
dividuals to engage in commerce.456 Every person has the right to own
property, “both real and personal, to any amount whatever.”457 And with
the right of ownership, came the inherent right to sell or transfer
property.458
And if persons can take these actions in their individual capacity, they
also have the right to organize into groups. Individuals, after all, have the
unquestioned right to own property “in joint tenancy or as tenants in com-
mon.”459 And it is but a short step from acknowledging these common-law
property rights to admitting that persons might band together into partner-
ships to enhance their commercial position.460 Thus parties have the right to
organize into “copartnerships” and “no authority in Government” may
abridge that right.461 And if individuals may form partnerships they also
have the right to “make by-laws or articles of copartnership for their own
government.”462 And—Boudinot kept building his case—if they have the
right to form partnerships for commercial purposes, they might utilize that
right to organize a bank.463 And the Government could, without constitu-
tional objection, “make contracts” with that bank “to all intents and pur-
poses, as great and important as a public bank, would their capital admit of
it.”464
If all of these actions were already permissible under the Constitution,
Boudinot effectively asked, then Congress must think closely about
454. Id.
455. Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of Power, 10
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 124 (2012).
456. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1971 (1791). On Boudinot’s opinion that the right to engage in
commerce was natural in origin, see id. at 1972.





462. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1971 (1791).
463. Id.
464. Id. at 1972.
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Madison’s rejection of the power to grant corporate charters. And if Con-
gress considered this matter carefully, it should begin by asking what
problems the grant of a corporate charter solves?
Corporations, Boudinot stated, were meant to solve the problems of
doing business on a large scale. It was cumbersome for a “private associa-
tion” to engage in substantial commerce. There was the “necessity of using
each individual’s name in all their transactions; suits must be brought in all
their names; deeds must be taken in like manner; . . . the death of a member
dissolves the partnership.”465 Each partner was fully “liable for the default
of the rest.”466
The corporate form was meant to alleviate these defects. Thus the cor-
porate charter contemplated by the Bank Bill assuaged the cumbersomeness
of dealing with a collective of individuals by creating “one legal artificial
body, capable by a fictitious name of exercising the rights of an individ-
ual.”467 Next, it also limited the financial obligations of its members, ab-
solving them for the debts of the corporation “beyond the joint capital.”468
Boudinot conceded that some individuals might find limited liability prob-
lematic, but what mattered was that all persons doing business with the
Bank were on notice.469
Boudinot also called attention to the restrictions that would be written
into the corporate charter. The Bank was limited in its capitalization;470
furthermore, the Bank charter came with an expiration date. It would not be
chartered for an indefinite, potentially perpetual existence, but “for a certain
time” only.471 These restrictions, Boudinot thought, should allay the fears
of Bank opponents that the Bank would grow into a dominating force in
American life.472
Seen in this restrictive light, Boudinot argued the corporate charter did
not pose a threat to the national government or the states.473 He disagreed
with Jackson, who viewed the Bank as inimical to an agricultural way of
life. Indeed, “he could not bring his mind to comprehend how the commer-
cial interests of a country could be promoted without greatly advancing the
interests of agriculture.”474 With commerce came expanding markets, and
465. Id. at 1971.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1971 (1791).
469. Id. at 1972.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1971.
472. Id. at 1971–1972 (“And by political duration their powers and abilities are limited, and
their rights restricted, so as to prevent any danger that might arise from the exercise of their joint
natural right, not only as to the amount of capital, but as to the by-laws they may make for their
government”).
473. Id. at 1972.
474. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1977 (1791).
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farmers as much as others were well-positioned to take advantage of that.475
The Bank, he was confident, “promoted” the “public weal.”476
Still, Boudinot confessed, even though he was confident of the right-
ness of his position, he acknowledged that his analysis might be mis-
taken.477 He knew that his responsibilities were awesome—he was
“legislating for a nation, and for thousands unborn.”478 He was comforted,
however, to know the judiciary was prepared to intervene to correct any
error he or his fellow representatives might make: the courts possessed the
power to “constitutionally prevent the operation of such a wrong measure
from effecting [sic] his constituents.”479 He was not alone in expressing
these sentiments. John Laurance of New York480 and William Loughton
Smith,481 a Southern ally of Hamilton’s, also argued that the courts were the
ultimate constitutional decision-makers should Congress err in its legisla-
tive capacity.482
d. Elbridge Gerry
Reviewing the debate as it had unfolded, Elbridge Gerry indicated that
at the heart of the disagreement between the two sides, was a conflict over
interpretive method.483 Madison had proposed a series of interpretive
rules,484 but Gerry rejected them as lacking grounding in law.485 Gerry did
not doubt Madison’s “good intentions,” but he was a long and well-known
opponent of the Bank, and Gerry feared he made up his interpretive rules
“for the occasion.”486 These were criteria, Gerry complained, that were “not
475. Id. at 1977–1978.
476. Id. at 1971.
477. Id. at 1978.
478. Id. at 1978–1979.
479. Id. at 1978.
480. John Laurance (1750–1810) was a lawyer and merchant who served in the Revolutionary
War and was active in New York politics in the 1780s, where he became an ally of Hamilton’s.
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIK MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC, 1788–1800, at 767 n.66 (1993). While a member of the First Congress, he was the “principal
author” of the Collection Act, which sought to eradicate smuggling from the Atlantic seaboard.
CHARLENE BANGS BICKFORD & KENNETH R. BOWLING, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE FIRST FED-
ERAL CONGRESS, 1789–1791, at 32 (1989).
481. William Loughton Smith (1758–1812) was a planter and a lawyer from Charleston,
South Carolina. He was educated in London and Geneva, and served in diplomatic posts following
his career in Congress. CAROL BERKIN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FIGHT TO SECURE AMERICA’S
LIBERTIES 207 (2015).
482. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1965 (1791) (John Lawrance); id. at 1988 (William Loughton
Smith); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Forward: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (2001) (considering the frequency with which judicial review was mentioned
in the early congresses); Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding,
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 523 n.235 (2014) (examining the subsequent history of Boudinot’s
recommendation of judicial review).
483. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1997–1998 (1791).
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1998.
486. Id.
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sanctioned by law exposition or approved by experienced judges of the
law.”487 As an ad hoc creation fashioned for purposes of temporary expedi-
ence, Gerry described Madison’s effort as “an ignis fatuus that may lead to
destruction.”488
Gerry proposed, instead of creating interpretive rules to fit the occa-
sion, it would be more appropriate to follow the well-established precepts
of the common law, as found in William Blackstone’s Commentaries.489
Gerry well recognized that a central point of disagreement was the meaning
of the noun “necessary” and so he quoted from Blackstone’s guidance on
how to derive meaning from words when reading legal texts: “they [words]
are generally [sic] understood in their usual and most ordinary [sic] signifi-
cation, not so much regarding the [sic] grammar as their general and popu-
lar use.”490
And so Gerry attempted to make sense of the word “necessary” and at
once called attention to its multiple meanings. Alas, Gerry pointed out, the
word’s meaning appeared to shift based on “the subject and circum-
stances.”491 A city under siege and out of supplies might be said to be
“under the necessity of surrendering.”492 A debtor sued by his creditors, on
the other hand, was not under a “physical necessity” brought on by long
tribulation, but under a necessary legal obligation to make payment.493
Gerry turned to public finance: a nation short on precious metals might find
it necessary to use some other medium of value, while the necessity of
providing for the common defense differs greatly depending whether the
nation is at peace or under foreign invasion.494 Clearly, Gerry concluded,
there was no single plain meaning to the word necessity, so recourse must
be had to other interpretive guides.
Still following Blackstone, Gerry proposed that the interpreter must
next consult context: “If words are still dubious, we may establish their
meaning by the context; thus, the preamble is often called in to help the
construction of an act of Parliament.”495 Unlike Boudinot, who assumed the
importance of the Preamble, Gerry demonstrated its significance through
reliance on traditional rules of interpretation.
487. Id.
488. Id. (emphasis in original); see also 1 JOHN WILKES, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE LATE
JOHN WILKES WITH HIS FRIENDS 85 (1805) (“ignis fatuus . . . bewilders and leads astray”). Ignis
fatuus, literally “deceptive fire,” was commonly used in medieval literature to describe playful
spirits that were also “potentially malicious.” DOUGLAS GRAY, SIMPLE FORMS: ESSAYS ON MEDIE-
VAL ENGLISH POPULAR LITERATURE 31 (2015).
489. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1998 (1791).
490. Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 439, at 59).
491. Id. at 1999.
492. Id. at 1998.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 1999.
495. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1999 (1791) (paraphrasing BLACKSTONE, supra note 439, at 60).
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The Preamble, Gerry continued, had two clauses that stood out: the
requirements to provide for the common defense and the general welfare.496
These obligations were singularly significant in Gerry’s estimation because
they were repeated in Article I, Section 8.497 Again echoing Boudinot’s
recollections about the dire situation of Revolutionary War finance, Gerry
stressed that the national defense is best ensured when the government is
financially prepared to withstand foreign invasion.498 And that can only be
accomplished through the creation of a national bank capable of financing
“sudden emergencies.”499
Finally, Gerry turned to what Blackstone called “the most universal
and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law . . . [i.e.], the
reason and spirit of it.”500 To come to an understanding of the Constitu-
tion’s reason and spirit, Gerry asserted, one had to appreciate the political
circumstances that preceded it. The union was “imperfect”; there was a
“want of public and private justice”; there were “internal commotions, a
defenceless community, neglect of the public welfare, and danger to our
liberties.”501 The Constitution was intended to have more “energy” than the
flaccid Articles of Confederation.502
If the Constitution’s purpose was to meet these pressing needs, then
the necessary and proper clause, Gerry thought, had to receive a “liberal
construction.”503 The risk in a more restrictive interpretation, according to
Gerry, was a return to the “Union, as it was under the Confederation.”504
Gerry acknowledged that there was the danger of abuse of power in adher-
ing to a liberal interpretation, but “disuse” of legitimate constitutional pow-
ers also posed the grave possibility of harm.505
In closing, Gerry trained his sights directly on Madison. “[W]hich is
most dangerous,” Gerry asked, “a liberal or a destructive interpretation?”506
Gerry was convinced that Madison’s interpretive approach would cause
chaos. Follow his effort to give an expansive application to the proposed
Ninth Amendment, Gerry declared, and “our whole code of laws is
unconstitutional.”507
Gerry could not long maintain his facade of amicability where
Madison was concerned. Thus, he accused the Virginian—and the man he




500. BLACKSTONE, supra note 439, at 61; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2002 (1791).




505. Id. at 2003.
506. Id.
507. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2003 (1791).
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would later serve as vice president—of hypocrisy. In the debate over the
president’s power to remove executive-branch appointees, Madison took
the more liberal position, arguing that the power should be vested exclu-
sively in the president, and rejecting a more literal understanding of the
Constitution that required the Senate to approve of the dismissal of any
appointee it confirmed to office.508 Gerry finally mocked Madison’s reli-
ance on the intention of the Framers. Memories are faulty, he noted, and
one Framer’s recollections differed from another’s.509 Furthermore, Gerry
once more pretended to the role of obtuse literalist, the Convention’s de-
bates were immaterial since the question of creating a national bank, as
opposed to the more generic issue of chartering “commercial corporations”
was never put before it.510
Finally, he took note of the objection that the Bank Bill created a mo-
nopoly. This was impossible, he said, since the Bank Bill did not prevent
states or private individuals from creating banks. Unlike the Bank of En-
gland, which was “founded in monopoly,” Hamilton’s proposed Bank was
free of these “feature[s].”511
3. Observations
These four proponents of the Bank Bill were united in the objective
they wished to achieve—approval of Hamilton’s plan by Congress. But
they offered different paths by which to achieve that goal.
Fisher Ames brought two important insights to bear. First, he proposed
that the Constitution could not be interpreted literally. In fact, he argued, the
Congress had consistently rejected constitutional literalism, and a return to
Madison’s rigid doctrine of enumerated powers would mean the invalida-
tion of most of what the First Congress had accomplished. Ames also ap-
preciated that since the Constitution was not self-interpreting, what was
needed was a political philosophy. He invoked the abstract noun “Govern-
ment” in an attempt to arrive at a set of coherent overarching interpretive
principles. Still, he did not develop what he meant by “Government” partic-
ularly well, and when he turned to the Constitution in an effort to identify
the provisions that conferred on Congress the implied power to charter the
Bank, the result was little more than a listing of plausible candidates. He
knew the Constitution offered open-ended possibilities, but not how to fully
exploit that insight.
Theodore Sedgwick provided a neater, more orderly exposition of the
grounds for supporting the Bank. The Constitution conferred on Congress




511. Id. at 2006.
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gress was limited in its scope of action. It could only legislate within one of
its defined powers, using the necessary and proper clause. Sedgwick pro-
posed an expanded interpretation of “necessary,” suggesting that it did not
mean “indispensable,” as Madison had argued, but rather conveyed the
sense of the routine or usual incidents associated with a particular grant of
power.
Elias Boudinot commenced his defense of the Bank bill by focusing on
the Constitution’s Preamble. For Boudinot, the Preamble functioned as a
kind of axiom; the first, unquestioned premise upon which all subsequent
constitutional analysis should be based. The Preamble stood for national
unity and for a federal government sufficiently powerful to ensure its own
survival in the face of war and invasion. A practical man who knew first-
hand from his governmental service during the Revolutionary War how dif-
ficult it was to finance a war effort, Boudinot emphasized the Bank’s abso-
lute necessity to national defense. But Boudinot took a further step also, by
explaining that the Representatives should not fear the Bank’s corporate
charter. He conceded that the prevailing common law conferred potentially
large powers on corporations but stressed that the limitations built into the
Bank’s charter—as to length of time and amount of capital it could hold—
obviated the greatest dangers.
Elbridge Gerry, finally, attacked Madison directly. He challenged
Madison’s rules for interpreting the Constitution as unfairly favoring the
outcome he longed for. Gerry countered by proposing that William Black-
stone’s rules for interpreting acts of Parliament should be used to explicate
the Constitution. Gerry, however, never asked the question whether a con-
stitution posed a different set of interpretive issues from duly-promulgated
statute law. Rather, he was led by steps to argue that the reason and spirit of
the Constitution should prevail and that spirit pointed in favor of the bank
legislation.
Each of these representatives offered a different perspective on the
power Congress had to enact the Bank bill. They arrived at their conclu-
sions by different routes, even though their reasoning was broadly consis-
tent. Still, their analysis left something to be desired. Exactly where did
Congress receive its implied authority to create a national bank? Was it
national defense? The regulation of trade? The power to borrow or tax? An
expansive view of the necessary and proper clause? Why did they fail to do
more with the word “proper” in the necessary and proper clause? It has
been observed that “‘proper” is the more lax term,512 yet none of these
congressional leaders thought to use it to modify the word “necessary.” And
these questions are not merely antiquarian concerns. One need only consult
modern Supreme Court decisions—William O. Douglas’s opinion in Gris-
512. Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the
Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 734 (2016).
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wold v. Connecticut comes to mind—to see modern jurists struggle to find a
principled foundation in the Constitution for a right or power (in Griswold,
the right of sexual privacy) that is not expressly mentioned in the text.513
C. Rebuttal
1. William Branch Giles
William Branch Giles, Madison’s faithful ally from Virginia, offered a
comprehensive rebuttal on February 7, 1791. He began his rebuttal by first
making clear his theory of the Constitution. The Constitution exists, he ar-
gued, to establish “a proper distribution of all governmental rights between
the Government of the United States and the several State governments, and
in fixing limits to the exercise of all authorities granted to the Government
of the United States.”514
Giles rejected the claim that governments had certain inherent powers
simply in virtue of being the supreme power in a particular society. That
might be true in some places and times, where a government presides over a
single unitary state or society.515 But that could not be the situation in the
United States, since the central government in America was “composed” of
the “people” of the different states.516 The United States, he proclaimed,
was a “Federal, not . . . a consolidated Government.”517 And in a federal
arrangement, one must not diminish the authority of “the State
governments.”518
It was wrong, Giles continued, to suggest that the Bank as contem-
plated did not infringe on the rights of the States. The existence of a na-
tional bank infringed even on the rights of states that had not chartered their
own local banks. Giles reasoned that since the Constitution conferred only
limited powers on the federal government, states retained total freedom to
act on all other matters. Thus, by the terms of the Constitution, states re-
tained the liberty to charter their own banks, and should enjoy “the freest
exercise of that [liberty].”519 States, furthermore, need not charter a bank at
all to lose their freedom to restrict “the circulation of bank paper within
their respective limits.”520 Giles feared that with these infringements on the
autonomy of states, “the very existence [of the States might be] radically
subverted.”521
513. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–485 (1965).
514. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1991 (1791).
515. Id. at 1993.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 1993–1994.
518. Id. at 1994.
519. Id.
520. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1994 (1791).
521. Id.
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Thus, Giles challenged what he perceived to be a fallacy at the heart of
the proponents’ case. They presumed the existence of a strong central gov-
ernment that could choose among a variety of means to accomplish its
objectives.522 But, he objected, the Constitution did not contemplate the
creation of a government with large and encompassing legislative powers.
If it had, “the detail of the Constitution would have been wholly unneces-
sary, further than to designate the several branches of the Government
which were to be entrusted with this unlimited discretionary choice of
means.”523
The enumeration of specific powers must mean something, Giles al-
leged, and that is the government envisioned by the Constitution was to be
one of limited authority. The states, on Giles’s reading of the Constitution,
were the primary locus of power in the new United States, and the federal
government was merely the product of agreement by these “previously ex-
isting governments.”524 And given that essentially derivative character, one
had to be very careful when attempting to identify implied powers. Giles
did not acknowledge—perhaps he never realized—that his case against the
Bank also rested on a series of assumptions about the powers of states.
Rather, he criticized the Bank’s proponents for their quixotic attempts to
find authority for the Bank secreted in one or another of the Constitution’s
clauses. In doing so, they relied on “indistinct confused conceptions.”525
None of the clauses they turned to—national defense, the collection of
taxes, the borrowing of money, the regulation of commerce—made explicit
mention of the granting of corporate charters or the creation of banks and
so, in Giles’s judgment, these texts provided no support for the establish-
ment of a Bank.526
Still, Giles chose to dissect each of the proponents’ more specific
claims. “Common defence and general welfare,” he asserted, “contain no
grant of any specific authority.” These were mere goals, objectives, state-
ments of purpose. They did not authorize the means to achieve those ends.
On Giles’s logic, only those constitutional provisions that employed spe-
cific language conferring power on the federal government were to be un-
derstood as effective conduits of those powers. Since “common defence”
and “general welfare” did not specifically empower their addressees to per-
form or to refrain from performing clearly expressed and authorized acts,
they could not be understood as power-conferring provisions.
522. Id. at 1990 (“It has been remarked that . . . the means to produce the ends are left to the
choice of the Legislature, and that the incorporation of a Bank is one necessary mean to produce
these general ends.”).
523. Id.at 1990–1991.
524. Id. at 1993.
525. Id. at 1992.
526. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1940 (1971).
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One can criticize Giles for advancing what amounted to a theory of
constitutional surplusage. If words failed to convey specific powers, they
were essentially without effect. The logical response to Giles’s contention is
to ask, why would the Constitution’s drafters insert ineffective language
into the text? The articulation of a purpose, it would seem, implies the
means to achieve that purpose. This is what Ames, Boudinot, and their col-
laborators were arguing. They meant to impute some substantive signifi-
cance to language that might otherwise avail nothing. Giles would not hear
of it.
The “borrow money” clause was the next provision Giles investi-
gated.527 This clause, he noted, authorized the government to borrow
money, not to create the lending institution that will extend the credit.528 To
see the creation of a bank as incidental to the capacity to borrow, Giles said,
was to get the relationship of means and ends backwards. The ability to
lend is greater than the capacity to borrow, so if the Constitution intended to
create the means of financing the government, it would have expressly so
declared.529 Giles found similar difficulties with other clauses the propo-
nents relied on, such as the power to tax or to regulate commerce.530
Thus, Giles charged, the proponents simply could not frame a case
under the Constitution as drafted and ratified. The power to grant corporate
charters was an important power. Had it been included in the Constitution,
the way to establish the Bank would have been clear.531 But its absence was
fatal: “I should . . . rather conclude that the right to borrow, if there be a
connexion at all, would be incidental to the right to grant charters of incor-
poration, than the reverse of that proposition.”532
Giles did not shy from denouncing certain opponents by name.
Sedgwick’s effort to expand the meaning of the word “necessary,” Giles
believed, amounted to introducing a utilitarian calculus into constitutional
reasoning. “The gentleman’s reasoning . . . if pursued, will be found to teem
with dangerous effects, and would justify the assumption of any given au-
thority whatever.”533 And Ames’ attempt to locate power to charter a corpo-
ration in Congress’s jurisdiction over a prospective capital district “seems
to me to be an ingenious improvement upon sophistical deduction.”534
The judiciary, Giles lamented, could not provide an effective check on
the unconstitutional exertion of power the Bank’s proponents were now
readying. Consider, Giles proposed, how a judicial challenge to this law
527. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (conferring on Congress the power “to borrow money on the
credit of the United States”).




532. Id. at 1991–1992.
533. Id. at 1993.
534. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1993 (1791).
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would arise. It would come under the criminal law. Someone will have
counterfeited the Bank’s paper.535 That person will be charged with a
crime, and since it is a felony, he will find himself on trial for his life.
“Hence a judicial decision will probably be had of the most serious and
awful nature; the life of an individual at stake on the one hand, an improvi-
dent act of the Government on the other.”536 Given the constitutional risk of
chartering the Bank and the ineffectiveness of any constitutional remedy,
the legislation should be voted down. It was nothing less than an untoward
expression of “the love of dominion”537 and “an unprovoked advance in [a]
scramble for authority.”538
2. James Madison
In his rebuttal, James Madison challenged each of the principal ideas
offered by his critics. He spoke first to Boudinot’s argument about the non-
threatening nature of the Bank’s corporate charter. Madison frankly did not
believe that the Bank’s charter would remain limited. Simply “granting the
powers,” Madison maintained, “is granting them in perpetuum.”539 As con-
firmation, he pointed to the history of corporations in Europe. There, corpo-
rations proved to be “powerful machines” unanswerable to popular will and
“independent of the people.”540
He then rejected Fisher Ames’ reliance on abstract notions of “govern-
ment.”541 What Ames said might be true of other forms of government in
other nations, but it was not true of the United States.542 For confirmation,
he looked to the Preamble and confessed that he could not understand how
the Preamble could serve as “a new mine of power.”543 Madison distin-
guished between the Preamble, which established the purposes of the “Con-
federation,” and the “subsequent clauses [which] designate the express
powers by which those objects are to be obtained.”544 “Was the Union a
mere confederation of states or was it a national government?”545 This was
one of the great burning questions of the 1790s and early 1800s,546 and with
his reference to “Confederation,” Madison subtly cast his lot with the for-
mer camp.
535. Id. at 1996.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 1989.
538. Id. at 1996.
539. Id. at 2009.





545. JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE
PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN EARLY UNITED STATES 109 (2001).
546. JEAN-LOUIS HALP ´ERIN, FIVE LEGAL REVOLUTIONS SINCE THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:
AN ANALYSIS OF A GLOBAL LEGAL LEGACY 123–124 (2014).
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Madison, furthermore, did not see how the Bank might be justified by
reference of Congress’s power to collect taxes. He also ridiculed the con-
nection some supporters supposed the Bank Bill had with the regulation of
trade. “Would any plain man suppose that this bill had anything to do with
trade?”547 He did not even perceive a necessary connection between the
power to borrow and the Bank. Central governments did not need banks,
since they could borrow funds from many types of lenders, as was true in
England, where the Crown borrowed from “various sources,”548 including
the great trading corporations.549
Madison saved his harshest words for Elbridge Gerry, whom he at-
tacked by name. Gerry, he reminded his audience, had once opposed the
Constitution, understanding its “powers . . . [as] . . . dark, inexplicable, and
dangerous.”550 And now Gerry stood for an almost limitless Constitution.
Taking aim at Gerry’s reliance on the “reason” and “spirit” language he
drew from Blackstone, Madison declared that this amounted “to the subver-
sion of every power whatever in the several States.”551
Gerry stood and tried to reply to Madison, but it was recorded that the
House expressed “impatience” and so the members proceeded to the
vote.552
3. Observations
Interpretation requires a starting point, a foundation, an axiom, which
need not be the same for everyone or true for all places and times.553 In-
deed, it has been said that “[l]egal history is the history of the rise and fall
of different systems of interpretation.”554 Guided by the modesty that at-
tends any historical investigation, I am not interested in determining which
school of thought was “right,” only in coming to a better historical under-
standing of their respective starting points and disagreements.
And there one can discern four distinctive approaches to constitutional
interpretation embedded in the congressional debate over the Bank. James
Madison read the Constitution as a limiting document. The power not given
by the text’s express clauses and provisions was withheld from the federal
government or implicitly conferred on the states. Fisher Ames was quite
547. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2010 (1791).
548. Id.
549. On the interconnections between Crown, state finance, and the great trading companies,
see BRUCE G. CARUTHERS, CITY OF CAPITAL: POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION 138, 148–149, 151 (1996).
550. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2010 (1791).
551. Id.
552. Id. at 2012.
553. This point has been made repeatedly, in many different and sophisticated ways. Compare
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 45 (2014), with JAROSLAV PELIKAN,
INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 48–51 (2004).
554. AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 92 (2006).
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right in saying that this perspective was no more or less privileged than his
own approach or anyone else’s. It assumed what it wished to prove: the
Constitution did not dramatically interrupt the relationship between the
states and the central government; and that government was best which was
local and exercised at the state level.
Intuitively grasping the difficulties inherent in Madison’s position,
Ames sought to locate his interpretive approach in abstract ideas about the
nature of government. Government, by virtue of its being the supreme polit-
ical organization in a particular society, possesses an inherent character dis-
cernible and deducible through reason and aimed to bring about certain
beneficial ends. And while the Constitution may allocate power in particu-
lar ways, ideas about government must nevertheless form the appropriate
starting point for further inquiry.
Elias Boudinot, on the other hand, addressed the question of interpreta-
tion the way a mathematician might. One requires an axiom, an explicitly
agreed upon, unquestioned starting point from which all further reasoning
flows. For Boudinot, that was the Preamble. Still, standing behind Boudi-
not’s endorsement of the Preamble as the foundation of all constitutional
reasoning was his own experiences in the Revolutionary War. He appreci-
ated the dangers of a weak central government in very tangible, first-hand
ways. And the Preamble, with its endorsement of unity, served as an anti-
dote to the disunion and disintegration he so deeply feared.
Finally, for Elbridge Gerry, interpretation must commence with lan-
guage. Gerry well knew, however, that words were elusive and context-
dependent in the ways they communicated their meaning. He was comforta-
ble with the ambiguity and indeterminateness that insight represented. Fol-
lowing Blackstone, he endorsed the “context,” the “reason,” and the “spirit”
of the constitutional text as the foundations from which subsequent reason-
ing should proceed. And, as Madison observed, this led Gerry—the one-
time opponent of the Constitution—to propose what amounted to perhaps
the most discretionary of all the schools of thought advanced in the debate.
4. The House Votes on the Bank
Still, it must be borne in mind that the debate over the Bank was part
of a political process and not a mere academic inquiry. It thus moved to a
vote on February 8. The bill was enacted by a margin of thirty-nine to
twenty on a vote that closely tracked sectional divisions.555 Only one North-
ern Representative voted against the Bank. That was Jonathan Grout of
Massachusetts.556 He was a lawyer, a sympathizer with Shays’ Rebel-
555. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1791).
556. Id.
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lion,557 and among the strongest voices against the Constitution in western
Massachusetts.558 He was elected to Congress in 1789 on the strength of his
associations with populist, anti-federalist ideals.559
On the other side, there were five Southern Representatives (defined as
states below the Mason-Dixon Line) who voted in favor of the Bill. These
included Joshua Seney560 and William Smith from Maryland;561 William
Loughton Smith, from South Carolina, who was among Hamilton’s most
effective allies but was also a staunch pro-slavery Federalist;562 and also
John Steele and John Sevier, both from North Carolina.563
Commentators have seen the voting pattern on the Bank of the United
States as possessing significance for the future political development of the
557. Franklin Pierce Rice, The Worcester District in Congress, from 1789 to 1857, in
WORCESTER SOC’Y OF ANTIQUITY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORCESTER SOCIETY OF ANTIQUITY FOR
THE YEAR 1889, at 77, 79 (1890), reprinted in 9 COLLECTIONS OF THE WORCESTER SOCIETY AN-
TIQUITY (1891). Grout’s hometown, Petersham, was the scene of one of the climactic battles in the
Rebellion. Richard Peet, A Sign Taken For History: Daniel Shays’ Memorial in Petersham, Mas-
sachusetts, 86 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 21, 21 (1996).
558. Brooke, supra note 40, at 457.
559. JOHN L. BROOKE, THE HEART OF THE COMMONWEALTH: SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CUL-
TURE IN WORCESTER COUNTY MASSACHUSETTS, 1713–1861, at 235 (1989).
560. Seney (1756–1798) was a lawyer who served in the Continental Congress and defended
the idea of a strong central government. ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERA-
MENT, 1634–1980, at 160 (1988); see also Michael A. Bellesiles, Book Review: Documentary
History of the First Federal Congress, Vol. 14: Debates in the House of Representatives, Third
Session, December 1790–March 1791, 121 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 276, 277 (1997).
561. Smith (1728–1814) was a Baltimore merchant, who was active in resistance to Great
Britain as early as 1774 and who had, like Seney, served in the Continental Congress. CHARLES G.
STEFFEN, THE MECHANICS OF BALTIMORE: WORKERS AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1763–1812, at 58–59 (1984); JOHN THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY 69 (1881). He was also appointed Auditor of
the United States Treasury later in 1791. U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, THE UNITED STATES TREASURY
REGISTER, at ix (1879).
562. Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton, His Friends and Foes, 19 HISTORIAN 132, 139
(1957) (“Smith spoke Hamilton’s lines, almost literally, but that did not make him the worse
expositor.”); see also MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EVIL 128–129 n.216 (2006); HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE, 1440–1870, at 518 (1997).
563. On Steele (1764–1815), see William S. West, Steele, John, in 5 DICTIONARY OF NORTH
CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 432, 432–434 (William S. Powell ed., 1994). John Sevier (1745–1815)
was a military commander on the Appalachian frontier during the Revolutionary War, served as
the Governor of the short-lived State of Franklin, and, after a turn representing North Carolina in
Congress, relocated to Tennessee, where he took a leading role in that State’s politics. On these
and other aspects of Sevier’s colorful career, see, for example, Ben Allen & Dennis T. Lawson,
The Wataugans and the “Dangerous Example,” 26 TENN. HIST. Q. 137, 140, 145–147 (1967). On
Sevier’s revolutionary career on the Appalachian frontier, see Kevin T. Barksdale, Violence,
Statecraft, and Statehood in the Early Republic: The State of Franklin, 1784–1788, in BLOOD IN
THE HILLS: A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN APPALACHIA 29, 29–46 (Bruce Stewart ed., 2012) (detail-
ing Sevier’s career as Governor of the State of Franklin); JOHN R. FINGER, TENNESSEE FRONTIERS:
THREE REGIONS IN TRANSITION 202–208 (2001) (detailing Sevier’s career as Tennessee Gover-
nor); Ben Wynne, Sevier, John, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WARS OF THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1783–1812, at 600, 600–601 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2014) (summarizing the main
events of Sevier’s career).
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American nation. Thus, John Aldrich and Ruth Grant have credited this
debate as contributing to the development of party politics in the 1790s.564
Others have seen this controversy as significant for an emerging
sectionalism.565
But the debate and subsequent vote signified also the emergence of
two rival schools of constitutional thought; one associated with the North
and commerce, and one aligned with the South and the plantation econ-
omy.566 On the one hand, there was Hamilton, who believed the Constitu-
tion was meant to facilitate “the active promotion of a dynamic, industrial
capitalist economy . . . [through the] establishment of sound public finance,
public investment in infrastructure, and promotion of new industrial sec-
tors.”567 On the other side, Madison and a group of Southern allies viewed
the Constitution as creating a confederation of states, whose internal econo-
mies were slave-based and principally a matter of state concern. The Bank
debate was among the first of many constitutional controversies to lay bare
these fundamentally different approaches to constitutional interpretation.568
IV. THE BANK DEBATE IN WASHINGTON’S CABINET
Following its passage by the House of Representatives, the Bank Bill
was submitted to President George Washington for his signature. Washing-
ton, however, before determining whether to sign the bill into law, polled
three of his cabinet officials for their opinions as to the bill’s constitutional-
ity.569 What was his motive for doing so? Perhaps, he was genuinely unsure
564. John H. Aldrich & Ruth W. Grant, The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the First
Parties, 55 J. POL. 295, 308–309 (1993); see also Lynn E. Uzzell, Courting Public Opinion:
James Madison’s Strategy for Resisting Federal Usurpations, in WHAT WOULD MADISON DO?:
THE FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION MEETS MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 181, 181–183 (Benja-
min Wittes & Pietro S. Nivola eds., 2015) (describing Madison’s efforts at popular political or-
ganizing in the wake of his defeat on the Bank bill).
565. See, e.g., Ralph Ketcham, James Madison, in THE PRESIDENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
A LIVING HISTORY 61, 64 (Ken Gormley ed., 2016); H. Wayne Morgan, The Origins and Estab-
lishment of the First Bank of the United States, 30 BUS. HIST. REV. 472, 486–487 (1956); Steven
Sagarra, Bank of the United States (1791–1811; 1816–1836), in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY 66 (Kenneth E. Hendrickson, III, ed., 2015); WIL-
LIAM L. RICHTER, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE OLD SOUTH 45, 45–46 (2d ed. 2013).
566. George William Van Cleve, “Founding a Slaveholders” Union, 1770–1797, in CON-
TESTING SLAVERY: THE POLITICS OF BONDAGE AND FREEDOM IN THE NEW AMERICAN NATION
121, 121–124 (John Craig Hammond & Matthew Mason eds., 2011).
567. Michael Lind, Hamilton’s Legacy, 18 WILSON Q. 40, 43 (1994).
568. DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 45 (2012); GARY
JOHN KORNBLITH, SLAVERY AND SECTIONAL STRIFE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776–1821, at 36–40 (2010); Kermit L. Hall, States’ Rights Constitutionalism, in 10 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE: LAW AND POLITICS 71, 71 (James W. Ely & Bradley G.
Bond eds., 2008).
569. Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson, Original Intent, and the Shaping of American Law:
Learning Constitutional Law from the Writings of Jefferson, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 60
(2006).
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as a matter of constitutional law.570 On the other hand, perhaps he had al-
ready made up his mind to sign the bill and wished to give the two Virgini-
ans in his cabinet, his Attorney General Edmund Randolph and his
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, an opportunity to be heard. Perhaps he
wished to have in hand the firmest possible constitutional reasoning for a
step he knew would cause dissension among the Southerners in Congress.
Finally, it is possible that he merely wished to set a good constitutional
example, hoping that a fastidious adherence to constitutional norms might
oblige his successors to the same strict course.571
A. Edmund Randolph
1. Randolph’s Background
Edmund Randolph (1753–1813), Washington’s Attorney General, was
the first to submit an opinion to the President, and in fact submitted not one
but two opinions. Randolph was well-equipped for his position as the
United States’ first Attorney General. He was born to one of Virginia’s
most important families572 and as an adult possessed vast holdings of real
estate and slaves.573 His grandfather, Sir John Randolph, had been Speaker
of the Virginia House of Burgesses,574 and his father, also named John Ran-
dolph, enjoyed a prosperous legal practice.575 The son followed the father
into the practice of law and was also given a generous assist by Thomas
Jefferson, who allowed the young Randolph to assume his legal practice.576
The young Edmund Randolph sided with the revolutionaries during the
War for Independence, thereby opposing his father, who remained true to
the loyalist cause.577 He was among those who drafted Virginia’s first state
570. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2015).
571. Richard J. Ellis, George Washington, in THE PRESIDENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
LIVING HISTORY 17, 20 (Ken Gormley ed., 2016); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (1999) (making the point that Washington’s scrupulous respect for con-
stitutional practice mattered greatly to John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
572. JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY 4–11 (1975).
573. In 1801, it was recorded that Randolph “had 7,000 acres of land, several houses, nearly
200 slaves, and ten or fifteen thousand dollars’ worth of public securities.” ROBERT ELDON
BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “AN ECONOMIC IN-
TERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION” 84 (1956).
574. JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE
SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 28 (1963); EMORY G. EVANS, A “TOPPING PEOPLE”:
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF VIRGINIA’S OLD POLITICAL ELITES, 1680–1790, at 90 (2009).
575. REARDON, supra note 572, at 4–5.
576. John M. Hemphill, Edmund Randolph Assumes Thomas Jefferson’s Legal Practice, 67
VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 170, 170–171 (1959).
577. Eliga H. Gould, The Laws of War and Peace: Legitimating Slavery in the Age of the
American Revolution, in STATE AND CITIZEN: BRITISH AMERICA AND THE EARLY UNITED STATES
54, 54 (Peter Thompson & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2013).
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Constitution in 1776.578 He served as Attorney General and as Governor of
Virginia in the 1780s,579 and was a major participant in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, where he worked closely with James Madison in craft-
ing the “Virginia Plan.”580 He was, however, one of “three leading mem-
bers of the Convention”—the others were Elbridge Gerry and George
Mason—who “refused to sign the Constitution on the final day of the Con-
vention.”581 Randolph raised a number of particular objections, but for the
most part they can be reduced to a fear that a “looseness of language . . .
would permit if not invite sweeping changes in the expressed intentions of
the Constitutional Convention.”582
Still, George Washington had confidence in Randolph’s legal abilities
and “offered [him] the post of attorney general in late 1789.”583 The posi-
tion, as originally conceived, was part-time.584 It was anticipated that the
attorney general would also maintain a private legal practice.585 George
Washington, however, made full use of Randolph’s skills both legal and
political, developed a “close relationship” with him, and ensured that he
regularly attended cabinet meetings.586 It was in his capacity as attorney
general that Washington now sought his advice.587
2. Randolph’s Opinions
The first of Randolph’s opinions was intended to state his opinion as to
the Bank’s constitutionality.588 The second aimed to criticize views Ran-
dolph found constitutionally untenable.589
578. A.E. Dick Howard, “For the Common Benefit”: Constitutional History in Virginia as
Casebook for the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 VA. L. REV. 816, 820 (1968).
579. RICHARD R. BEEMAN, THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 31 (2004); George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 967, 1100 (1991).
580. Jonathan Clark, The Myth of the Consolidating Federalists, 4 HIST. REFLECTIONS 111,
111 (1977).
581. ROBERT FERGUSON, PRACTICE EXTENDED: BEYOND LAW AND LITERATURE 20 (2016).
582. Edward J. Drake, The Men Who Didn’t Sign the Constitution, 49 A.B.A. J. 1101, 1103
(1963).
583. John Garry Clifford, A Muddy Middle of the Road: The Politics of Edmund Randolph,
1790–1795, 80 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 286, 288 (1972).
584. CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE
MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 16 (1992).
585. Id.
586. Id. at 16–17.
587. On the importance of this step to the development of the Office of Attorney General, see
Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney
General’s First Constitutional Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 110–113 (1994).
588. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmund Randolph, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH
AMERICA 86, 86–89 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall comp. 1832) [hereinafter Opinion 1].
589. Edmund Randolph, Attorneys General’s Opinion No. 2, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 588, at 89, 89–91 [hereinafter
Opinion 2].
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Randolph opened his first opinion by clarifying the precise type of
constitution he was called upon to interpret. There were unwritten constitu-
tions, he noted, and written ones.590 Unwritten constitutions, Randolph sug-
gested, might “claim a latitude of power not always easy to be
determined.”591 Under an unwritten constitution, in other words—which
might be susceptible to elastic interpretation and organic growth—a bill
such as this one might be approved. But it is otherwise with a written con-
stitution. Its language is fixed, and so all analysis must begin and end with
the written text.592
Randolph found yet other distinctions to draw on the subject matter of
constitutions. There were, he said, constitutions that contain general grants
of authority, and those whose grants of authority are narrow and express.
Where there is lacking “a special demarcation of powers, [the legislature]
may, perhaps, be presumed to be left at large as to all authority which is
communicable by the people and does not affect any of those paramount
rights which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their rep-
resentatives.”593 On the other hand, there are constitutions “whose powers
are described.”594 Where grants of authority are specific and express, the
legislature may not exceed those limits.595
Randolph was not yet finished. The first type of written constitution,
those lacking defined and demarcated powers, he found characteristic of
state governments.596 The second type of written constitution, on the other
hand, with carefully drawn and circumscribed grants of power, character-
ized the federal government.597 His interpretation, he proposed, was con-
firmed by the Tenth Amendment.598 All “powers which are not delegated to
[the federal government],” Randolph wrote, tracking the language of the
Tenth Amendment, resides with the states.599
Randolph tested these distinctions with a hypothetical question. What
of a power “not within the verge of a State constitution,” but which also
was not conferred on the federal government by the Constitution?600 Such a
power, Randolph indicated, should properly belong to the states.601 He elu-
cidated this point by drawing yet another distinction. Yes, he conceded, the
590. Opinion 1, supra note 588, at 86.
591. Id.
592. Id. (“Those which have written constitutions are circumscribed by a just interpretation of




596. Opinion 1, supra note 588, at 86.
597. Id.
598. Id. (Randolph termed this provision the Twelfth Amendment, but the text he was refer-
ring to, as ratified, was the Tenth).
599. Id.
600. Id. at 86–87.
601. Id.
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federal government enjoyed the power to “superintend[ ] the general wel-
fare of the States”; but he also admonished that “it ought not to be forgotten
. . . that it superintends . . . according to the dictates of the
[C]onstitution.”602
What are the rules of interpretation, Randolph asked next, that should
govern constitutions? His answer was a tacit repudiation of Elbridge
Gerry’s reliance on Blackstone’s Commentaries. Legislation, he wrote,
aims to resolve a particular problem or defect and should “be construed
with a discreet liberality.”603 A grant of power under the Constitution, how-
ever, must be applied “with a closer adherence to the literal meaning.”604
This was because under the Constitution, “each of [the specified powers]
includes those details, which properly constitute the whole of the subject to
which the power relates.”605
To rephrase Randolph’s position: since legislation aims at correcting
some identifiable problem, it should be interpreted in a way that actually
remedies the matter at hand. Power, on the other hand, is by its nature fu-
ture oriented and open ended. If power-conferring language is not strictly
construed, future legislatures will find ever more creative and elastic appli-
cations and so stray ever farther from its original grant and the original
restrictions will be lost.
There are, of course, alternative approaches to applying the Constitu-
tion. One might productively compare to Randolph’s opinion, Edward
Levi’s guidelines for constitutional interpretation, written in 1949.606 “[A]
written constitution,” so Levi declared, “must be enormously ambiguous in
its general provisions.”607 Where Randolph viewed constitutional language
as capable of clear and precise meaning, Levi noticed that “[e]ach major
concept written into the document embodies a number of conflicting ide-
als.”608 Levi illustrated this point by noting the many ways in which the
commerce clause was used to regulate American life.609
Randolph saw constitutional language as plain and unambiguous be-
cause it fit his larger constitutional theory. And that theory above all en-
tailed deference to state power and state authority in all controversial
matters.
Still, Randolph wanted to make clear that he did not cling to extreme
interpretations of the Constitution. That was the point of his second opinion
on the Bank. There are those, he observed, that understand the Constitution




606. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 57–102 (2013).
607. Id. at 59.
608. Id. at 60.
609. Id. at 62–64 (where Levi provides the example of the Mann Act, which prohibits inter-
state prostitution).
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to be self-interpreting.610 They read each clause narrowly as allowing only
for the exercise of expressly granted power and foreclose altogether the
possibility of implied powers.611 This school of thought proposes that “be-
cause some incidental powers are expressed, no others are admissible.”612 It
is entirely possible that Randolph had James Jackson or Michael Jenifer
Stone in mind when he wrote his lines. His rejection of this perspective,
however, was swift. Such a view, “would not only be contrary to the com-
mon forms of construction, but would reduce the present Congress to the
feebleness of the old one, which could exercise no powers not expressly
delegated.”613 Thus, Randolph recognized that a truly strict and literal inter-
pretation of the Constitution’s power-conferring provisions would render
governance impossible.
Randolph also dismissed claims that the deliberations of the Constitu-
tional Convention should carry any normative weight.614 What was said and
done at the “federal convention” regarding the powers of incorporation
should have no bearing on constitutional analysis.615 In reply, Randolph
posed a rhetorical question that answered itself: “[O]ught not the constitu-
tion to be decided on by the import of its own expressions?”616 The text,
and only the text, was Randolph’s guiding principle.
But, he stressed, none of this meant that the Bank was permissible
under any fair reading of the Constitution’s implied powers. The Bank can-
not be justified under the taxing power, or the power of Congress to see to
the general welfare.617
Nor could supporters of the Bank find any refuge in the necessary and
proper clause.618 The word “necessary” must be understood as related to
“the natural means of executing a power.”619 And the word “proper,” “if it
has any meaning, does not enlarge the powers of Congress, but rather re-
stricts them.”620 And so Randolph asked President Washington to remain
vigilant where the supporters of the Bank were concerned: “[L]et it be pro-
pounded as an eternal question . . . whether the latitude of construction,
which they arrogate will not terminate in an unlimited power in
Congress.”621
610. Opinion 2, supra note 589, at 89.
611. Id. at 89–90.




616. Opinion 2, supra note 589, at 90.
617. Id. at 91.
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B. Thomas Jefferson
1. Notes on the State of Virginia
How does one describe Thomas Jefferson: as a lawyer,622 political
thinker,623 student of nature (or, as he was known in the eighteenth century,
a natural philosopher)?624 He was, of course, all of these things. And all of
these features of Jefferson’s thought are on display in his work, Notes on
the State of Virginia. And while the many facets of Jefferson’s capacious
mind are evident in his Notes, I shall focus in particular on the constitu-
tional theory that is found in its pages.
Originally published in 1785, during Jefferson’s residence in Paris,625
this work is part reflection on the natural abundance of his native Virginia,
part speculation on the attributes of a just social order, and part admonition
on the role and purpose of law. Throughout this work, furthermore, one can
identify arguments, both express and implicit, about the nature and purpose
of constitutional government, the leading role of the individual states within
the territories so recently liberated from Great Britain, and the transcendent
significance of an agrarian way of life to a well-ordered polity.626
When Jefferson wrote of Virginia, he had in mind its borders as they
existed in the early 1780s, stretching vaguely westward towards the Missis-
sippi River and jutting north into modern-day West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
and the Ohio River Valley.627 And within those borders, nearly everything
needed for self-sufficiency might be found. Indeed, a large section of the
work was given over to a discussion of the abundance of minerals, fauna,
and flora, that could be found within the state’s immense boundaries.628
622. Jefferson practiced law for a little more than seven years, from February 1767 to August
1774. FRANK DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON, LAWYER, at xi (3d. prtg. 1987).
623. LUIGI MARCO BASSANI, LIBERTY, STATE, & UNION: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 1 (2010) (“Thomas Jefferson is . . . one of those rare individuals who could . . . go
down in history as both a thinker and a politician.”).
624. Harlow Shapley, Notes on Thomas Jefferson as a Natural Philosopher, 87 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC’Y 234, 234–237 (1943).
625. The Notes took shape gradually over several years of composition and editing. Jeffer-
son’s own assigned date for the manuscript is 1782. Kevin J. Hayes, Notes on the State of Vir-
ginia, in A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA LITERATURE 124, 124–125 (Kevin J. Hayes ed., 2015).
626. Dustin A. Gish & Daniel P. Klinghard, Republican Constitutionalism in Thomas Jeffer-
son’s Notes on the State of Virginia, 74 J. POL. 35, 38 (2012) (“Read with attention to its coherent
governing structure, the Notes comes to light as a comprehensive statement on both natural and
political science.”).
627. These boundaries were temporary and were the result of British withdrawal from the
area. The territory would subsequently be ceded to the federal government and parceled out in
smaller units among the newly formed states. JEREMY BLACK, FIGHTING FOR AMERICA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN NORTH AMERICA, 1519–1871, at 120–123 (2011); Paul A. Demers,
The French Colonial Legacy of the Canada-United States Border in Eastern North America, 10
FRENCH COLONIAL HIST. 35, 46–49 (2009).
628. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 26–72 (William Peden ed.,
1982).
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But Jefferson’s study of Virginia embraced much more than an ac-
count of its natural wonders. He wished to propose as well a system of
government for his beloved home state. Thus Jefferson spoke much about
the type of constitution he wished Virginia to adopt in an appendix to his
Notes. He advocated for a form of legislative supremacy, arguing that the
chief executive of the state should possess only the powers to “administer
the government.”629 He recommended the creation of a “council of state” to
advise the executive on important questions that would from time to time
arise.630 He proposed that Virginia should henceforth “be governed as a
commonwealth,”631 that would protect and preserve the rights and liberties
of its citizens.632 The working assumption in all of this was that Virginia
would likely remain an autonomous state in association with the other for-
mer colonies, which, thanks to the successful Revolution, had become
“free, sovereign, and independent States.”633
In other sections of the Notes, Jefferson affirmed as well a vigorous
role for state and local government within his idealized vision of Virginia.
At the local level, he urged counties to create smaller subdivisions for the
purposes of establishing and funding schools open to the general public,634
a reform that was only fitfully implemented in Jefferson’s lifetime and only
truly came to fruition a half-century later in New England.635 He recom-
mended retaining a system of poor relief that depended on local churches
and poor houses.636 He also argued on behalf of a strong role for the state in
higher education. He called on the state to hire more professors for the
College of William and Mary637 and he sought the creation of a state-
funded library consisting of books as well as works of art.638 Finally, Jeffer-
son maintained that the State should not be indifferent on the promotion of
economic growth. Thus, he pushed the state legislature to be generous in
629. Id. at 214; see also R.R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITI-
CAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760–1800, at 208 (2014) (further developing Jefferson’s
ideas about executive power).
630. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 215–216.
631. Id. at 210.
632. WHITNEY RICHARD DAVID JONES, THE TREE OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1450–1793, at 20
(2000) (discussing conceptions of commonwealth current in eighteenth-century political thought);
see generally JONATHAN SCOTT, COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES: REPUBLICAN WRITING OF THE EN-
GLISH REVOLUTION (2004).
633. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 209; see also MARTIN BR ¨UCKNER, THE GEOGRAPHIC
REVOLUTION IN EARLY AMERICA: MAPS, LITERACY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 134 (2006) (“For
Jefferson [at the time of the Notes], the semantic application of ‘nation’ was as dynamic and
constitutive a concept as that of ‘state.’”).
634. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 146.
635. Samuel A. Pleasants, Thomas Jefferson-Educational Philosopher, 111 PROC. AM. PHIL.
SOC’Y 1, 1–2 (1967).
636. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 133.
637. Id. at 151.
638. Id. at 149.
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the granting of privileges and charters for the improvement of waterways,
“iron-works[,] and mills.”639
Still, while Jefferson saw the value of commercial development, the
heart of his message was agrarian. In an ironically entitled chapter on
“Manufactures,” Jefferson warmly endorsed an agricultural way of life:
“Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he has a
chosen people, whose breasts he had made his peculiar deposit for substan-
tial and genuine virtue.”640 The word virtue was important in Jefferson’s
hierarchy of values.641 It contained within itself ideals of stability,642 civic
commitment,643 and independence.644 And, most importantly, it was
through virtue that the real spirit of constitutional governance—self-re-
straint—was actualized.645 Commerce, on the other hand, at least of the size
and scale found in the great European cities, would subvert American inde-
pendence by creating a class of impoverished laborers dependent on others
for their daily bread.646
At an intellectual level, in his Notes at least, Jefferson appreciated that
slavery was inconsistent with the other ideals he had set out to promote. He
was no believer in racial equality. After all, he wrote as a “suspicion only”
that “the blacks . . . are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of
body and mind.”647 There is little doubt that by contemporary standards the
Jefferson of the Notes on the State of Virginia should properly be labeled a
racist.648 Still, he favored emancipation even as he suggested that the most
appropriate course of action was to send newly liberated African Americans
to colonize distant shores.649
639. Id. at 135.
640. Id. at 164–165.
641. DAVID E. SHI, THE SIMPLE LIFE: PLAIN LIVING AND HIGH THINKING IN AMERICAN CUL-
TURE 86 (1985) (“Agriculture, [Jefferson] stressed, was not primarily a way to wealth but a way to
goodness.”).
642. PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE AGRARIAN VISION: SUSTAINABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETH-
ICS 186–188 (2010).
643. Paul B. Thompson, Thomas Jefferson’s Land Ethics, in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND PHILOS-
OPHY: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL CAST OF JEFFERSON’S WRITINGS 61, 75 (M. Andrew
Holowchak ed., 2014).
644. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 165 (“Dependence begets subservience and venality, suf-
focates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”); see also Mark
Sturges, Enclosing the Commons: Thomas Jefferson, Agrarian Independence, and Early American
Land Policy, 1774–1789, 119 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 42, 45 (2011) (detailing Jefferson’s
support for various plans of universal white male land ownership).
645. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 43 (1986).
646. Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 288–289 (1991).
647. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 143.
648. PETER ONUF, THE MIND OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 205–212 (2007); Paul Finkelman, “Let
Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens May Fall”: The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
325, 349 (1994).
649. JEFFERSON, supra note 628, at 137–138.
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How, then, should one characterize the constitutional ideas of the
Notes on the State of Virginia? First, it was centered on the State, which, as
Jefferson conceived it, was not some minimalist, passive, night-watchman-
like structure. He saw the State as having real responsibilities—for the edu-
cation of the broad mass of citizens and for the development of commercial
opportunity. The State was also conceived of as an autonomous, self-con-
tained unit. Jefferson thus says little in the Notes on Virginia’s intricate
relationships with its neighboring states. Most importantly, at its heart, Jef-
ferson’s constitutional ideal depended upon agrarian principles.650 Only
agrarianism could assure the virtues, self-discipline, and personal indepen-
dence necessary for the well-ordered state.651
2. Jefferson on the Bank of the United States
The principles and policies that animated Jefferson’s Notes on the
State of Virginia give life and sustenance as well to his analysis of the Bank
bill. It was, Jefferson firmly believed, an unconstitutional exercise of Con-
gressional power. Jefferson commenced his analysis with a careful review
of what it was the Bank bill authorized.652 By its terms, Jefferson noted, it
permitted the creation of a corporation;653 it allowed that corporation to
own both real and personal property, thus removing goods and lands from
state laws of inheritance, “forfeiture, and escheat;”654 it concentrated power
to create a bank under federal authority to the detriment of state banks;655
and in these authorizations, the bill disregarded the role and responsibility
of “State Legislatures” to manage these areas of the law.656
Thus commenced Jefferson’s first argument against the Bank, which
might be described as a strong defense of the primacy of the states vis-a-vis
the federal government on the matter of what to Jefferson were strictly
questions of private law. He followed this litany of perceived constitutional
transgressions with a close paraphrase of the proposed Tenth Amendment,
pointing out that “all powers not delegated to the United States by the con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to
the people.”657 The conclusion for Jefferson was obvious and very omi-
650. Stephen M. Feldman, Is the Constitution Laissez-Faire? The Framers, Original Meaning,
and the Market, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2015); Izqueirdo, supra note 177, at 1131–1133.
651. MICHAEL LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE MAK-
ING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 88–89 (1988); James Phillips, American Agrari-
anism’s Answers to the Nation’s (In)Securities, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 343, 345–346 (2010).
652. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, on the Same Subject,
in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
588, at 91, 91–94 [hereinafter Jefferson Opinion].




657. Id. (paraphrasing Tenth Amendment—Jefferson, here, termed this provision the Twelfth
Amendment, but the text he was referring to, as ratified, became the Tenth Amendment).
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nous: “To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn
around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of
power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”658
Jefferson next examined the claims of implied powers made by the
Bill’s proponents. This was not a bill to raise taxes or to borrow money.
The government was being asked, in the first instance, to finance the Bank,
and Jefferson was perplexed as to how such an act could possibly constitute
a loan.659 Nor could the Bank Bill be justified as implied under the com-
merce clause. “To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very differ-
ent acts.”660 A bank produces items of value—bank notes—which are
freely negotiable. This, Jefferson observed, is akin to miners who extract
wealth from the earth.661 In each case, a valuable object is made “which
may be bought and sold.”662 The creation of value, Jefferson argued, was
fundamentally different from its regulation.663
Jefferson also related the commerce clause to the question of states’
rights. The commerce clause was intended to regulate commerce among the
several states. Yet, banks are fundamentally concerned with “the internal
commerce of every State.”664 “[C]ommerce between citizen and citizen”—
by which Jefferson must have meant the citizens of the affected states—
“remains exclusively with its own legislature.”665
Banking, in other words, was a matter of state law, and, for Jefferson,
keeping it that way was not only constitutionally sound, but served utilita-
rian ends.666 Banks in different states will compete or cooperate with one
another, as their business needs and local conditions required.667 And such
competition, and the flexibility it promoted, proved that the preservation of
local banking was not only an “expedient” but a “necessity.”668
Jefferson proceeded next to the “general welfare” and “necessary and
proper” clauses.669 The language about “general welfare,” Jefferson noted,
was part of a larger clause authorizing Congress to raise taxes. Jefferson
looked to “an established rule of construction, where a phrase will bear
either of two meanings, to give it that which will allow some meaning to the
other parts of the instrument.”670 If one applied this rule, he asserted, it was
clear that the “general welfare” language must be limited, since to read it
658. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 652, at 91.





664. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 652, at 92.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 93.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id. at 92–93.
670. Jefferson Opinion, supra note 652, at 92.
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independent of the power to tax “would reduce the whole instrument to a
single phrase, that of instituting a Congress to do whatever would be for the
good of the United States, and as they would be the sole judges of the good
or evil, it would also be a power to do whatever evil they pleased.”671
Jefferson similarly condemned the proponents’ interpretations of the
necessary and proper clause. The key to understanding this clause, Jefferson
argued, was the word “necessary.”672 It must be strictly construed. Bank
supporters have attempted to equate necessary with “convenient,” but for
Jefferson such an equation would open the flood gates.
If such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase, as to
give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one; for there
is no one, which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in
some way or other, to some one . . .; it would swallow up all the
delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase, as before
observed.673
In his treatment of both the general welfare and necessary and proper
provisions, Jefferson engaged in a classic “parade of horribles” presenta-
tion. His opponents had not made the expansive claims Jefferson imputed to
them. For Jefferson, however, his world view and way of life seemed to be
threatened even by the prospect of a national bank. The states, and he must
have had Virginia foremost in mind, were the main repositories of power,
and for Jefferson, the Constitution was meant to enshrine that understanding
in fundamental law. And this meant also that states were free to maintain
their own economic systems. Jefferson’s agrarian vision depended on that.
State banks, answerable to local legislatures and political pressures, did not
threaten Jefferson’s agrarian Arcadia. But a national bank, whose purpose
was to stimulate commercial development on a national scale, was little
more than a dagger drawn and had to be resisted at any price.
Jefferson’s arguments, some have suggested, might owe a debt to the
anti-federalists,674 although the boundary lines between federalists and anti-
federalists had become blurred in the constitutional controversies of the
early 1790s.675 Of greater significance, probably, for Jefferson’s constitu-
tional theorizing, was his underlying commitment to agrarianism. “Jeffer-
son’s utopia was a farmer’s paradise where all farmers owned land and
shared comparable shares of wealth, political power, and stewardship over
thriving natural wonders.”676
671. Id.
672. Id. at 92–93.
673. Id. at 93.
674. RICHARD S. GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE IN-
DUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800, at 223 (2010).
675. SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADI-
TION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 221–222 (1999).
676. CARL A. ZIMRING, CLEAN AND WHITE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (2015).
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In the Bank, Jefferson contended with what he almost surely perceived
to be a mortal enemy. If the Constitution was not meant to actively promote
an agrarian way of life, at least it was supposed to ensure its survival.
Boudinot’s argument that commerce and agriculture augmented one another
could not have persuaded Jefferson, given his belief that large-scale com-
merce sowed the seeds of the political order’s destruction. Jefferson well
appreciated how deeply at odds Hamilton’s vision of a commercial republic
was with his own deep commitment to agrarianism. Jefferson’s cause was
about more than the Constitution. It was about the survival of a particular
way of structuring the nation.
C. Alexander Hamilton
After receiving Randolph’s and Jefferson’s analyses, President Wash-
ington forwarded them to Hamilton for his review. He wished to give Ham-
ilton the last word on the Bank’s constitutionality.677 Washington now
expected a prompt reply.678 Six days later, Hamilton wrote back, asking
Washington for his “indulgence” and assuring him that he “has ever since
been sedulously engaged in it.”679
A week after Washington made his request, on February 23, 1791,
Hamilton submitted his analysis for the President’s review.680 He began by
asserting the need for an “axiom,” and that axiom for Hamilton was the
concept of sovereignty.681 Hamilton granted that the United States repre-
sented a federation in which sovereignty was divided between the states and
a central government.682 But this recognition did not mean that in those
spheres of responsibility allocated to the federal government that its power
was incomplete.683 As proof of this proposition, Hamilton looked to the
supremacy clause. The supremacy clause embodied sovereignty, it exuded
sovereignty. “The power which can create the supreme law of the land, in
any case, is doubtless sovereign as to this case.”684
677. Letter of President George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Feb. 16, 1791), in LEGIS-
LATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 588, at 94,
94.
678. Id.
679. Letter of Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Feb. 22, 1791), in LEGISLATIVE
AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 588, at 113, 113.
680. Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in LEGISLA-
TIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 588, at 95,
95–113 [hereinafter Hamilton Opinion].
681. Id. at 95.
682. Id.
683. Id. (“To deny that the Government of the United States has sovereign power as to its
declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all laws, would be equally to
deny that the State Governments have sovereign power in any case, because their power does not
extend to every case.”) (emphasis in original).
684. Id. at 96.
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One might compare Hamilton’s analysis with Fisher Ames. Ames
sought an expansive reading of the federal power to act in abstract philo-
sophical speculation about “happiness” and “government.” Ames’ use of
these terms, however, was hopelessly ambiguous. Hamilton was now ad-
ding precision and rigor to Ames’ analysis. He did so by drawing on a
vocabulary of sovereignty with deep roots in the law of nations. For some-
one of Hamilton’s time and place, the law of nations consisted of timeless
principles, provable by reason, that defined the quality and character of
states in a world of many and competing sovereign powers.685 It was a body
of law Hamilton was fluent in and had recourse to often.686
At the time of the Founding, among the most influential treatises on
the law of nations in general circulation in the new United States was Em-
merich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations.687 It is known that Vattel’s work
exercised strong sway over Hamilton’s thinking.688
Vattel opened his treatise with an analysis of the concept of sover-
eignty. There were, for Vattel, three essential characteristics to sovereign
power. It had to aim for “[t]he preservation of [the] nation”;689 it embodied
“perfection”;690 and it sought the “procure[ment] for the citizens whatever
they stand in need of for the necessities, the conveniences, the accommoda-
tions of life.”691 Perfection, it must be understood, did not mean “flawless,”
or “superb,” or “something beyond compare.” As Vattel used the term it
meant unity, or integrity, or completeness. “We know that the perfection of
the thing consists, generally, in the perfect agreement of all its constituent
parts to the same end.”692
685. William J. Moon, The Original Meaning of the Law of Nations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 70
(2016); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 822–823 (1989).
686. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1136–1138 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of
Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (2007).
687. CARL OSTROWSKI, BOOKS, MAPS, AND POLITICS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, 1783–1861, at 16–18 (2004) (discussing the use of Vattel by Hamilton, Madison,
and Benjamin Franklin); Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22
EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 627, 633–634 (2011); Richard H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the
Early History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 407
(2007).
688. GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
134 (1970); LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AMBIVALENT ANGLOPHILE 128
(2002); Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 296 (2014) (“Esteem for Vattel
was even a rare point of common ground for Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.”); see
also Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law of Nations, 106 AM. J. INT’L L.
547, 549 (2012) (observing that Hamilton drew from a broad range of thinkers in addition to
Vattel when he wrote on the law of nations).
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These three elements of sovereign power are apparent in Hamilton’s
discussion of the Bank Bill. Hamilton illustrated the full range of power the
federal government enjoyed by proposing a hypothetical scenario: suppose
the United States conquered one of its neighbors.693 Its governance of the
conquered territory would not be limited by the enumerated powers con-
ferred on the federal government in its relations with the states, but would
be limited only by the law of nations and prevailing definitions of
sovereignty.694
The federal government was thus a sovereign power. Over conquered
territory, that sovereignty was full and complete. Regarding its relations to
the states, however, the federal government’s powers were determined by
the Constitution. Its sovereignty was complete, but only with respect to the
powers that were delegated to it.695
With this strong conception of sovereignty as his foundation, Hamilton
moved to consider the nature of the enumerated powers conferred by the
Constitution on the federal government. The enumerated powers might be
express or implied, but the status of an implied power was not diminished
simply because they were not directly articulated in the Constitution.696
Hamilton realized, of course, that the power to charter the Bank was
not expressly granted by the Constitution. Still, he thought it was easy to
prove that the federal government might grant charters through the exercise
of its implied powers.697 But before embarking on this proof, Hamilton, like
Boudinot before him, wished to demystify the idea of the corporation: “Im-
agination appears to have been unusually busy concerning it. An incorpora-
tion seems to have been regarded as some great independent substantive
thing; as a political engine, and of a peculiar magnitude and moment.”698 In
fact, corporations were merely a convenience to the proper conduct of busi-
ness. And corporate charters were not licenses to plunder or pillage but
legal documents that restricted corporations in the types of activities they
might engage in and the kind and amount of assets they might hold.699
If corporations were not a threat to the established political order but
merely a means of doing business, Hamilton reasoned, then also the grant-
ing of a corporate charter was not really a momentous event. Hamilton il-
lustrated this point with a comparison to Roman law. At Roman law, a
corporation was nothing more than “a voluntary association of individuals,
at any time, or for any purpose.”700 People organizing freely for the pur-
693. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 96.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Id. (“[I]mplied powers are to be considered as delegated equally with express ones.”).
697. Id. at 97.
698. Id.
699. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 97.
700. Id.
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poses of business, Hamilton seemed to imply, what could be more natural
and less threatening than that?
Hamilton’s emphasis on the word “voluntary” stressed that he also
wished to draw out a lesson by comparing the Roman and common law
systems.701 “In England,” Hamilton continued, “whence our notions of [the
corporation] are immediately borrowed, [the granting of charters] seems
part of the executive authority.”702 And it is this peculiarity, the omission
from the Constitution of a particular British practice—Hamilton drove the
point home—that was the source of the mistaken belief that the federal
government was divested of all powers to grant corporate charters.703
For Hamilton, however, it was obvious that the federal government
possessed the power to grant corporate charters as an attribute of its status
as a sovereign power. Hamilton’s logic ran as follows: sovereign power
might be delegated, but it was nevertheless “perfect,” that is, complete or
comprehensive over the subjects that fell within the scope of the delegation.
Corporations, furthermore, were not in their origin creatures of the law, but
the product of the human impulse to associate for shared purposes. Differ-
ent legal regimes accommodated this inherent human desire in different
ways. Roman law gave great latitude to individual initiative while the En-
glish common law tightly controlled the recognition of corporations by its
system of charters. But even though the recognition and accommodation of
corporate life might differ from one legal system to another, every legal
system had to make an allowance for corporations, which was accom-
plished through an exercise of sovereign authority.704 Sovereignty thus in-
cluded as one of its attributes the power to give formal legal status to
corporate bodies.
On this analysis, the power to grant corporate charters was inherent in
the federal government by reason of its sovereign capacity. Hamilton never-
theless felt the need to reconcile this lofty view of sovereignty with the
Constitution. Hamilton turned first to the Tenth Amendment.705 It was, he
said, little more than a restatement of the “republican maxim that all gov-
ernment is a delegation of power.”706 Still, it acknowledged that certain
powers belonged uniquely to the states and certain powers to the federal
government. Hamilton illustrated what that meant in the case of granting
corporate charters. “Thus, a corporation may not be erected by Congress for
701. Hamilton elided over much history in this deft comparison. In fact, it was medieval canon
lawyers who framed and defended the proposition that “the corporation [was] a voluntary associa-
tion of individuals who remain the source of its authority.” LARRY SEIDENTOP, INVENTING THE
INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN LIBERALISM 235 (2014).
702. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 97.
703. Id.
704. Id. (The federal government, Hamilton maintained, possessed “the right of employing all
the means requisite to the execution of the specified powers of the Government.”).
705. Id. at 96.
706. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST104.txt unknown Seq: 84 10-APR-18 14:36
188 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
superintending the police of the city of Philadelphia, because they are not
authorized to regulate the police of that city.”707 On the other hand, Con-
gress might charter a corporation to facilitate the collection of taxes, or
regulate trade.708 Why? “[B]ecause it is incident to a general sovereign or
legislative power to regulate a thing, to employ all the means which relate
to its regulation, to the best and greatest advantage.”709 The collection of
taxes and the regulation of trade were expressly delegated to the federal
government, and so Congress enjoyed complete power to determine the
means and methods of performing these functions.
On this theory, it mattered not at all that states chartered their own
banks. Indeed, where Hamilton was concerned, to think otherwise was to
demonstrate “a radical source of error.”710 States might take whatever steps
they deemed most advantageous in deciding whether or not to charter a
bank; in doing so, the states were doing nothing more than addressing local
concerns. The federal government, however, was charged with the responsi-
bility to achieve certain national ends, and its actions were rooted in its
sovereign authority as confirmed ultimately by the supremacy clause.711
Having built a constitutional case for the Bank, Hamilton next turned
to a different set of objections voiced particularly by James Madison. It has
been contended, Hamilton suggested, that the word “necessary” meant in-
dispensable. “It was essential to the being of the National Government,”
Hamilton urged, “that so erroneous a conception of the meaning of the word
necessary should be exploded.”712 Indeed, it is often the case that the word
“means no more than needful, requisite, incidential, useful or conducive
to.”713 “It is a common mode of expression,” Hamilton wrote, to say that
some course of action is necessary “when nothing more is intended or un-
derstood than that the interest of the Government or the person require, or
will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing.”714
And so Hamilton turned patterns of everyday discourse against
Madison. He pressed the point home. Suppose the word necessary was con-
strued to mean indispensable; or some such modifying adverb—”absolutely
or indispensably”—had been used to qualify the necessary and proper
clause.715 “Such a construction would beget endless uncertainty and embar-
rassment.”716 Every act of legislation would require proof of incontestable
707. Id. at 97.






714. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 97–98.
715. Id.
716. Id.
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necessity. “There are few measures of any government which would stand
so severe a test.”717
Logically, linguistically, Hamilton argued, the word necessary must
not be converted into “extreme necessity.”718 Such an interpretation was
also consistent with the way Hamilton understood sovereignty. Echoing—
though not citing—Vattel, Hamilton pointed out that governments existed
to procure certain goods and advantages for their citizens, and the word
“necessary” should not therefore be given too restrictive an application. In
support of this contention, Hamilton drew upon a “maxim” that held “that
the powers contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be con-
strued liberally in advancement of the public good.”719 A pair of modern
writers have emphasized that for Hamilton the flexibility contained in this
maxim was a “universal rule” that aimed to address the “variable and un-
predictable” problems that arise in the course of governance.720 Hamilton
surely would have agreed.721
Consider, Hamilton went on, the way governments actually function.
“The means by which national exigencies are to be provided for; national
inconveniences obviated; national prosperity promoted; are of such infinite
variety, extent, and complexity, that there must, of necessity, be great lati-
tude of discretion in the selection and application of . . . means.”722 A na-
tion forced to follow the course recommended by Madison and his two
Virginia allies, Randolph and Jefferson, Hamilton implied, would be para-
lyzed in the face of each new contingency, should the word “necessary” be
construed as they desired.723 Thus, Hamilton argued that Randolph was
wrong to suggest that the federal constitution had to be construed with a
special strictness. The federal government was far more likely than state
governments to face “public exigencies . . . of a far more critical kind,” and
717. Id.
718. Id.
719. Id. The language and idea of liberal construction was current in Hamilton’s day, but one
is hard pressed to find an example of this language being applied to constitutions. For other
usages, see, for example, JOHN IRVING MAXWELL, A POCKET DICTIONARY OF THE LAW OF BILLS
OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK NOTES [AND] CHECKS 70–71 (London, Longman et al.,
2d. ed. 1804) (liberal construction of bills of exchange); 2 GILBERT HUTCHESON, TREATISE ON THE
OFFICES OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, CONSTABLE, [AND] COMMISSIONER OF SUPPLY 9 (Edinburgh,
W. Creech, 2d ed. 1809) (liberal construction of provisions for the poor); HUGH HENRY BRACKEN-
RIDGE, LAW’S MISCELLANIES 226 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1814) (liberal construction of remedial
statutes). It seems probable that Hamilton was responsible for extending well-established private-
law maxims of liberal construction into constitutional interpretation. 2 FRANCIS HARGRAVE, JURIS-
CONSULT EXERCITATIONS 125, 158–159 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1811) (liberal construction of
the words of a will to effectuate its purpose); 1 WILLIAM CUSACK SMITH, TRACTS ON LEGAL AND
OTHER SUBJECTS 100–101 (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies 1811) (liberal construction of the
principle against self-incrimination).
720. Michael Zuckert & Felix Valenzuela, Constitutionalism in an Age of Terror, in WHAT
SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS DO? 72, 87–88 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2011).
721. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 98.
722. Id. at 98–99.
723. Id. at 99.
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had to have the legal resources at hand to resolve those crises.724 Sover-
eignty seeks the preservation of the state. Hamilton had no need to quote
Vattel. Again, the influence is palpable.
This form of reasoning about the Constitution, drawn not from the text
or language or history of the document but from first principles of sover-
eignty, has factored in at least one major Supreme Court decision—the Se-
lective Service Cases of 1918, which upheld the constitutionality of the
draft in World War I. Lacking express foundation in the constitutional text,
Chief Justice Edward Douglass White cited Vattel’s Law of Nations as au-
thority to conclude that “the very conception of a just government . . . in-
cludes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in
case of need and the right to compel it.”725
Hamilton subsequently engaged in a detailed analysis of particular
clauses of the Constitution to reinforce his major points.726 He then summa-
rized his conclusions: “The powers of the Government, as to the objects
intrusted to its management is, in its nature, sovereign.”727 “[T]he right of
erecting corporations is one inherent in, and inseparable, from the idea of
sovereign power.”728 “[T]he word necessary, in the general clause, can
have no restrictive operation. . . . [I]ndeed, . . . the degree in which a mea-
sure is, or is not necessary, cannot be a test of constitutional right, but of
expediency only.”729
Hamilton concluded by bringing his argument back to the enumerated
powers of Congress. To be sure, Congress had the power to charter a corpo-
ration, but did it have the power to charter a corporation for the purposes
which the Bank was intended to serve?730 Hamilton answered in the affirm-
ative. Hamilton pointed to a series of enumerated powers—the power to
tax, to borrow, to spend, to regulate trade, and to ensure the national de-
fense.731 As further support, Hamilton looked to European experience:
“[B]anks are an usual engine in the administration of national finances, and
an ordinary, and the most effectual, instrument of loans.”732 Early Ameri-
can experience with banks concurred with European practice.733 And so
Hamilton concluded, all of the foregoing “pleads strongly against the sup-
724. Id.
725. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918); see also Charles J. Reid, Jr., A Louisi-
ana Civilian in the Supreme Court: The Selective Service Cases Reconsidered, in 4 HONOS ALIT
ARTES: STUDI PER SETTANTESIMO COMPLEANNO DI MARIO ASCHERI 421, 421–427 (Paola Maffei
& Gian Maria Varanini eds., 2014) (reviewing White’s use of Vattel and strong conceptions of
sovereignty to uphold the military draft).
726. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 99–105.




731. Id. at 105–106.
732. Hamilton Opinion, supra note 680, at 111.
733. Id.
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position that a government clothed with most of the important prerogatives
of sovereignty, in relation to its revenues, its debt, its credit, its defence, its
trade, its intercourse with foreign nations, is forbidden to make use of that
instrument as an appendage of its own authority.”734
CONCLUSION
William Crosskey has written that the proximate cause for the debate
over the Bank Bill had little to do with really momentous issues, but was
rather a fear on the part of Southern members of Congress that Northerners
might renege on a deal that had been struck the previous summer to situate
the new nation’s capital on the banks of the Potomac River, between Mary-
land and Virginia.735 Kenneth Bowling, in his investigation of the subject,
has shown that Southerners believed that if the Bank were once located in
Philadelphia, it would become impossible practically and politically to
move the capitol away from that city for a rough and undeveloped patch of
land like the future Washington, DC.736
What matters for our purposes, however, are not the motives of the
participants but the chain of events and ideas that the controversy over the
Bank launched. James Madison grew estranged from Hamilton as a result
of the Bank conflict and began to draw closer to “an Anti-Federalist ap-
proach to strict construction.”737 “In effect,” one historian of the period has
written, “Hamilton undermined the assumption upon which Madison’s ear-
lier constitutional theory had rested,”738 and he responded with a height-
ened level of political activism.739 If Madison could not prevail on the floor
of the Congress, he would take his constitutional case to the public.740 The
division between Federalists and Republicans that would characterize
America’s first party system was now being born.
The Bank controversy also contributed to shaping the course of Ameri-
can nationhood.741 It did so in at least two ways. First, Jefferson’s dream of
an agrarian republic, always at least faintly unrealistic, now appeared unat-
734. Id. at 111–112.
735. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 194 (1953).
736. Kenneth R. Bowling, The Bank Bill, the Capital City, and President Washington, 1 CAP.
STUD. 59, 60 (1972).
737. CORNELL, supra note 675, at 190.
738. Id. at 191.
739. Thus, Madison participated in establishing Philip Freneau’s National Gazette and used
that newspaper to publish a series of essays in early 1792 that put in motion the nation’s first party
system. Jeffrey L. Pasley, The Two National “Gazettes”: Newspapers and the Embodiment of
American Political Parties, 35 EARLY AM. LITERATURE 51, 69–70 (2000).
740. Alan Gibson, Veneration and Vigilance: James Madison and Public Opinion,
1785–1800, 67 REV. POL. 5, 16–23 (2005).
741. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, if Anything, from the
Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 886 (2001).
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tainable.742 Hamilton, through the Bank legislation and his other financial
measures, had put the United States on the path towards becoming the com-
mercial republic he had long wished for.743 Secondly, sectional differences
between North and South had begun to appear. Representatives from these
two regions now appreciated that their interests did not converge, and in
fact might not even brook compromise in some important respects.744
Most significantly, of course, from our perspective, is the emergence
of alternative theories of constitutional interpretation. Was the Constitution
a restraining text? An empowering text? How should enumerated powers be
interpreted? What of implied or constructive powers? How faithful must
one be to the text? How literally should the text be read? What was the
appropriate role for sources external to the Constitution? What of philoso-
phy? What of the writings of jurists such as Vattel? What was the relation-
ship of the states in contrast to the federal government? None of these
questions were definitely answered in 1791. None of them have been defin-
itively answered today. What began in 1791 was a conversation centered on
these questions that endures to our own day. What is the Constitution? Is it
simply reasoned argument over these essential questions of constitutional
interpretation? I raise the question without hope of answering it.
742. GEORGE MACESICH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY: POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES 16 (1997).
743. Richard Sylla, Financial Systems and Economic Modernization, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 277,
284 (2002); Shankman, supra note 139, at 331–334.
744. LISLE ROSE, PROLOGUE TO DEMOCRACY: THE FEDERALISTS IN THE SOUTH, 1789–1800, at
8–18 (1968).
